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ABSTRACT 
 From the time of American independence to the antebellum period, Americans 
labored to distinguish their collective identity from that of their colonial forebears in a 
world increasingly shaped by technological advances, industrial transformations, and 
scientific developments.  Discoveries regarding electricity and electromagnetism 
resulted in inventions that would especially revolutionize human life.  The advent of 
the lightning-rod in the mid-eighteenth century challenged prior notions that a 
destructive lightning bolt was an inevitable consequence of divine will, with any 
interference with that power understood as sacrilege.  The rod symbolized a new, 
Franklinian American, who, steeped in Enlightenment science and philosophy, could 
stand up against religious and cultural dogma.  In a post-Franklin America, one could 
re-invent oneself—and embody divine power—by harnessing and mastering nature, 
replacing old gods with new “gods” of technology and reason.  Lightning-Rod Men, 
Magnetic Lives, Bodies Electric examines a strange and powerful epistemological and 
representational turn inside this discourse: those moments in which antebellum 
American writers imagined the human body itself as a lightning rod, as a centralized 
conductor that could use, transform, or synthesize this newly understood power 
beneficially.  Images of the body as a lightning-rod came to signify a new American 
corporeal identity, one that allied the spirit of Franklinian independence and self-
reliance with a materially manifest, independent and self-reliant body.  Could a body’s 
ability to channel, control, and convey electrical current, all the while remaining 
insulated from its harm, indicate some exceptional, supernatural power, or a form of 
artistic genius?  This is the question that came to pre-occupy the writers whom I treat.   
  
Ralph Waldo Emerson, Herman Melville, and Walt Whitman exemplify the 
antebellum American struggle to grasp the significance of emerging electromagnetic 
technologies and determine how this new knowledge could illuminate our 
understandings of the human body.  Investigating the prominence of electromagnetic 
metaphors and representations of corporeality in Emerson’s essays, Melville’s Moby-
Dick and “The Lightning Rod Man,” and Whitman’s 1855 edition of Leaves of Grass, 
I find ambivalent readings of electromagnetism’s significance for constructions and 
conceptualizations of the human body vying with a theme of electromagnetic 
conductivity as a trope for genius: the image of an integrated body, mind, and soul that 
could directly translate the influence of nature into words and actions.  Although all 
three writers espouse self-reliance and liberation from external influences, they share 
an impulse to create imagery that would pose the body of the attractive or enlightened 
poet, artist, performer, or orator as an electrified automaton, influenced and guided by 
the forces of nature.  In their formulations, the attractive poet or performer seems 
marked for success by remaining impervious to the danger of conducting electrical 
currents, while synthesizing these currents and conveying them to audiences through 
“electrified” or “electrifying” performances.  Through such imagery, these writers not 
only anticipated later constructions of corporeality, but also invented them through 
language.  Such imagery continues to inform metaphors of corporeality today, as 
exemplified by clichéd language used to characterize celebrities.  These “dead 
metaphors” reveal larger frameworks of cultural metanarratives that inform our 
understanding of a range of affective traits or personal characteristics, from spirituality 
to enthusiasm, from attractiveness to enlightenment, from animation to genius.
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INTRODUCTION 
 
“CRUDE AND HASTY THOUGHTS”: ELECTRICITY’S BEGUILING 
INDETERMINACY FROM FRANKLIN TO EMERSON 
 
These thoughts […] are crude and hasty; and if I were merely ambitious of acquiring 
some reputation in philosophy, I ought to keep them by me, till corrected and 
improved by time and farther experience.  But since even short hints, and imperfect 
experiments in any new branch of science, being communicated, have oftentimes a 
good effect, in exciting the ingenious to the subject, and so become the occasion of 
more exact disquisitions, and more compleat discoveries, you are at liberty to 
communicate this paper to whom you please […]” 
    —Benjamin Franklin, from his letter on electricity,  
       written to Peter Collinson, September 1753 
 
Electricity…is ill understood, employed with risk, subject to unexplained vagaries and 
accidents; it is notoriously an imperfect science. 
    —Boston Medical and Surgical Journal (1898) 
  
Whether/whether even counts as an option/in genuine truth-telling—shouldn’t that be/ 
a thunderbolt?  Minus the should.  For that matter, minus/thunder too.  It’s/ the bolt: 
to be beside/ oneself.  To know what happened,/what has to. 
    —Marianne Boruch, from her poem “Mind and Body” 
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 Looking at the depiction of Benjamin Franklin in Benjamin West’s 1805 
painting Franklin Drawing Electricity from the Sky (see fig. 1), one may find it easy to 
get swept up in the majesty and romance of the scene of Franklin’s famous kite 
experiment of 1752.  It may also be easy to forget how West both falsifies the 
particulars of the experiment and its lauded hero as he mythologizes Franklin as a kind 
of superhuman Prometheus figure.  As Walter Isaacson writes in his biography of 
Franklin, the painting “mistakenly shows him as a wrinkled sage rather than a lively 
46-year old,” as he became “celebrated…in popular lore” (140).   By 1805, in the 
wake of Franklin’s death just fifteen years earlier, the engraved images of Franklin’s 
much older bespectacled face had already become iconic, emblazoned on the 
collective American memory.  To attach the face of the much younger man to the kite 
experiment would likely render him unrecognizable.  And in the wake of the 
successful American Revolution, Franklin’s kite experiment was not only 
representative of scientific achievement, but also symbolic of the triumph of reason 
over nature, democracy over inherited dogma and aristocratic hierarchy.   
West drapes his hero in what appears to be a sort of flowing red cape, befitting 
of a superhero, long before depictions of superheroes ever became popularized in 
comic books.  Franklin is also shown accompanied by what appear to be near-naked 
putti, who, as if borrowed from Michelangelo’s frescoes, assist Franklin in holding the 
kite string and operating his scientific instruments.  Ironically, it is as if in conquering 
and harnessing electricity, he has been ordained by heavenly angels to complete his 
task, even if such a task might infer that he would supplant a vengeful God who might 
3 
 
 
Fig. 1.  Benjamin West, Franklin Drawing Electricity from the Sky, 
 Philadelphia Museum of Art.  
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strike down sinners by lightning bolts as punishments for their transgressions. Even 
more tellingly, the kite itself is not depicted in West’s work and exists somewhere 
beyond our frame of vision; the painting envelops Franklin’s body in darkness and 
would have us focus our attention squarely on not only Franklin’s iconic white face, 
but also on his extended and raised arm and hand, and the white spark that he receives 
from the electrified key to his upward-pointed knuckle.  Long before images of 
lightbulbs appeared in thought balloons over depictions of the human body in order to 
represent epiphany or enlightenment, West’s characterization of the scene makes it 
seem as if the electricity that travels to Franklin’s body is itself a kind of 
enlightenment.  In this way, Franklin would embody the Age of Enlightenment. 
  What is forgotten or elided by West, however, is that in taking the risk of 
extending his uninsulated knuckle to test whether or not sparks would be present, 
Franklin would risk his life.  Two years before, Franklin had made the mistake of 
conducting electricity to his person when he nearly killed himself accidentally as he 
attempted to cook a turkey by means of a Leyden jar.  As Isaacson reminds us, it was 
thus “notabl[e]” for Franklin “to survive” his failure to insulate his hand in the kite 
experiment (140).  Others who made similar attempts were not so lucky.  The death of 
German scientist Georg Wilhelm Richmann, who succumbed to electrocution in 1753 
while attempting a similar type of lightning-rod experiment to the one performed by 
Franklin, serves as a grim reminder that experiments with electricity could sometimes 
prove lethal.  Far from being a superhuman hero impervious to electrical influence or 
conduction, Franklin should have known that touching his uninsulated knuckle to the 
key was foolhardy and irresponsible, and that his survival of that action was the 
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product of sheer luck.  In fact, it is altogether possible that this detail was part of 
Franklin’s own mythologizing of himself in his own narratives, a feat that he certainly 
did not shy away from in the Autobiography and elsewhere.  It is as if the myth of 
Franklin’s victory, the majestic legend of his “drawing of electricity from the sky,” 
becomes more important for its symbolic potential than the actual particulars of the 
scene of the experiment itself.  As Tom Tucker writes in his book on the mythology 
and symbolism surrounding Franklin’s kite experiment, “after Franklin’s death and 
throughout the nineteenth century, the image of the Founding Father who conquered 
electricity would be used in assimilating a broad American cultural identity” (212).  
As images of Franklin came to embody and symbolize the American Enlightenment, 
his subject matter, electricity, consequently became increasingly conflated with lower 
case “e” enlightenment, despite any imprudence that may have accompanied the risky 
actions that Franklin undertook.  For his part, Benjamin West disregards the 
recklessness of Franklin’s actions, as he gets carried away by his own majestic 
imagery that would laud and deify Franklin as an American brand of hero.  It seems he 
would carry us along with him.   
As easy as it is to forget how images of the mythologized body of Franklin 
became superimposed over the details of the man himself, it is perhaps even easier to 
forget how Franklin’s observations on electricity, along with the vocabulary he used to 
describe it, were, in his own words, “crude and hasty” thoughts.  Using the imperfect 
medium of language, Franklin coined much of the vocabulary by which we describe 
electricity today, and, as such, he is sometimes lauded as the great “inventor” of 
electricity.  But, in using language to “invent” new ways of thinking about electricity, 
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Franklin introduced indeterminacy to his subject.  Such indeterminacy would open the 
door to pseudoscience that he would not agree with, or metaphor that he did not 
necessarily intend.    
With such indeterminacy in mind, we might then ask ourselves: what is 
electricity, exactly?  Although electrical energy is omnipresent and commonplace, 
surging, coursing, and flowing within and without us, it may be difficult for many of 
us—especially those of us who lack formal education in electrical and electromagnetic 
science—to say definitively what it is.  Moreover, given its power to animate what 
would otherwise appear to be inanimate objects, we might ask ourselves (as did early 
nineteenth century poets such as Samuel Taylor Coleridge1): what is electricity’s 
relationship to life itself, or the so-called meaning of life?  Are the two analogous, or 
synonymous?  Despite advances in electrical and electromagnetic theory since the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, we face today a dilemma similar to that of early 
“electricians” when attempting to describe electricity adequately.  Presented with the 
problem of defining electricity, electrical engineer William J. Beaty writes that the 
“question is impossible to answer because the word ‘Electricity’ has several 
contradictory meanings...[which] are incompatible, and the contradictions confuse 
                                                 
1
 In his 1825 work Aids to Reflection, for example, Coleridge attempts to show that the combination of 
magnetism, galvanism, and electricity is analogous and essential to the animating power of life.  
Responding to a claim made by Vide Lawrence that would argue that “…there is no resemblance, no 
analogy, between Electricity and Life; the two orders are completely distinct; they are 
incommensurable” (60), Coleridge concedes that while electricity and life are not one and the same 
thing, “as no man in his senses, philosopher or not, is capable of imagining that the lightning which 
destroys a sheep, was a means to the same end with the principle of its organization” (65), he later 
argues that that the animating power of life can be expressed in terms of magnetism (understood as the 
“power of length”), electricity (understood as the “power of length and breadth”), and chemical affinity 
(understood as the “power of depth”), which correspond to three “constituent forces of life,” which he 
accordingly associates with  “reproduction,” “irritability,” and “sensibility”:  “the consitituent forces of 
life in the human living body are—first, the power of length, or REPRODUCTION; second, the power 
of surface (that is, length and breadth), or IRRITABILITY; third, the power of depth, or 
SENSIBILITY” (94).  
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everyone.”  So how are we to manage and make sense of such incompatibilities and 
contradictions?  Even as we become more and more reliant on harnessed electricity for 
our daily activities, and even as scientists become more adept in measuring and 
calculating electricity’s effects, we might yet ask: is it an energy?  A process?  A 
force?   None of the above, or some combination? 
Part of the problem with defining electricity is due to the slipperiness of the 
language first coined to describe it, language that in many ways confused rather than 
clarified its characteristics.  Franklin, along with other early practitioners of electrical 
theory from the period of the Enlightenment, wrote for example of electricity’s 
fluidity, currents, and bipolarity, its charge and its conduction.  Yet Franklin and 
others operated under significant misapprehension as they struggled to find language 
to describe with accuracy their observations of phenomena that they investigated in 
this new and emerging field of science.  By the early 1830s, Michael Faraday would 
challenge the century-old assumption that electricity was composed of two fluids 
(“vitreous” and “resinous”) by showing that electricity was not in fact a fluid at all.  
Alan Hirshfield describes Faraday’s discovery in this way:  
 
 Through experiment, Faraday identified an assortment of solid-liquid 
  duos that behave like water—insulating when solid, conducting when 
  liquid.  He found that all such substances share a common property: 
  When conducting electricity, (while liquid) they simultaneously  
  decompose—split apart—and their component elements or compounds 
  appear at oppositely charged electrodes.  Faraday’s discovery  
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  challenged the still widely accepted fluid model of electricity: If  
  electricity is indeed an imponderable fluid, coexisting but not  
  interacting with matter, its ability to flow should not be influenced by 
  the state of the surrounding matter.  (133) 
 
Lacking Faraday’s later insights, Franklin, along with other eighteenth century 
scientists, paradigmatically associated electricity with water or other “fluids.”  Given 
the dearth of alternate vocabulary choices, calling electricity a “fluid” offered a 
convenient metaphor that would help scientists and laypersons alike begin to describe 
or understand electrical phenomena or the movement of electrical energies.  Since 
electricity was understood to behave in ways that resembled fluids, it was thus 
understood as “flowing” in “currents,” much like streams of water.  Franklin and 
others deployed such figurative language to capture a phenomenon for which there 
were not yet words readily available.  It was an attempt at truth-telling, yet did not 
necessarily convey the literal truth at that point in time, and at that point of scientific 
understanding.  Such figurative language worked as a sort of shortcut to bring about 
ready understanding among other interested parties, to begin a conversation and 
discourse upon which others might develop and improve: in short, to enable “more 
compleat discoveries,” such as those made decades later by Oersted, Davy, or 
Faraday.  
For his part, Franklin himself acknowledged and admitted that his own 
language choices were somewhat flawed and lacking in precision, when he wrote for 
example in 1753 that his emerging electrical philosophy was composed of thoughts 
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that were “crude and hasty.”  Yet despite whatever crudeness or hastiness 
accompanied Franklin’s coinages, it is nonetheless important to remember, as Stephen 
Johnson observes in The Invention of Air, that Benjamin Franklin’s “basic model of 
electricity survives to this day, along with the vocabulary [he] built to describe it” 
(21).   As a result, in search of a suitable description of electricity, we grope, endowed 
with a vague, somehow inadequate lexical inheritance.   But to what extent are the 
electrical coinages and applications of electrical theory of Franklin and others merely 
earnest transcriptions of observations, and to what extent are they also inventions or 
fabulations that would come to undergird, inform—and, more importantly, 
misinform—later observations and theories?  Alternatively, could it also be possible 
that despite some misprision and missteps in precision in the scientific philosophy of 
Enlightenment-era electricians, that they could indeed stumble upon what Franklin 
might call “a good effect,” “more exact disquisitions, and more compleat 
discoveries”?  Could the creation of new vocabulary around the concept of 
electromagnetism and its relation to the body yield new metaphors, and with them, 
new understandings?      
Thinking of this question’s relevance to literary study, I would ask: where can 
we draw lines between the sphere of empirical, naturalistic documentation of 
electricity’s elements and effects, and the sphere of electrical analogy or metaphor?  Is 
there in fact a line to be found?  Some voices in the scientific community might have 
us think of objective scientific inquiry as a realm free of metaphor and other forms of 
figurative language (or a realm that should be free of metaphor), but by following in 
this thinking we may fail to acknowledge fully the prevalence of—and importance 
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of—metaphor within scientific discourse.   If one assumes that scientific discourse on 
electricity is indeed populated by an abundance of “electrical” metaphors, then how 
can we know what constitutes “real” electricity?  Can we know?  
Given electricity’s indeterminacy and the difficulties of expressing description 
of it in language somehow free of metaphor (if such language is indeed even possible 
at all), it is not surprising that it has been such an oft-cited example used by those who 
would theorize the role of metaphor in science, as well as those who would in general 
ponder the linguistic relationship between words and their referents.  If we explore the 
body of scholarly work on this subject, we find that electricity is often a pivotal 
example used in such debates, revealing yet further evidence of what we might call its 
“beguiling indeterminacy.”   
Electricity is a central topic used by American philosopher Hilary Putnam, for 
example, in order to illustrate his arguments on “meaning” and “knowledge” and their 
relation to what Saul Kripke called the “causal theory of reference.”  In his 1975 work 
Mind, Language, and Reality, Putnam criticizes what he calls a “traditional view” of 
knowledge (a view he associates with German philosopher Rudolf Carnap), in which it 
would be assumed that for every linguistic term or name there would exist a 
universally discernible “intension” (e.g. a “property” such as “red,” which can be 
somehow intuited), and an equally discernible “extension” (e.g. a class of items that 
would fall into the “red” category).  Putnam argues that in such a flawed model, 
“knowledge” is only linguistic in nature (one who “knows” knows what words mean, 
by knowing to what they refer).  Putnam describes this model of knowledge as 
“fundamentally wrong,” as he believes that to have linguistic competence in 
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connection with a term it is not sufficient…to have the full battery of usual linguistic 
knowledge and skills; one must, in addition, be in the right sort of relationship to 
certain distinguished situations” (199).   
To illustrate this point, he offers the example of electricity, which he describes 
as a “magnitude,” yet at the same time, “not even that: electricity was thought at one 
time to possibly be a sort of substance” (199).   For Putnam, although scientists today 
no longer think of electricity as a “substance,” the term “electricity” is as valid a term 
for us to use as it was for scientists then, as the term was inspired by the same 
phenomenon—the same original cause responsible for its naming.  This is true, 
according to Putnam, even if our understanding of its properties, effects, and related 
associations may have changed since that initial naming.  In other words, the act of 
naming (or what Kripke would call “dubbing”) renders the referent fixed and stable, 
even if our theories about the referent may change.  Putnam believes that although 
different speakers could associate the word “electricity” with different related 
concepts, these different people using the same word could still in a sense all be right, 
depending on their situational or environmental context.  In this way, nobody would 
necessarily need to know the whole of what could be known (or has ever been known) 
about electricity or its related, associated concepts in order to use the term 
appropriately.  Putnam describes this as follows: 
 
 I cannot…think of anything that every user of the word ‘electricity’ has  
 to know except that electricity is…a physical magnitude…[and] is  
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 capable of flow or motion.  Benjamin Franklin knew that ‘electricity’ 
  was manifested in the form of sparks or lightning bolts; someone else 
  might know about currents and electromagnets; someone else may  
  know about atoms consisting of positively and negatively charged  
  particles.  They could all use the term ‘electricity’ without there being a 
  discernible ‘intension’ that they all share.  I want to suggest that what 
  they do have in common is this: that each of them is connected by a 
  certain causal chain to a situation in which a description of electricity is 
  given, and generally a causal description—that is, one which singles 
  out electricity as the physical magnitude responsible for certain effects 
  in a certain way.  (199-200) 
 
According to a model such as that offered here by Putnam, we might understand that 
although Benjamin Franklin understood “electricity” as a fluid, whereas Faraday did 
not, both used the same term, “electricity,” to refer to the same phenomenon that 
caused naming to occur in the first instance.  Therefore, despite the changing scientific 
understanding that occurred, their use of the word “electricity” would nonetheless 
point to the same “physical magnitude” responsible for the effects they would observe 
and describe.            
In order to critique Putnam’s epistemological and linguistic model, Thomas 
Kuhn takes a different approach—while still using electricity as an illustrative 
example—in his essay “Metaphor in Science.”  In particular, Kuhn takes issue with 
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Putnam’s formulation, especially as it concerns the idea of a word “pointing to” a 
referent: 
 
 There is something right about Putnam’s claim that the referent of  
  “electric charge” is fixed by pointing to the needle of a galvanometer 
  and saying that “electric charge” is the name of a physical magnitude 
  responsible for its deflection.  But, despite the amount that Putnam and 
  Kripke have written on the subject, it is by no means clear just what is 
  right about their intuition.  My pointing to an individual, Sir Walter 
  Scott, can tell you how to use the corresponding name correctly.  But 
  pointing to a galvanometer needle while supplying the name of its  
  cause for deflection attaches the name only to the cause of that  
  particular deflection…it supplies no information at all about the many 
  other sorts of events to which the name “electric charge” also  
  unambiguously refers.  When one makes the transition from proper 
  names to the names of natural kinds, one loses access to the career or 
  lifeline which, in the case of proper names, enables one to check the 
  correctness of different applications of the same term.  (535) 
 
If we apply Kuhn’s formulation to the example of Benjamin Franklin, we see how the 
proper name “Benjamin Franklin” points to the man himself as he was when he lived.  
Not having Franklin alive with us today, we could point to an engraving or portrait 
purportedly of Franklin and understand that the name “Benjamin Franklin” points to 
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the man depicted in that engraving or portrait.  Then we might check the historical 
archive and biographical records and see if the man depicted in the portrait matches up 
to the data we have recorded, in order to verify that that to which the picture refers is 
indeed correct, so that we can be sure we are using his name correctly.  In the case of 
the Benjamin West painting discussed earlier, we know in fact that the portrait of 
Franklin is inaccurate, for the reasons already listed.   
 But now what if we try to do the same thing with a “name of natural kind,” 
such as “electricity”?  Even if we point to the cause of its being named, the “physical 
magnitude” that could flow or move in a lightning bolt directed toward Franklin’s kite 
(or flow or move from Franklin’s Leyden jar to his body), how does that help us to 
know how and when to use or apply that word appropriately, especially when the term 
took on so many applications far afield from its original use, such as its use to describe 
an appealing, compelling performer, or, as we shall see, in pseudoscientific 
applications of medical electricity?  For example, if an admirer of Benjamin Franklin 
chooses to express that admiration by metaphorically making an association between 
Franklin’s genius (or, for that matter, his courage in the face of danger, his skills as an 
inventor, scientist, statesman, ambassador, etc.) and his supposed bodily electric 
charge, or, to borrow the words of Chauncey Depew, “the electric spark of his 
presence2,” then how are we now to understand how to use this word correctly, with 
respect to the original usage?  Whereas one can point to the movement of a 
                                                 
2
 The Hon. Chauncey M. Depew uttered this phrase in a speech delivered July 5, 1897 at the American 
Chamber of Commerce in Paris, speaking of the effect that Franklin had on the French upon his arrival: 
“Benjamin Franklin came over here as the first predecessor of the eloquent and distinguished gentleman 
who now represents the United States as Ambassador to France, and as the messenger of peace and 
good will.  With a key upon a kite string he had drawn lightning from the clouds, but when he stood 
upon the soil of France it was the electric spark of his presence which revolutionized that country” (41). 
Depew, an attorney for the great industrialist Cornelius Vanderbilt, would later be elected U. S. Senator. 
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galvanometer needle and see that it in turns points to a “physical magnitude” (the 
electric charge) responsible for its “deflection,” one cannot point to Franklin’s 
“electrically charged” body, or more precisely, the constructed image of Franklin’s 
“electrically charged” body, and see that it has necessarily anything to do with the 
“physical magnitude” dubbed “electric charge.”  Yet we can nonetheless 
metaphorically praise the “electricity” of Franklin’s personality and still be 
understood, without necessarily suggesting any natural correlation between this cliché 
and the “magnitude” that would register on a galvanometer. 
 But (as Kuhn would have us ask) what happens when scientific discovery 
brings about paradigm shifts that would literalize that which had previously been only 
metaphorical?  If we now understand (as we do) that every human body (not only 
Franklin’s) does indeed have an electrical charge which can be observed and recorded, 
and, moreover, that some human bodies transmit a greater electric charge than others 
(as they do), then how are we to differentiate that from metaphorical applications of 
“electrical charge” that associate it, for example, with love, or sexual attraction?  In 
their 1980 work on metaphor, Metaphors We Live By, Lakoff and Johnson offer such 
examples of phrases in English illustrative of common metaphors that would suggest 
that “love is a physical force (electromagnetic, gravitational, etc.)”: 
 
  I could feel the electricity between us.  There were sparks.  I was  
  magnetically drawn to her.  They are uncontrollably attracted to each 
  other.  They gravitated to each other immediately.  His whole life  
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  revolves around her.  The atmosphere around them is always charged.  
  There is incredible energy in their relationship.  They lost their 
   momentum.  (49)     
 
Given that such metaphors are so commonplace, how are we to know if one intends to 
speak literally or metaphorically about one’s “electric charge,” in the wake of 
scientific advances that would affirm electromagnetic corporeality as literal truth?  
And if what was once only possible in metaphorical terms (e.g. “I was attracted to her 
electricity”) suddenly becomes possible as literal truth (e.g. “her brain emits 
electromagnetic waves”), then how are we to know that it will not later be shown, for 
example, that emotions of love or sexual desire are not also literally the product or 
result of an exchange of electromagnetic activity (e.g. “I was attracted by the 
electromagnetic waves emitted by her brain”)?   Could other utterances, once thought 
to belong purely to the category of metaphor, someday also be revealed over time as 
literal truths?  And, in the aftermath of scientific revolution that would literalize 
metaphors, how are we to know which is which, and how can we make ourselves 
understood so that our listeners comprehend our meaning?  How are we to 
differentiate between the two?  How would it be possible to speak in metaphor-free 
language, or, more importantly, why should we, when metaphor is not only so 
prevalent, but can also be so revealing of truths which we may not yet see?  Such are 
the questions raised by electricity’s indeterminacy. 
 Even though Putnam would attempt to strip from his description of electricity 
everything that would suggest its multifarious metaphorical applications, leaving 
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behind only the vague phrase, “physical magnitude,” which he would have us believe 
is what can be universally understood as the common source of its original dubbing, 
he can still not avoid metaphor in his own description of this “magnitude.”  
“Magnitude” itself is understood according to paradigms of substance (physical size) 
and light (brightness), both paradigms that do not neatly apply to electricity, if at all.  
Moreover, while Putnam would argue that “every user of the term ‘electricity’ knows 
[it] is a magnitude of some sort” and, moreover, that all they need to know is that it “is 
capable of flow or motion” (199), the very word “flow” is metaphorical, in that it 
associates electricity and its movement with fluid, and the movement of fluids.  In 
these ways, metaphor seems inevitable in discourse that would try to erase it.  But 
chasms between words (and their metaphorical applications) and their supposed 
originating causes become even further apparent when over time we forget, as 
individuals or as cultures, that metaphors are indeed metaphors. 
 As Judith Butler writes in Gender Trouble, “metaphors lose their metaphoricity 
as they congeal through time into concepts” (26).  The same idea applies here.  
Through repeated usage of the word “electricity” to refer to particular kinds of human 
bodies with particular characteristics, we reiterate dead metaphors or clichés, and as a 
consequence, the original freshness of such metaphors becomes increasingly lost.  
Over time, metaphors of electromagnetic corporeality “congeal” into concepts that 
might lead us to forget why—or how—they were coined.   So if we cannot find—or 
cannot remember—correlations between the many metaphorical applications of 
electricity, the many concepts and clichés associated with electricity, and the many 
metaphors that informed the concepts associated with and used to name electricity just 
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after its “physical magnitude” demanded its being named and categorized, then how 
can we know what we know about electricity, and, moreover, how can we talk or write 
about it?     
Presented with such an epistemological and semantic quandary, we might 
begin first by considering whether electricity was invented, created, or discovered.  On 
one hand, one cannot “invent” or “create” electricity, as the energy, force, fluid, or 
process we now bring under the umbrella of “electricity” existed and was felt long 
before humans found language to name or describe it.  If we understand knowledge to 
be empirical in origin, arising from that which is directly felt or sensed, then surely the 
phenomenon of what we now call electricity has been long “known” to humans, 
irrespective of whether or not it had a name.  Yet, on the other hand, can’t the act of 
describing electricity itself be an act of invention, creation, and discovery, helping to 
give birth to new avenues of conceptualization?  If we understand knowledge also to 
be filtered through the complex and imperfect process of application, association, and 
arrangement of arbitrary sounds and signs to represent phenomena, then can we not 
trace the genealogy of our knowledge of electricity to specific moments of linguistic 
invention and intervention, where electricity became newly “known?”  If so, then to 
what extent are our “scientific” definitions of electricity informed by metaphor?  And, 
further, how might the indeterminacy of “electricity” then dissolve the distinctions we 
might make between the realms of literature and science, or between the metaphorical 
and the real?  Applying these questions to the study of antebellum American literature, 
I will begin by asking: how did electricity’s beguiling indeterminacy serve both the 
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scientific and literary imaginations of the post-Enlightenment era, the era that we have 
come to call the American Renaissance? 
Such questions are not merely a matter of semantics, when one considers some 
effects of the application of electrical metaphors to understandings of human 
corporeality.  As James Delbourgo amply demonstrates in his book A Most Amazing 
Scene of Wonders, once knowledge of electrical theory circulated and became more 
widespread in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, early narratives of 
electrical discovery such as that of Franklin were soon followed up by 
pseudoscientific theories that lacked scientific merit yet led to spectacles and symbolic 
displays of “enlightenment” of quite dubious nature, in an age when electricity became 
fashionable, when electrical theory became a hot topic in social circles, and when 
showmen and quacks alike made quick profits by exhibiting electrical phenomena to a 
paying public.  Hence, the so-called “enlightened” few could enjoy the spectacle and 
experience of the “electric kiss” (receiving sparks from the lips of a woman charged 
by an electrostatic generator); could purchase and display umbrellas equipped and 
pointed with lightning-rods; could have their sexual dysfunctions supposedly “cured” 
through application of electrical apparati to their genitals; or, could witness African 
slaves given electric shocks for the purposes of entertainment, all in the name of 
promotion of—and display of—“enlightenment.”  
We are thus led to ask: what happens when the language of electrical or 
electromagnetic theory is mapped onto human anatomy and the functions of human 
bodies, or living bodies in general?  What happens when we substitute “electricity” for 
other concepts associated with bodies, such as “spirit,” “soul,” “animation,” 
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“enlightenment,” or “enthusiasm,” just to name a few?  How does usually invisible 
and always incorporeal electrical “fluid” (presumably flowing in a “current” between 
“poles”), become conflated with the properties and functions of water, blood, saliva, 
or other ordinary bodily fluids, despite having little else in common with them?  How 
might these semantic moves engender, create, or reveal moments of analogical or 
metaphorical slippage?  What might be some consequences of this slippage for our 
ways of thinking about our own corporeality?     
Moreover, to what extent is scientific discovery preceded by and informed by 
metaphorical thinking?  While some might like to think of scientific discovery as free 
from metaphorical thinking, grounded purely in logical analysis of collected 
observations and data, this may not always be so.  In fact, sometimes metaphor— or, 
to think of it in another way, hypothetical, imaginative, speculative thinking— 
associates dissimilar objects or concepts in ways that engender scientific discovery.  
Such metaphor or speculation could bring about accidental discoveries that might not 
have otherwise been foreseen or made possible.   
Such was the case in the discovery of electromagnetism.  Danish scientist Hans 
Christian Oersted, credited with the 1820 discovery that electricity and magnetism 
were inherently connected as part and parcel of the same unified force, in fact 
accidentally stumbled upon this discovery.  He had long imagined and speculated that 
electricity and magnetism were not only similar in their properties but indeed one in 
the same force, without the benefit of any hard evidence or data to support this 
position.  We may understand his hypothesis in the form of a simile: electricity is like 
magnetism (or vice versa).  Similarly, both forces resembled each other because both 
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were thought of as moving in flows or currents, like a fluid, yet invisible.  But what if 
we transform this linguistic formulation into metaphor?  What if, instead of claiming 
that electricity is like magnetism, we simply say electricity is magnetism?  In this way 
we begin to see how thinking in terms of metaphor might help us to render further 
hypotheses, which might be tested in order for the observer to seek what comes to be 
understood as truth.    
For Oersted, he began thinking from just such a metaphorical standpoint.  
Rather than being satisfied with observing that electricity and magnetism had similar 
properties, he instead began with the proposition that they were perhaps 
interchangeable, that they were part of the same force.  As physics professor Gerrit 
Verschuur explains, Oersted began 1820 with a lecture in which he “stat[ed] that there 
had to be a connection between electrical and magnetic phenomena” (59).  Oersted 
had nothing to go on to prove his position other than his belief and his suspicion that a 
strange phenomenon—namely, that ship’s compasses went awry and had to be 
remagnetized if the ship happened to be struck by lightning—must expose some 
inherent relationship between electricity and magnetism, forces which had heretofore 
been understood as separate and discrete.  He finally achieved his discovery 
unintentionally through experimentation.  Operating under his suspicion that the 
application of electrical current might have an effect on the magnetic needle of a 
compass, he attempted to prove this point by making a demonstration of this before an 
audience without ever trying it out first in private.  The results were unimpressive, as 
the compass needle only “deflected slightly” under the application of electrical 
current, but the results were the same: unbeknownst to Oersted or his audience at that 
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time, “the world’s first demonstration of the bond between electricity and magnetism 
occurred before witnesses” (Verschuur 60).  Such a case serves as a vivid example of 
how metaphorical, speculative thinking could actually help scientists stumble upon 
truth.  
At the same time, metaphor and speculation can sometimes prove problematic 
with regards to science.  Sometimes associative leaps fail to cross logical chasms, 
therefore leading to false propositions, or misguided understandings.  It is 
understandable why scientists would attempt to perform their work in a language free 
of metaphor and speculation, even if that proves to be largely an impossible task.  For 
every Oersted who might accidentally stumble upon a major scientific discovery 
informed by metaphorical or speculative thinking, there may be hundreds of other 
scientists who are led down unfruitful paths by making assertions grounded in 
metaphor or speculation that in the end do not match up to reality when challenged 
and tested by experimentation.          
The pseudosciences around electricity, magnetism, and the body—
pseudosciences that emerged almost immediately after Franklin made his discovery 
that the electricity of a lightning bolt was the same electricity which could be 
generated and contained in a laboratory setting— serve as examples of logical 
overreach and misguided speculation.  No sooner did Franklin make his discoveries 
about electricity than he was approached by such speculators, motivated by suspect 
and faulty logic, who looked to employ electricity for its supposed healing effects on 
the body.  Could electricity provide a long-awaited panacea that might cure health 
problems?  Franklin was skeptical of this, but his skepticism did not prevent others to 
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imagine how electricity might be applied to the body for medical—or, to be more 
precise, pseudo-medical—purposes.  Unconvinced as Franklin was by the supposed 
healing properties of electric shocks applied to the body, he nonetheless continued to 
use electricity for medical purposes on those who requested it (Delbourgo 205).   The 
pseudoscience of medical electricity was born, and it was used to treat all manner of 
ailments.  In large part it was adopted as legitimate medicine by prominent physicians 
both in America and abroad, including such notable figures as Erasmus Darwin, who 
for his part straddled the fields of science and literature, writing poetry that adopted 
concepts borrowed from the emerging study of medical electricity, and even suggested 
an essential link between electricity and the creation of life itself3.  
Meanwhile, Franz Anton Mesmer and his followers similarly applied 
knowledge from the burgeoning field of magnetic theory to establish the 
pseudoscientific theory of animal magnetism, that bodies were composed of magnetic 
fluids that could be brought back into balance by the skilled physician, who would 
restore the body’s harmony by applying motions of the hands over the affected body 
parts.  Strangely, such virtual laying on of hands would be followed up by playing of 
Franklin’s armonica, implying that some mysterious connection must exist between 
the practice of Mesmerism and the man who was one of the most well-known pioneers 
of electrical theory—and one of the most recognized faces of medical electricity—at 
                                                 
3
 In Canto III of his epic poem The Temple of Nature, entitled “Progress of the Mind,” published 
posthumously in 1803, Darwin draws connections between electricity and the origins of life by 
suggesting that the two supposed fluids of electricity (the “resinous and vitreous fire”) may have 
“through Galvanic chain-work” brought about  “the first spark,” which “lighten'd into Life”:  Then 
mark how two electric streams conspire/To form the resinous and vitreous fire;/ Beneath the waves the 
fierce Gymnotus arm,/And give Torpedo his benumbing charm;/ Or, through Galvanic chain-work as 
they pass, /Convert the kindling water into gas./How at the poles opposing Ethers dwell,/Attract the 
quivering needle, or repel./How Gravitation by immortal laws/Surrounding matter to a centre 
draws;/How Heat, pervading oceans, airs, and lands,/With force uncheck'd the mighty mass 
expands;/And last how born in elemental strife/Beam'd the first spark, and lighten'd into Life.   
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that time.  Although Franklin and others denounced Mesmerism as bad science, their 
denunciation neither stopped Mesmerists from enticing sufferers of sundry ailments to 
continue seeking their mysterious cures, nor stopped Mesmerism from influencing 
new generations of Americans, well into the 19th century and beyond.   
Long before Oersted stumbled upon his discovery of electromagnetism, 
Mesmer already believed in some correlation or association between the two.  As 
Daniel Tiffany points out, in his 1779 treatise Mémoires sur la découverte du 
magnétisme animale, Mesmer made the following claim among his 27 propositions 
about animal magnetism: 
 
 21.  This system will furnish new insights into the nature of fire and 
  light, as well as the theory of attraction, of the ebb and flow of things 
  [du flux et du reflux], of magnetism, and of electricity.  (142) 
 
Despite the fact that Mesmerism was for all intents and purposes a hoax, Mesmer was 
at least partially correct in hypothesizing that the principles and characteristics of 
magnetism and electricity were essentially connected.  At the same time, his spurious 
claims led him to apply magnetic and electrical “theories” to the human body in ways 
that propped up unfortunate stereotypes about the female body in particular, while also 
underscoring popular yet unfounded images of the body as surrounded by 
“atmospheres.”  As Tiffany writes, “the fundamental link observed…between the  
‘magnetic cure’ and corporeal ‘vapors’ or atmospheric properties leaves no doubt that 
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the discourse of ‘animal magnetism,’ by seeking to moderate the hysterical climate of 
the female body, treats the body as a meteoric phenomenon” (141).      
Oersted’s later discovery that electricity and magnetism were two parts of the 
same force, known as electromagnetism, lent the proponents of Mesmerism or “animal 
magnetism” more authority and legitimacy.  The Danish physicist’s confirmation of 
the long awaited connection between electricity and magnetism was quickly followed 
up by the breakthroughs made by Michael Faraday, the celebrated English scientist, 
some of which led to the creation of electrified machines that made the modern 
industrial age possible.  While it may be argued that Oersted’s initial logical leap 
sparked electromagnetic theories that would lead to revolutionary steps forward in 
technology in the coming decades, such as the electric telegraph, proof of the 
connection between the two forces also served as fodder for pseudoscientists.  If 
electricity and magnetism were inherently connected, then couldn’t it follow that 
legitimized medical electricity could be inherently connected to animal magnetism, 
previously the object of intense derision among much of the established scientific 
community?  Could there be some truth to Mesmerism after all?    
The apparent connection between electricity and magnetism also promised 
evidence of a single grand unified theory that would explain all life, a belief sought 
out and held not only by Oersted but also by many other respected scientists and 
natural philosophers of the early part of the nineteenth century.  Ralph Waldo 
Emerson, whose literary career coincided with the era of scientific discoveries in the 
field of electromagnetism made by Michael Faraday and others, was particularly 
intrigued by the idea of a single unified theory of life, and took particular interest in 
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these developments.   He was most certainly drawn to the work of Romantic 
predecessors such as Samuel Taylor Coleridge, who for his part largely subscribed to 
such theories, and was eager to understand life itself as guided, generated, and 
influenced by electromagnetic forces and processes.  Emerson scholar Eric Wilson 
notes that Coleridge argued in his 1825 work Aids to Reflection that “forms of 
organisms are evolved from an 'invisible central Power', an 'unseen Agency’” (3).   
Such an “agency” was understood by Coleridge as “'weav[ing] its magic Eddies' 
through plants, animals, humans, animating and metamorphosing them’” (qtd. in 
Wilson 3).   Patrick Keane is one among many scholars to note the powerful influence 
that Coleridge’s work had on Emerson’s thinking, noting his mention of his depth of 
“interest” in the work in an 1830 letter (64).  Citing the scholarship of Robert 
Richardson, Jr., Keane mentions the “electric effect” that Coleridge’s work had on 
Emerson (65).  More so even than finding a single theory, an “invisible central 
power,” that would explain all life and animation, Emerson was interested, as was 
Hans Christian Oersted, in the idea of unification of literature and science, a blurring 
of boundaries and classifications of knowledge. 
In 1833, Emerson wrote in his journal that he thought that Faraday had 
possibly uncovered the “secret mechanism of life & sensation [in the] great long 
expected discovery of the identity of electricity and magnetism” (Wilson 12).  Inspired 
by the various threads of thought circulating around the significance of the discovery 
of electromagnetism, both scientific and pseudoscientific, Emerson thus incorporated 
and synthesized such thought in his writing.  But to what extent did his thought on 
such matters rest or rely upon “crude and hasty thoughts”?  To what extent did 
27 
 
Emerson, in his haste to employ and apply metaphors of electromagnetic corporeality 
to his thinking about the relationship between the poet and nature, engender his own 
metaphorical slippage?  What discoveries or misprisions might result from such 
slippage, and what effects might these have over the long term, not only for the 
literature and philosophy that would follow in Emerson’s wake, but for American 
culture in general?  These questions are central to my work here.  
Turning to antebellum American literature as test case, then, my study will 
examine analogical or metaphorical slippage around electricity, electromagnetism, and 
an attendant discourse of embodiment.  I will focus my attention and analysis 
primarily on three major works of antebellum American literature: Ralph Waldo 
Emerson’s first and second series of essays, Herman Melville’s Moby-Dick, and Walt 
Whitman’s 1855 edition of Leaves of Grass, each containing both explicit and implicit 
references to electricity/electromagnetism.  When Emerson writes in “The Poet” that 
“man is the conductor of the whole river of electricity,” or when Melville writes in 
“The Quarter-Deck” chapter of Moby-Dick that Ahab “…shocked into [his ship’s 
mates] the same fiery emotion accumulated within the Leyden jar of his own magnetic 
life,” or when Whitman “sing[s] the body electric,” in what sense do we understand 
these references as examples of metaphor or analogy, and to what extent do they 
exemplify moments when distinctions between the “metaphorical” and the “real” 
become lost?  How is electricity or electromagnetism indeterminate in these examples, 
or what part do these formulations play in the larger weave of these texts’ 
indeterminacy?  How do these constructions of electricity and electromagnetism, 
working at a cross-roads of radical unknowability, both reflect and inform changing 
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conceptions of corporeality in American culture?  How, in these examples and 
elsewhere, does the slippage that electricity engenders reformulate what it means to be 
an animated human body, or rearticulate what electrified or conductive bodies might 
signify?      
By asking such questions, my work takes literary theorist Barbara Herrnstein 
Smith up on her invitation to both “figure” and “refigure” the relationship between the 
humanities and the sciences, by showing how, at a crucial point in our nation’s history, 
these two supposedly distinct areas of academic study were—and are—both integrally 
linked and mutually instructive.  We would be wise to remember that in the late 
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, many of those whom we might today refer 
to as “scientists” took strong interest in poetry and literature, just as men and women 
of letters of this same era found fascination in the sciences.  This is exemplified by the 
literary work of the English physician and medical electrician Erasmus Darwin, who 
frequently wrote poetry in which electricity is a recurring theme, or the Danish 
physicist and discoverer of electromagnetism Hans Christian Oersted, who also wrote 
poetry and who, according to Andrew Wilson, “had a deep and lasting interest in 
aesthetics and poetry which, over the years, occupied him as much as his work in 
natural science” (629).  We may pause to reconsider the work of English Romantic 
poet Samuel Taylor Coleridge, whose strong interest in the sciences led him to argue 
in his Theory of Life that “a new light was struck by the discovery of electricity, and, 
in every sense of the word, both playful and serious, both for good and for evil, it may 
be affirmed to have electrified the whole frame of natural philosophy” (31), or find 
further meditation on the words of Percy Bysshe Shelley, when he argued that poetry 
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“is at once the centre and circumference of knowledge; it is that which comprehends 
all science, and that to which all science must be referred” (55).  It is my hope that my 
study will reveal how such intermingling of scientific and literary discourse are 
synthesized in the works of American writers such as Ralph Waldo Emerson. 
This work builds upon a growing body of scholarship that undoes previous 
stereotypes that characterize American Romanticism as somehow galvanized against 
science or technological progress.  Rather, I would show how the aesthetics of writers 
of the American Renaissance were formed and formulated very much in relation and 
in conversation with emerging scientific and technological discourse of the antebellum 
era.  While Leonard Neufeldt noted over thirty years ago that the subject of Emerson's 
"endorsement of the possibilities of technology and science for the individual and the 
culture" had "rarely been treated in American scholarship" (330), this is certainly not 
true today.  With the emergence of Cultural Studies, and with the growth in 
“interdisciplinary” scholarship in literature and the humanities, the past decade and a 
half has witnessed entire books written largely on the subject of Emerson’s synthesis 
of Romanticism with emerging science and technology, such as Laura Dassow Walls’s 
Emerson’s Life in Science (2003), or Lee Rust Brown’s The Emerson Museum (1997).  
The effects of scientific and pseudoscientific electrical theory on the literary 
imaginations of Emerson and other antebellum writers has likewise begun to be 
investigated at some length in a number of recent scholarly articles and conference 
papers, and in books such as Sam Halliday’s Science and Technology in the Age of 
Hawthorne, Melville, Twain, and James (2007), or Paul Gilmore’s Aesthetic 
Materialism: Electricity and American Romanticism (2009). 
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Extending beyond the scope of James Delbourgo’s work, which deals 
primarily with eighteenth-century America, I would reconsider his historical 
metaphorical tie between “electricity” and “enlightenment” and apply this to a 
rethinking of the philosophy and aesthetics that informed antebellum American 
literature, investigating how this sometimes clumsy and often incongruent link 
between “electricity” and “enlightenment” manifests itself, and determining what, if 
anything, might be considered as shockwaves emanating from these manifestations.  
My approach differs from others in this emerging sub-genre in this way: by outlining a 
trajectory along which electricity and electromagnetism passed through various stages 
of linguistic invention and conceptualization, as it moved—sometimes back and 
forth—from science to pseudoscience, from corporeal analogy to practiced medicine, I 
examine how American literary figures imagined, invented, reiterated, and 
mythologized electromagnetic corporeality.  At the same time, I trace the movement 
of electromagnetic tropes as they passed from “effective metaphor” to “effaced 
metaphor,” to borrow terms used by Jacques Derrida in his well-known essay “White 
Mythology.” 
Some recent criticism on antebellum writers who employ electromagnetic 
tropes might have us believe they would become “linguistic electricians,” so to speak.  
In other words, such criticism would have us understand that writers such as Emerson 
refer to electricity and deploy terms borrowed from electromagnetic science in order 
to develop an “electric style” that would excite and electrify their audiences, both in 
the literal and figurative sense of the term.  In contrast to this approach, I argue that by 
confusing a writer’s formal and aesthetic concerns with his desire for actual or 
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imagined “electrification” of a reading or listening audience, such criticism too hastily 
and willingly literalizes the metaphorical as it fails to distinguish or differentiate 
linguistic play from scientific hypothesis.  My departure from Eric Wilson’s work on 
Emerson is a case in point.  In his book Emerson’s Sublime Science, Wilson stands out 
as a prime example of a scholar who, noting that “critics…have overlooked 
[Emerson’s] interest in electromagnetism” (12), pursues a direct and focused 
examination of the significance of electromagnetic references found in Emerson’s 
work, arguing for example that  
  
 …tracking the confluence of European Romanticism and   
  electromagnetism in the young Emerson’s work reveals an Emerson 
  who…unsatisfied with mere speculation about the animating principle 
  of life….wanted hard scientific proof for the ideas of his Romantic  
  predecessors…[and] had very specific scientific information in mind 
  when celebrating ‘energy’ in nature and language.” (12) 
   
While Wilson employs this argument to applaud Emerson’s own genius, by pointing 
to his ability to weave “electric words”—or, to put it differently, to strike literary 
gold—by employing concurrent electromagnetic theory while simultaneously tapping 
into more ancient, alchemical, mystical traditions (in what Wilson terms a “new 
hermeticism”), and by finding what Wilson calls “alembics”—distillations or loci of 
experiences that would allow him glimpses of the infinite totality of the sublime—I 
argue instead that it is precisely Emerson’s conflation of literal electromagnetic 
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activity (as exemplified by transcriptions of experiments in scientific literature), with 
figuratively or metaphorically corporeal electromagnetism (as represented in poetry 
and prose ranging from that of Erasmus Darwin, to Samuel Taylor Coleridge, to Percy 
Bysshe Shelley, just to name a few examples) that opens the door for further 
ambiguity, contradiction, and confusion around the body’s power to conduct and 
transmit electromagnetic energy.  Far from trying to prove or disprove Emerson’s own 
literary genius (or that of other antebellum American writers), my approach would 
rather focus on the ways that misprisions and conflations of literal and metaphorical 
electricity, as expressed in literature, helped pave the way for the notion that one’s 
“genius” might be measured in volts, amperes, or ohms, or that one’s superior 
electromagnetic conductivity relative to others could be read as an outward sign of 
inner, inherited genius—a chilling sign in the context of a culture in which phrenology 
was becoming an accepted and acceptable practice, and eugenics lay on the horizon. 
Given emphatic claims made in recent scholarship with reference to the 
influence of electricity, the early electricians, and their inventions on understandings 
of the Age of Enlightenment and the emergence of America as both a sovereign nation 
and as a cultural concept, it must be underscored that the link between corporeality 
and electromagnetism is no small matter when one considers its relevance to 
formulations of American cultural identity.  In Stealing God’s Thunder, historian 
Philip Dray writes that Franklin’s invention of the lightning-rod was "a moment in 
history as epochal as the birth of Jesus Christ" (xvii).   Steven Johnson does no less 
than to credit Joseph Priestley’s curious blend of politics and science with the “birth of 
America.”  Such strong statements beg fresh inquiry, bringing one to consider how 
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scientific and pseudoscientific notions of electricity and electromagnetism—and the 
analogies and metaphors that they inspired—informed later formulations of 
corporeality, subjectivity, and identity. 
Interrogating these aforementioned examples of “electricities,” we may ask: 
why it is that electricity is so readily adaptable to incongruent analogies and 
contradictory conflations of literal and metaphorical registers?  Given electricity’s 
problematic definitions and its resulting indeterminacy, how can one begin to write 
about or speak of electricity and its effects on the body without contending with 
claims such as that made by Rudolf Steiner in 1923, when he wrote that “when we 
speak of electricity, we enter a sphere that presents a different aspect to the 
imaginative vision than that of the other spheres of Nature”?  Entering such a 
“sphere,” one who speaks of electricity would seem to require a different vocabulary 
than that used to describe other natural phenomena.  It is electricity’s incorporeality—
despite its corporeal effects—that lends it the privilege of being distinguished from 
other natural phenomena, sometimes allowing room for magic and mysticism to reside 
comfortably alongside established scientific theory and process.  Consequently, our 
ability to define electricity precisely is confounded by the metaphors and clichés that 
have obscured, transformed, and multiplied its original meanings.  So when we speak 
of an “electrifying” public speaker, a romantic “spark” between new lovers, or a 
“lightning-rod of controversy,” is it not true that we are no longer speaking of actual 
electrical conductivity or transference of electrical charge, but rather we are applying a 
quasi-electrical vocabulary to describe phenomena which have nothing or little to do 
with actual electrical processes?   
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Keeping in mind the “dead metaphors” of electricity that continue to be 
invoked in our language and culture, we may be reminded of Jacques Derrida’s 
employment of this term in his essay, “White Mythology.”   More specifically, how is 
it that examples of metaphors of electromagnetic corporeality serve as demonstrations 
of what Derrida refers to as “effaced metaphor,” or “white mythology”—“metaphysics 
which has erased within itself the fabulous scene that has produced it” (11)?  Today’s 
television commentator may think nothing of referring to the “electric” or “magnetic” 
qualities of a performer or celebrity while failing to be fully cognizant of the historical 
and cultural contexts, the complex intertwinings of narrative threads, or the discursive 
stakes, that enabled such associations to be made.  Terms which were once used 
specifically in the eighteenth century to define and describe specific scientific 
phenomena, such as attraction between elements, were almost immediately used 
metaphorically to represent attractions between human bodies, such as sexual 
attractions, or attractions to compelling personalities.  Not long after, electricity was a 
word also used to describe some essential quality of life itself, giving name to some 
animating force, some vitality, some vigor or enthusiasm that was somehow in want or 
in need of a name.     
As metaphor piled upon metaphor in ever increasing layers and striations, the 
sense became lost that these associations were indeed metaphorical and not in fact 
representative of real, observable natural phenomena.   This paved the way for 
pseudoscientific medical electricity or animal magnetism, both of which would have 
us believe that manipulations of electrical or magnetic energies in a human body could 
somehow restore that body to health.  As science went on to prove that human bodies 
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were indeed electrical and magnetic, while at the same disproving many of the 
pseudoscientific theories that would use electrical or magnetic language to justify their 
dubious practices, it also created further confusion.  As many doctors continue to use 
electromagnetic impulses to treat or cure their patients, with the full backing and 
support of the scientific and medical community, we may wonder if the practitioners 
of animal magnetism were on to something, even if their practices were suspect or 
lacking in medical merit.  This opens the door to the question: could it be that those 
who originally deployed electrical and magnetic vocabulary in a metaphorical sense 
could have actually been more correct and literal in their observations and 
commentary than even they themselves ever imagined?  Perhaps so, yet such a line of 
questioning would forget, or erase, the illusions that formed the basis of these truths, 
or perhaps form the basis of all truths.  As distinctions between literal and figurative 
“electricities” became somehow lost through a process of slow but steady effacement 
over the last two and a half centuries, like Derrida we may quote Nietzsche in 
observing that “truths are illusions of which one has forgotten that they are illusions” 
(15) .   
The modern day commentator who would drop clichéd references to 
electromagnetic corporeality into a conversation about a pop star or a politician would 
likely neither recognize his or her statements as a culmination of a longstanding 
discursive history, nor care whether or not they were based in any concrete scientific 
truth.   Or, to be more precise, such commentators would not necessarily find the 
distinction between the literal and metaphorical register to be very important, as the 
general thrust of their ideas would likely be conveyed effectively without being called 
36 
 
into question.   If Forbes magazine calls Beyoncé’s 2013 Super Bowl Halftime Show 
performance “electrifying” (as it did4), does it really matter if she literally electrified 
any audience members?   Does it matter that such a cliché has a long and complex 
history, one which would interweave corporeal electricity with libertine sexuality?  
From a 21st century perspective, the effect is the same: she excited the enthusiasm of 
her audience, stimulating a neural response akin to electricity, therefore, even if she 
did not in fact directly transmit electromagnetic energy from her body to those of her 
viewers, the apparent likeness of “electricity” with “enthusiasm” makes the 
association between the concepts stand, irrespective of whether or not such association 
accurately reflects reality.  An antebellum American audience, on the other hand, 
might actually believe that a performer like Beyoncé could be imbued with electrical 
charge and be able actually to convey that charge to others through her performance.   
Similarly, when Joe Biden referred to Barack Obama’s “spine of steel” in his speech at 
the 2012 Democratic National Convention5, praising the “courage” in the president’s 
“soul,” he was unlikely unaware of the genealogy of such metaphor, likely unaware of 
how it would resonate with statements made by American writers of the antebellum 
era, such as Ralph Waldo Emerson or Henry David Thoreau, who would similarly 
praise individuals who possessed a “lightning-rod” spine.  The primary difference here 
is that while 21st century audiences would never dream that Biden was actually 
speaking literally in this instance (i.e. they would not think the vice president was 
                                                 
4
 See images published by Forbes under the title “Beyonce's Electrifying Super Bowl Halftime 
Performance,” 3 Feb 2013, at http://www.forbes.com/pictures/ehlm45jgmm/pepsi-super-bowl-xlvii-
halftime-show/ 
5
 The full transcript of Vice President Biden’s speech may be found, for example, at the following 
webpage, published by National Public Radio on 6 Sep 2012 under the title “Transcript: Vice President 
Biden's Convention Speech,” available at http://www.npr.org/2012/09/06/160713378/transcript-vice-
president-bidens-convention-speech 
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implying that the president actually had a spine composed of steel, or had a steel rod 
implanted in his body),  antebellum audiences might very well have believed that one 
who possessed what we might today call an “iron will” might have actually possessed 
a spine that was both conductive and protective in nature, very much like an iron 
lightning-rod, if not in fact a lightning-rod itself.  These examples illustrate how 
today’s clichés may have originated in tentative scientific hypotheses of a bygone era, 
just as scientific hypotheses may find inspiration or grounding in the illusions offered 
by metaphor.  In this way, “illusions” and “truths” oscillate and exchange positions 
over time.    
As “electricity” evolves into cliché and dead metaphor, it becomes increasingly 
indeterminate—or multideterminate—as it continues to be reinvoked and reanimated 
in discourse.  So, is it reasonable, then, to consider Whitman’s “body electric” an 
“effective metaphor”?  Or is it already an example of “effaced metaphor,” metaphor 
for which distinctions between truth and illusion have been worn away due to long use 
and abuse, an erosion of an expression once freshly coined?  Has electricity followed 
the natural course of metaphors, in what Derrida, employing a reference to Hegel, 
describes as a movement that “pass[es] from a proper sensible meaning to a proper 
spiritual meaning through a figurative detour” (25)?  Or, defying Hegel’s formulation, 
does electricity stand as an example of a word that oscillates fluidly between the 
figurative and the literal, between the sensible (the physical sensations associated with 
substantial entities, forces, or magnitudes) and the spiritual (the thoughts we might 
associate with that which belongs to the realm of the metaphysical, ethereal, or 
otherwise invisible)?   
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By studying the effects of electric and electromagnetic analogy and metaphor 
in literature concurrent with and subsequent to the era of electromagnetic discovery in 
the antebellum period, I would argue that by the age of Whitman, such metaphor had 
already begun to evolve into what Derrida might refer to as “effaced metaphor.”  In so 
doing, I hope to uncover and reveal that which has been erased and effaced, i.e. the 
“fabulous scene” that preceded clichés of bodily electricity and electrification in the 
palimpsest of the English language, and, moreover, in that of American culture.  
Why electromagnetic metaphor is relevant to formulations of embodiment is 
tied to a recurring principle that emerges from recent theories of the body: that the 
body is a site where cultural conflicts and social tensions, centered around power 
relations, are negotiated and worked out.  Sociologist Bryan Turner, writing on the 
body and culture, describes “traditions” in the sociology of the body: first, that the 
body is a “carrier or bearer of social meaning and symbolism” (26), and secondly, that 
the body is “a system of signs which stand for and express relations of power” (27).  
Such traditions inform my approach to this study as I am interested in the ways in 
which bodies are socially regulated and self-regulated according to metaphors 
associated with bodily characteristics.  As electricity is identified in the eighteenth 
century as a “fluid” and is later understood to flow alongside or in conjunction with 
other bodily fluids, I aim to investigate how this new concept disturbs, reiterates, or 
reconfigures ancient mythologies and metaphors associated with bodily fluids.   In 
Technologies of the Self, Michel Foucault introduces the idea of “technologies of 
power,” or technologies “which determine the conduct of individuals and submit them 
to certain ends or domination, an objectivizing of the subject” (18).  With this 
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definition in mind, we may consider how antebellum American writers deployed 
imagery and metaphors suggesting the relationship of the body to emerging 
technologies of electricity and electromagnetism in order to reconfigure relations of 
subjects to objects, and vice versa, in order to subvert or resist existing “technologies 
of power.”   In this way, their application of electromagnetic theory and its associated 
metaphors to understandings of corporeality anticipates Foucauldian “biopower” or 
“biopolitics.”  I explore the ways in which antebellum American literary figures such 
as Walt Whitman used electromagnetic metaphor and analogy to imagine or envision 
something closely resembling what Foucault describes as “technologies of the self,” 
defined as that which would “permit individuals to effect by their own means or with 
the help of others a certain number of operations on their own bodies and souls, 
thoughts, conduct, and way of being, so as to transform themselves in order to attain a 
certain state of happiness, purity, wisdom, perfection, or immortality” (18).  Yet I 
would at the same time examine some of the problems inherent in this attempt, as 
these antebellum writers reinscribed “technologies of power” in this process.  
One might describe my approach as transdisciplinary, insofar as the literature 
that I will analyze was written by authors who likewise took what we may call in 
contemporary terms transdisciplinary approaches to understanding the natural world 
and the place of language in that world.  Somerville and Rapport’s collection of essays 
entitled Transdisciplinarity: Recreating Integrated Knowledge is especially helpful 
here: “transdisciplinarity dissolves the boundaries between disciplines and creates a 
hybrid which is different from each constituent part” (xiv).  While today we might 
take for granted the notion that fields of study in the realm of science and in that of 
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humanities are distinct and separate, for antebellum American writers this distinction 
was less clear, as the boundaries to which Somerville and Rapport refer had not yet 
developed to the extent that they have today: in fact, in the earlier nineteenth century, 
such boundaries had been actively resisted.  My interest in and research of electricity 
and its manifestations in literature has thus naturally led me toward a transdisciplinary 
approach, and, moreover, demands such study.  Self-described “scientific,” 
“historical,” or “philosophical” texts may thus be placed into conversation with 
“literary” texts, in order to see what insight might be gained by crossing or dissolving 
boundaries between these various manifestations of literature or narrative. 
Resisting a New Critical or formalist approach to literature that would see 
meaning as produced inherently in the arrangement of a given text, free from its 
greater cultural and conceptual context, I am also interested in the ways in which 
literary works are products, manifestations, and representations of dynamic cultural 
movements in states of tension or conflict, movements which can be “read” or 
analyzed like texts.  Furthermore, I am particularly interested in the ways that various 
literary narratives may reveal flashpoints in the construction of myths by which we 
come to understand our world.  In these ways, my project’s methodology may be 
broadly called a “cultural studies” approach.  In his introduction to The Cultural 
Studies Reader, Simon During writes that “we need to think of cultural studies not as a 
traditional field of discipline, nor as a mode of interdisciplinarity, but as…as a field 
within multidisciplinarity” (27).  He goes on to write that “the point [of cultural 
studies] is not so much to dismantle boundaries as to be able to move across them; the 
aim is to transport methods and attitudes from cultural studies where they are 
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appropriate, but also to be able to forego them when they are not” (27).  In “moving 
across” disciplinary boundaries, I aim to unravel and deconstruct prevalent distinctions 
between science and culture. 
Embracing transdisciplinarity and the founding tenets of cultural studies while 
also informed by Derridean notions of metaphor and Foucauldian approaches to 
embodiment, then, I bring the works of Emerson, Melville, and Whitman into 
conversation with concurrent antebellum discourse in the fields of electricity and 
electromagnetism.  In the chapters that follow, I closely examine vital moments in 
Emerson’s essays, in Moby-Dick, and in Leaves of Grass, drawing these texts into 
encounters with electrical and electromagnetic discourse as manifested in the popular 
culture of the time, as well as in material culture, newspapers, scientific and literary 
journals, and other concurrent literature.  Finally, I investigate how a nineteenth 
century discourse of electromagnetic corporeality had residual effects on American 
popular culture of the past century, by examining the example of iconic American 
entertainers Elvis Presley and Marilyn Monroe, both of whom were frequently noted 
for their supposed bodily “electricity.”  In doing so, I demonstrate how twenty-first 
century notions of corporeality and electricity are informed by an earlier discourse that 
is represented by flashpoints I identify in works composed by the three major 
antebellum American writers whom I study.   
In Chapter One, “‘Conducting the Whole River of Electricity’: Bodies in 
Emerson’s Electromagnetic Fields of Play,” I turn to Ralph Waldo Emerson’s essay 
“The Poet,” where Emerson writes that “man is the conductor of the whole river of 
electricity,” and consider how this anticipates his assertion in “Conduct of Life” that 
42 
 
“the best lightning-rod for your protection is your own spine.”  Clearly, in these and 
other examples, we find that electricity and electromagnetism are recurring themes in 
Emerson’s work, as amply demonstrated by Eric Wilson and others.  Emerson 
undoubtedly had avid interest in this burgeoning field of science, and followed closely 
the work of contemporary pioneers in the field such as Michael Faraday.  But to what 
extent does he employ metaphors of electromagnetic corporeality merely for their 
potential for dramatic and vivid literary effects, and to what extent does he employ 
such metaphors to offer or test earnest scientific hypotheses?  For example, does he 
sincerely offer the hypothesis that one must possess excessive electrical conductivity 
in order to excel as a poet, or do his metaphors merely provide him the vivid poetic 
imagery that might help him to persuade his audiences in a fresh and novel way?  
Does his playful approach to this subject render his claims more malleable and flexible 
than they would otherwise appear at first glance?  
Whereas Wilson would chiefly answer such questions by suggesting that 
Emerson harvested or harnessed electricity in the creation of an “electric” literary 
style, I take issue with this approach and instead attempt to show how Emerson, 
playfully synthesizing various strands of electrical and electromagnetic theory, from 
Swedenborg, to Kant, to Schelling, to Coleridge, to Oersted, proffers a vision of the 
ideal human body as a kind of “superconductor” of divine energy.  In so doing, he 
both reflects and builds upon concurrent scientific and pseudoscientific discourse on 
electromagnetic corporeality, testing out and experimenting with these ideas, while in 
this process offering a mythologized vision of the electrical or electrified body.  
Furthermore, I show how Emerson, reconfiguring and revising over a period of many 
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years a conversation with his friend Henry David Thoreau on lightning-rods and the 
body, stumbled upon a seductive and powerful image of the body as its own best 
lightning-rod, able to conduct and convey electrical current without harm, much like 
the mythologized body of Franklin that is the focus of Benjamin West’s painting.  Far 
from subscribing to this mythology, however, Emerson both plays with and plays 
upon it for its literary effect, without actually “drawing electricity from the sky” and 
conveying it through his language. 
Chapter Two, “Daring to Take the ‘Full Forced Shock’: Emersonian 
Electromagnetic Corporeality in Melville’s ‘The Lightning-Rod Man’ and Moby-
Dick,” asks whether Melville’s work in Moby-Dick is typical of other concurrent sea-
narratives, as Hester Blum would suggest, as he empirically documents the particulars 
of life at sea in order to contemplate revisions or reconfigurations of a larger 
philosophical or metaphorical framework.  If so, to what extent does Melville’s 
deployment of metaphors and imagery associated with electromagnetic corporeality 
demonstrate his efforts at offering commentary or questioning of existing discourse on 
that subject, as represented, for example, by the conversation between Emerson and 
Thoreau that I discuss in Chapter One?   
Electromagnetic corporeality undoubtedly plays a crucial role in both 
Melville’s novel and his short story, revealing an avid interest in the subject that rivals 
that of Emerson, which may be representative of a larger fascination maintained by the 
American reading public in the antebellum era.  Electromagnetic corporeality plays a 
significant role in some of the most dramatic scenes in the novel, perhaps most notably 
in the fact that Ahab’s own body is marked by a lightning-like scar that runs from 
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head to foot, evidencing his survival of an earlier encounter with a lightning-bolt, 
much as Franklin somehow survived his encounter in the kite experiment.  In the 
pivotal chapter “The Quarter-Deck,” in which Ahab finally reveals to his crew his true 
intended purpose for the voyage of the Pequod, he passes “the full-forced shock” of 
“[his] own electric thing” into his ship’s mates when he touches the tips of their 
crossed harpoons and thereby “shock[s] into them the same fiery emotion accumulated 
within the Leyden jar of his own magnetic life,” intimating that Ahab’s magnetism, 
along with his earlier encounter with electricity and survival of its effects, rendered 
him capable of literally conveying that electromagnetic energy to the bodies of other 
individuals.  Another moment of intensity and drama occurs in “The Candles,” in 
which Ahab orders Starbuck to let the lightning rods be rather than lowering them into 
the water so that they might protect the ship from the onslaught of corpusants that 
threaten to set the ship aflame and rend it asunder.  We may wonder in this case if we 
should applaud Ahab for his fearlessness in the face of impending catastrophe, or if we 
should be fearful of his seeming irresponsibility and carelessness, given the lethal 
danger that looms.   
In these and other instances in this novel—as well as in the short story “The 
Lightning-Rod Man”—issues of place become central and defining questions.  Both 
the novel and the short story would have us ask ourselves: are we to feel at place and 
at home in our own bodies, given the threat of natural danger such as lightning strikes?  
Or, in the age of advanced technology that might protect and insulate us from harm, 
should we feel out of place, fearful, and endangered without that protection?  Would it 
be better to be self-reliant and feel comfortable in one’s skin, daring to take the “full-
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forced shock” without the insulation that lightning-rods and other protective devices 
might offer, or would it be better and wiser to depend and rely on such technology?  
Could a strong-willed, self-reliant, independent individual somehow insulate his or her 
body from harm, simply by exercising mind over matter, or is such belief merely 
misguided and wishful thinking, well-suited to a monomaniacal madman such as 
Ahab?   Melville picks up on lines of questioning very similar to those raised by 
Emerson and Thoreau, and through his literary compositions, tests out that line of 
questioning against his own experience on whaling ships.  At the time when Melville 
sailed on the open ocean, lightning strikes on ships were extremely common, often 
with lethal consequences.  From his experiences, he would surely know the very real 
dangers implicit in considering oneself impervious to the threat of lightning strikes.  
Therefore, as I would argue, he is well aware of the dangers implicit in metaphors that 
would mythologize the ideal body as a conductor of electrical energy without any 
insulative protection.  Nevertheless, his blending of realism with romantic speculation 
plays upon, develops, and questions such metaphors when they are considered for 
their plausibility as scientific facts.    
Chapter Three, entitled “The Electrical ‘Charge of the Soul’: Whitman, 
Automata, and the Superconductive Body,” revisits Walt Whitman’s famous phrase, 
“the body electric.”  One should not take for granted the long and complex history of 
the term “electric” and its associations with corporeality.  Yet, according to Whitman 
biographer Jerome Loving, the poem is written when “electric” and “electricity” were 
still not yet “household words” (202).  Therefore, Whitman’s composition of the 
phrase “body electric” is significant and revealing for its novelty.  But to what extent 
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is Whitman’s metaphor “new,” and to what extent does it reiterate already well-
trodden territory?   I argue that Whitman employs electromagnetism as a trope in order 
to attempt to erase boundaries or dichotomies, in the effort of promoting individual 
freedom and avoiding binding his speaker to a single, culturally defined identity.  
More importantly though, I argue that his deployment of electrical metaphors 
illustrates an association between electricity and vitality, where one who possesses 
poetic genius is a sensing, feeling, writing machine, an automaton who not only 
conducts Emerson’s “river of electricity” but is the electricity, where no distinction 
exists between subject and object, animator and animated.  But is it reasonable, then, 
to consider Whitman’s “body electric” an effective metaphor, as described by Jacques 
Derrida in “White Mythology”?  To what extent, by the time of writing Leaves of 
Grass, had Whitman already lost a sense of distinction between the real and the 
metaphorical in relation to electromagnetism?  In other words, is he attempting to 
convey vitality by animating a linguistic device which is already “dead”?  And in this 
process, does his ideal poet somehow become an automaton, or even an “automatic 
writer”?  Does Whitman’s work chart a pathway from the animated to the automated, 
and how does literature, by way of electromagnetic theory, come to be understood as 
generative and life-giving?  What exactly can a poem animate or automate?  I attempt 
to answer these questions through examination of Whitman’s association of 
superconductive bodies with poetic genius. 
Chapter Four, “‘Driving a Brave Trade’: Elvis Presley, Marilyn Monroe, and 
the Legacy of ‘Lightning-Rod Men’ and ‘Bodies Electric’ in America,” considers 
electricity’s discursive status in our current moment.  While we no longer receive 
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lightning-rod salespeople at our door, as did the skeptical and resistant narrator of 
Melville’s short story “The Lightning-Rod Man,” and while we no longer use 
lightning-rods as fashion accessories as we might have in the late eighteenth and early 
nineteenth centuries, we may, if pressed, think of many different incarnations of 
“lightning-rod men” in our culture, or, at the very least, certainly those who would 
“drive a brave trade with the fears of man.”  How are products that would supposedly 
electrify or magnetize our bodies “correctly”—or images of supposedly 
electromagnetically supercharged bodies— marketed and sold?  How are those who 
aspire to become artists or celebrities encouraged to perform and embody 
“electrifying” qualities?   Most importantly, how do these cultural phenomena 
exemplify the manner in which the residue of nineteenth century electromagnetic 
pseudoscience persists to this day?   
I look to the examples of Elvis Presley and Marilyn Monroe to demonstrate 
how Whitman’s imagery of superconductive “bodies electric” resonates with the 
images of these figures that have circulated and continue to circulate in American 
popular culture.  I ask: how were these images perceived, and how do they continue to 
be perceived, given changing cultural contexts and new and emerging technologies of 
the past century?  To answer this question, I examine how Americans of the twentieth 
century came to take for granted clichés regarding what I would call 
“superconductive” bodies, bodies that are claimed naturally to attract, conduct, and 
convey electricity more intensely than others.  Due to this supposed or imaginary 
superhuman conductivity or transmission of “electrical energies,” such bodies become 
associated paradigmatically with a host of loosely related concepts, from 
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enlightenment, to vitality, to sex appeal.  In this process, I show how such clichés blur 
lines between the “real” and the “metaphorical” to the point where meaningful 
distinctions become lost, forgotten, or elided, where the difference between “reality” 
and “virtual reality”—or bodies and “virtual bodies”—becomes increasingly hard to 
distinguish.   
While we may find amusement in the naiveté of nineteenth century attitudes 
toward electricity’s “healing” powers, we may be surprised to learn that our 
understandings of electromagnetic corporeality are still informed—or misinformed—
by pseudoscience, or by mischaracterizations or problematic characterizations of 
electromagnetism that were formed in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.  When 
we encounter images in the media or in literature of some of the archaic practices of 
those physicians who used electricity or magnetism to heal their patients, we may 
scoff, or even laugh, incredulous at the relative ignorance of doctors of a bygone era.  
Playwright Sarah Ruhl has fun with this topic in her Broadway play “In the Next 
Room,” in which she illustrates how 19th century doctors used electrical instruments to 
induce “paroxysms” (a.k.a. orgasms) in their female patients, providing them sexual 
pleasure under the guise of medical care during a time when the existence of orgasms 
for women was a matter of scholarly debate.  Yet this was no laughing matter in the 
late 19th century, and in fact, as we shall see, there was intense controversy in the 
medical field over the proper place of electricity as a treatment for gynecological 
symptoms.  Moreover, in laughing at the medical or pseudo-medical practices of the 
prior century, we may forget not only the longstanding associations made between 
sexuality, sex appeal, sexual health, and electricity (associations that date to the mid-
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18th century), but we may also forget how these associations linger and remain with us 
today.   
Electricity and magnetism are still words used today in association with a sexy, 
compelling, or otherwise attractive performance, and these associations can be traced 
to eighteenth and nineteenth century origins.  So what are we to make of the images of 
“lightning-rod men” (and women) or “bodies electric” that continue to be produced, 
reproduced, repackaged, and resold in our culture?  How, when we are presented with 
images of brains that light up in the presence of assumed neural activity, might we 
mistake electrification for enlightenment?  Is there a difference between the two?  
How has electromagnetic metaphor and analogy been used and abused in our culture, 
and to what end?  By combining analysis of “superconductive bodies” in American 
popular culture with analysis of medical literature and scientific journals, I examine 
this central question: how did eighteenth and nineteenth century “lightning-rod men” 
serve as prototypes that inform many current characterizations of electromagnetic 
corporeality?   
We may find how electromagnetic corporeality came to be embodied in 
American popular culture by analyzing examples of twentieth century American 
celebrities such as Elvis Presley and Marilyn Monroe.  Through comparison of these 
examples to models of electromagnetic corporeality expressed in the culture and 
literature of nineteenth century America, we will discover how genius and 
attractiveness (presumably inspired by electromagnetic influence, or control over 
electromagnetic forces or powers) came to be performed, and what attitudes, 
characteristics, and behaviors would-be celebrities would adopt in order to conform to 
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models of electromagnetically influenced genius and attractiveness: in essence, how 
they would achieve celebrity or the appearance of genius and attractiveness by 
assuming what we might call electromagnetic affect, by becoming, at least in a 
metaphorical sense, “superconductive.”   Moreover, this movement towards desiring 
electromagnetic, superconductive affect is the result of conflation between 
electrification and enlightenment that dates to eighteenth century America, 
exemplified by the Benjamin West painting with which we began this chapter.  As we 
examine the trajectory from Emerson to Whitman, we will see that what began as 
metaphors that would playfully associate electromagnetic corporeality with genius 
erode by Whitman’s era into conflation or confusion of the two concepts, by which we 
would understand that a poetic genius is not just a literary aesthetician, but is also an 
electrician of sorts, who actually conducts and conveys electricity and thereby 
generates a real, sensual, electrical effect on audiences.  While such a poet or 
performer might simulate such an effect, or give the audience the impression that this 
effect has been achieved, it would be a fallacy to claim that actual electricity was 
conducted or conveyed by either the performer or the audience.  In literalizing 
metaphors of conduction and transmission, such clichés would lead us to forget 
differences between simulation and reality.  Through this effacement, we are left with 
dead metaphor that may bear little resemblance to reality:  “the body electric.”           
As we trace the history and genealogy of modern day clichés of 
electromagnetic corporeality, we shall find that each cliché is informed by and 
embedded within a historical and cultural context of impressive complexity and 
breadth.  Metaphors of electromagnetic corporeality have lives and careers of their 
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own, traceable to detours and oscillations between the sensible and the spiritual realm. 
Some anticipate later scientific discovery, and others defy reason and logic, sometimes 
in ways that could have damaging or even destructive effects.  The goal of my project 
is not, however, to offer a “police of metaphors6” that would ban certain usages of 
metaphors of electromagnetic corporeality while endorsing and preserving others.  I 
am not a “literalist”: I don’t believe that the distinctions that some scientists would 
make between metaphor and “reality” are as clear cut or easily classified as they 
would suggest.  “Reality” is constructed through application of metaphorical language 
that would help us make sense of experience.  Moreover, all language is analogous to 
metaphor.  To make our experience and observation coherent to others, we must rely 
on the medium of language, which itself relies on our belief that a word signifies an 
object or phenomenon to which it bears no inherent or self-evidently intuited 
resemblance.  That said, metaphor is often informed by—and reflects—aspects of 
reality, even when it may not seem so at first. 
It is impossible to record and communicate empirical observations without 
relying on metaphor on some level, and, moreover, metaphor is necessary for such 
recording and communication to occur, just as it was necessary for Franklin to resort 
to metaphor to make his observations on electricity readily understood.  The notion of 
metaphor-free scientific discourse is a myth.  That said, a study of the history of 
metaphors of electromagnetic corporeality will amply illustrate not only that 
                                                 
6
 Here I am referring to a phrase used by Bruno Latour in his essay entitled “A Word on Michel Serres’ 
Philosophy.”  In this essay, he attributes the term to work of philosophers Michel Serres and Mary 
Hesse.  Latour summarizes the term in the following way: “In a position akin to that of Mary Hesse,  
Serres is not a ‘literalist,’ believing that there is a strong distinction to be made between literal and 
metaphoric meaning.  Like Hesse, he is not for a ‘police of metaphors’ that would forbid certain uses 
and turn others into precise, literal ones” (94).   
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differences between metaphor and reality exist, but also that these differences matter, 
and have real consequences.  As William Zinsser once said about the difference 
between “sanguine” and “sanguinary,” “the difference is a bloody big one” (9-10).    
It is not my goal to valorize metaphors of electromagnetic corporeality in 
relation to the “reality” of electromagnetic currents that are conducted and transmitted 
by human bodies.  Rather my goal is to show that through literary study, we may 
discover the varied cultural and historical terrain in which such metaphors took shape, 
and observe how, through repeated use, these metaphors were transformed into 
clichés.  By analyzing these clichés and discovering how they arose discursively, we 
may begin to understand the many threads that have been woven over time into 
concepts and stereotypes.  Given the effacement of history that is a chief characteristic 
of dead metaphors or clichés, we may scrutinize and interrogate that which may 
otherwise be taken for granted, and in doing so, better understand how such clichés 
inform our constructions and conceptualizations of our very bodies.  Understanding 
how bodies are socially constructed seems especially crucial at a time when old 
understandings of embodiment are rapidly being challenged, by means of 
technological advance, by notions of virtual embodiment.  By reconstructing the 
“coins” of metaphors long effaced and eroded, we may better understand how and 
why people (and, for the purposes of this study, Americans in particular) talk and 
think about bodies the way they do when they think of them in terms of 
electromagnetic forces, and consider the ramifications of such thinking.   
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CHAPTER 1 
 
“CONDUCTING THE WHOLE RIVER OF ELECTRICITY”: BODIES IN 
EMERSON’S  ELECTROMAGNETIC FIELDS OF PLAY 
 
The best lightning-rod for your protection is your own spine. 
      — Ralph Waldo Emerson 
 
Given nearly universal attribution of the above quotation to Ralph Waldo 
Emerson, it may be easy to forget that it is actually Emerson’s paraphrase of 
something originally uttered by his friend Henry David Thoreau.  In a journal entry 
dated July 6, 1852, Emerson writes that Thoreau “rightly said, the other evening, 
talking of lightning-rods, that the only rod of safety was in the vertebrae of his own 
spine” (435).  But, without the full context of their conversation, how are we to 
understand what may be signified by Thoreau’s turn of phrase, and why it captured 
Emerson’s attention so much that he thought to record this observation in his journal?  
Moreover, what would it mean to say that Thoreau was “right” in making this 
assertion?  Are we to understand this as the shared skepticism of the two men toward 
the safety and effectiveness of lightning-rods, which were, as Herman Melville’s 1853 
short story “The Lightning-Rod Man” vividly illustrates, aggressively marketed and 
sold at that time?  Or, are we to understand this concept in another way?  Surely, to 
think of one’s own spine as literally the best and safest lightning-rod makes little 
sense, as conducting the electrical force of a lightning bolt would kill most human 
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beings, save the rarest of cases.  Is the idea suggestive, then, of a need for Emersonian 
self-reliance in the face of extreme natural danger?  A need to eschew overreliance on 
technology?  Or is it suggestive of a rare power of certain select human beings to 
conduct, control, and convey the most sublime forces of nature through sheer will, 
strength, and talent?  
Despite the apparent pithiness of Emerson’s aphorism, it becomes opaque and 
enigmatic upon further analysis.  It is hard to visualize what exactly a “lightning-rod 
spine” would look like, or why it would be useful.  To our 21st century sensibilities, 
conditioned by vivid science fiction, such an utterance might evoke fantastical images 
of superhuman cyborgs with mechanized organs and appendages.  Yet in the context 
of antebellum America, we may be led to wonder exactly where Emerson’s imagery 
might lead us. Was Emerson imagining a “lightning-rod spine” as a concrete physical 
attribute, a desirable characteristic of actual human bodies?  Or was such a “spine” 
more suggestive of a particular frame of mind, like the proverbial “backbone” that 
weak-willed individuals are often encouraged to acquire?  In a time when the 
increasing popularity of Franklin’s lightning-rods was accompanied by similar 
expansion of both fire departments and fire insurance (also inspired by Franklin), is 
Emerson’s assertion that one may already freely possess a spine that would insulate 
one from harm (and therefore ensure one’s security and comfort) to be understood as a 
reaction against such fear-induced commercialism and economic expansion?  In short, 
are we to understand Emerson’s revision of his conversation with Thoreau as an 
earnest attempt at scientific hypothesis regarding human biology (i.e. some people 
have spines which are more resistant to electromagnetic current or which have greater 
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capacity to withstand its influence), or are we to understand his formulation as a turn 
of phrase, an example of figurative language used symbolically to convey a certain 
philosophical attitude that could aid one’s survival and success, without any inferences 
about anatomical or physical differences between human bodies?  Both?  Neither?  
While such questions may prove ultimately difficult to settle with any sense of 
certainty, closer inspection may shed light on Emerson’s playfulness with language, as 
he straddles boundaries between body and mind, science and language, biology and 
philosophy.  As I will argue in this chapter, this playful balancing act reveals the ways 
in which Emerson toys with science to help us reimagine relations between the body 
and nature.  
Before further interrogating some of the effects of Emerson’s playfulness with 
language and concepts of electricity—or, more tellingly, how this plays itself out in 
his exchange with Thoreau—we might begin by examining Emerson’s own attitudes 
toward play itself.  In a journal entry dated April 19th, 1835, Emerson wrote, “it is a 
happy talent to know how to play” (470).  Happy indeed!  We might well remind 
ourselves, as Emerson’s good friend Margaret Fuller did in an 1845 Tribune article, of 
the line from the classic nursery rhyme that reads: “all work and no play makes Jack a 
dull boy.”   Speaking of the line, Fuller wrote that we have to “fight a good fight for 
our amusements, either with the foils of excuse…or the sharp weapons of argument” 
(qtd. in Zwarg 214).   But recent theorists in the emerging field of play studies would 
go even further, as they would consider play a vital component of cognitive 
development and argue that play not only offers children (and adults) outlets to 
express joy and pleasure, but can also lead to creative discoveries.   Play, in the form 
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of pretending and experimentation, can inspire innovation that may not necessarily 
arise from activities that we might otherwise traditionally classify as “work.”   Stephen 
Nachmanovitch, a pioneer in play studies, boldly asserts for example that “all creative 
acts are forms of play, the starting place of creativity in the human growth cycle” (42).  
Although Nachmanovitch’s claim may strike some of us as revolutionary, many have 
argued long before him that play is essential to the development of the human mind.   
In fact, this tradition was very much embodied by philosophers of the Romantic era, 
such as Kant and Schilling, who served as important predecessors to the thought of 
Emerson.  Matthew Kaiser, a literary scholar who specializes in play studies, argues 
that “popular debates…reached a boiling point in the nineteenth century about the 
meaning and value of play as a central component of human experience” (34).  If this 
is so, we may begin to understand why play might be important not only to Emerson’s 
philosophy, but also why it may have informed his approach to writing essays. 
While Emerson is certainly careful to temper his enthusiasm for play in his 
1835 journal entry by noting that “some men must always work if they would be 
respectable” (470), he nonetheless does sincerely value play.  Yet such an attitude 
would run counter to the so-called “Puritan work ethic” stereotypically applied to 
Emerson’s early colonial Massachusetts forebears, if not also Emerson and his 
contemporaries.  Subscribers to Max Weber’s theories on the subject may assume that 
an attitude of industrial capitalism, which eschews idleness in favor of productivity 
and profitability, was the prevailing attitude among American thinkers during the era 
of burgeoning industry and economic growth that marked the antebellum period.  We 
may easily forget, however, that Weber’s phrase was a 20th century coinage, 
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something neither known to antebellum Americans, nor their colonial counterparts. 
Still, Emerson’s attitudes do occasionally lend credence to Weber’s theory and show 
that, at least in part, he exemplified it.  Steeped in the Massachusetts Unitarianism of 
the First Church of Boston, heir to the original church in which such Puritan 
luminaries as Increase Mather and Cotton Mather had previously taken the pulpit, 
Emerson, like his predecessors, does often rail against the idleness and complacency 
of his fellow Americans.  In this way, he recalls Protestant calls for abstinence from 
the deadly sin of sloth.  This is famously evidenced, for example, when he chides the 
younger set of Harvard scholars in his “American Scholar” address to embrace a 
vision of the nation in which “the sluggard intellect of this continent will look from 
under its iron lids.”  Yet it is intellectual idleness and complacency which is the 
primary target of his criticism, not physical idleness, as was so often the case in the 
writings of influential American predecessors such as Benjamin Franklin.  
Emerson reveals a more nuanced attitude toward play than we might otherwise 
expect.   If we were to limit ourselves to understanding his philosophy as indicative of 
what Weber and his followers might understand to be the developing American ethos 
and character in the early 19th century, we might be easily led to conflate Emerson’s 
attitudes with that of a larger “Puritan work ethic” that characterized America of the 
time, if not also America of today.  But it is important to remember that for Emerson, 
play is not necessarily antithetical to work, in a dichotomy that would view it as an 
undesirable alternative to more profitable, less wasteful endeavors.  Rather, play, in 
the form of imagination and creativity, could be an engine for intellectual growth that 
would help Americans to awaken from their intellectual slumbers and think for 
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themselves, rather than merely reciting inherited dogma.  Taken in this light, it is not 
play which prevents antebellum Americans from prying open their “iron lids,” but 
rather a lack of play and creativity that does so.  While Emerson concedes in “The 
American Scholar” that industry and industriousness abounds in America, he also 
engages in a jeremiad that bemoans the intellectual laziness that prevents the young 
nation from achieving “something better than the exertions of mechanical skill.”  As 
such, Emerson plays both sides of the coin: he defends “play” as a useful and 
productive endeavor, while at the same time aligning himself with a mindset that 
values that which might be more universally and traditionally understood as “work.”  
Yet he is mindful to temper his enthusiasm for play as it is often commonly 
understood (as a kind of holiday from labor), as play in essence becomes for him a 
different kind of work, a work that is nonetheless necessary and vital to supplement 
and ameliorate mere industrial labor and the “exertion of mechanical skill.”    
 Emerson felt a need to temper his enthusiasm for play because he keenly felt 
the need to distance himself from criticisms of Transcendentalism that would view it 
as precisely the sort of idle endeavor that would run counter to what from a modern 
standpoint we might deem the “Protestant work ethic” of the era.  Emerson scholar 
Len Gougeon puts it this way: “Emerson was well aware of criticisms that his 
Transcendental philosophizing was, literally, a waste of time and energy” (53).  
Underscoring this point, Gougeon then goes on to offer an example from an 1840 
journal entry in which Emerson writes that his “essays [are a] sort of apology to [his] 
country for [his] apparent idleness.”  Emerson does not admit to his own idleness 
caused by engaging his body and energy in philosophical pursuits.  Rather, he is 
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keenly aware of the possibility of that perception among an American public that 
frequently expresses disdain for sloth.  As such, he works actively to resist and combat 
that perception.  It is the labor of literary and philosophical production—and, more 
importantly, the linguistic and discursive play that work as vital components of that 
labor—that may then offer ample justification for his activities and his use of time.   
 For Emerson, then, appreciation of play and playfulness is not limited merely 
to stealing away to enjoy one’s favorite pastime in lieu of physical labor.  Rather it 
embodies a desirable characteristic of literature.  We can see this, for example, in his 
critique of the sonnets of his friend and fellow Transcendentalist, Jones Very, in 1842.  
In an otherwise generally sympathetic review of Very’s work, Emerson notes that the 
sonnets “have little range of topics, no extent of observation, no playfulness” (161).  
From this it is assumed that Very’s lack of playfulness is a detriment to the quality of 
his work.  We might contrast Emerson’s criticism of Very with his praise of his friend 
Bronson Alcott, when he says of him in 1842 that “where he is greeted by loving and 
intelligent persons, his discourse soars to a wonderful height, so regular, so lucid, so 
playful, so new and disdainful of all boundaries of tradition and experience, that the 
hearers seem no longer to have bodies or material gravity” (226).  Emerson reveals his 
love for playfulness in language in both written and spoken form, by presenting it as a 
trait worthy of admiration.  In Alcott’s case, discursive playfulness could, at least in a 
figurative sense, suspend otherwise immutable laws of physics.  Just as Emerson 
playfully imagines in “Worship” the human being who could defy nature and 
withstand the force of a lightning bolt, so too does he imagine the human being who 
through language could defy gravity.  But this attitude should not be surprising, for, as 
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we see expressed elsewhere in Conduct of Life, language and play should go hand in 
hand.  For example, in “Illusions,” Emerson writes: “'tis the charm of practical men, 
that outside of their practicality are a certain poetry and play” (260).  For Emerson, the 
individual is great who is rigid neither in personality nor in language.  In fact, it is this 
kind of flexibility of belief, playfulness of style, and willingness to “lift a corner of the 
curtain” that, in Emerson’s opinion, makes one truly great or interesting. 
This flexibility of belief, or playfulness of style, might be understood in 
material, physical, corporeal ways as well, however.  At a time when outward physical 
appearance or countenance could represent one’s intellectual and emotional makeup, 
could a person who possesses a flexible spine, a spine with “play,” likewise possess a 
playful, flexible personality?  Would a rigid, rod-like spine then be a detriment to 
one’s health or well-being?  Would it insulate and protect the individual from harm?  
Or would the healthy spine be able to oscillate fluidly between states of flexibility and 
rigidity?  Would its ability to oscillate and flow between such states demonstrate its 
ability to conduct and circulate electromagnetic energy without impedance?  Could 
“playing” with one’s spine help these flows to circulate?   
Although chiropractic was not introduced as alternative medicine until nearly 
the turn of the century, we may wonder to what extent Emerson’s thinking may have 
anticipated this field, especially as chiropractic found its origins in pseudoscientific 
applications of “electromagnetism.”  This effort is perhaps best exemplified by D. D. 
Palmer, who wished, like Mesmer and others done had over a century before, to apply 
these beliefs to “medical” practice.  Palmer, widely understood as the founder of 
American chiropractic, was fascinated with such connections, writing for example that 
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 There is an emanation from us, not magical or miraculous, but a subtle, 
  invisible substance, capable of perception, which consciously or  
  unconsciously magnetizes, influences, more or less, every person and 
  object with which we come in contact.  (qtd. in Coddington 94) 
 
As Mary Coddington observes, Palmer “believed that this energy-giving life to the 
body was actually nerve-force; that it was generated in the cells of the brain and the 
spinal cord” (95).  This in turn would “give power to the organs, as electricity is sent 
out through wires” (95).  By this thinking, the skillful chiropractor could somehow 
manipulate the spine and by so doing manipulate the life-energy or electricity that the 
spine might generate or conduct.  But Palmer’s thinking did not happen by accident; it 
did not happen in a vacuum.  The linguistic play of writers like Emerson paved the 
way for Palmer and others to find the words and concepts that made their scientific 
and pseudoscientific “discoveries” possible.  That said, Palmer and others like him 
may have taken leaps in reason and imagination that Emerson himself would have 
never dreamed of making.  While Emerson’s playfulness of language around 
electromagnetism and the body might be understood as representative of a form a 
conceptual prerequisite for the type of thinking that informed Palmer’s later assertions, 
Emerson himself may have been playful with such thinking without necessarily 
staking out firm scientific hypotheses and generalizations.  In fact, Emerson’s 
tendencies to contradict such generalizations in his own writing may help us to 
understand his ambivalence or skepticism toward unquestioning scientific application 
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of such ideas, as well as his pragmatic and nuanced approach to incorporating them.  
 Writing on Emerson’s “pragmatism,” and in particular, how Emerson would 
define “genius,” Stanley Cavell writes that for Emerson “genius is, as for Plato, 
something each person has, not something certain people are” (74).   Remarking on 
Emerson’s claim in “Self-Reliance” that “in every work of genius we recognize our 
own rejected thoughts [which] come back to us with a certain alienated majesty,” 
Cavell argues that such an approach “requires what Emerson calls ‘experimenting,’ 
something Thoreau calls ‘trying’ people” (74).  Cavell goes on to pose the following 
questions: 
   
  Does what you might call science, or its philosophy, have an  
  understanding of this use of experimentation, experimentation as  
  provocation?  Is this use less important than the understanding science 
  requires?  (74)   
 
By focusing on this quote of Emerson’s and asking these questions of it, Cavell 
touches upon two very rich insights.  First, the idea of “experimentation as 
provocation” seems central to Emerson’s approaches to writing as he “tries” people or 
“ideas” by building upon borrowed claims from other writers or thinkers in order to 
test them and provoke further interrogation and thought, while reserving the right to 
reject or dismiss such thoughts at a later date.  At the same time, his ability to see 
“genius” in other people’s writing reflected in thoughts that he himself had “rejected” 
demonstrates an openness to reinvestigation or rethinking of old ideas, a willingness 
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not only to provoke others through his writing, but to be provoked by the writing of 
others.   Emerson and Thoreau were both well aware that, to seek truth, practitioners 
of science might privilege more narrowly defined empirical evidence as opposed to 
experimentation limited merely to a linguistic or literary realm.  Yet Emerson and 
Thoreau may not be in agreement that an understanding that is achieved through 
literary experimentation is necessarily “less important” than what “science requires.”  
Not only could Emerson’s play with words play upon existing scientific discovery, but 
it could also inform future scientific discovery.         
Emerson’s appreciation for play might help to reveal his playful and pragmatic 
attitudes to his own writing, his ability and willingness to play with, try out, and try on 
inherited concepts by posing generalizations about them, only to contradict himself in 
short order.  Far from shying away from a habit of playing with words and ideas, 
Emerson vehemently defends this practice and advises others to follow it, telling 
readers or auditors of his essay “Self-Reliance,” for example, to “speak what you think 
to-day in words as hard as cannon-balls, and to-morrow speak what tomorrow thinks 
in hard words again, though it contradict everything you said to-day” (120).  
Emerson’s willingness to play with language may remind us of another sense of the 
word “play”: flexibility, or lack of tautness.  While one who dutifully followed 
Emerson’s advice might be viewed as hard-headed or inflexible to a given audience on 
a given day, thus risking an impression of appearing stern or lacking in playfulness, 
one’s willingness to contradict oneself just as vigorously the next day might reveal the 
benefits of play as an intellectual endeavor.  According to this line of thinking, one 
could give the impression of utter rigidity of spine and total implacability of 
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philosophical position, while still retaining the freedom to free oneself from the 
rigidity of those positions the very next day (or even the very next moment).    
Taking Emerson’s lessons from “Self-Reliance” into consideration, we might 
conclude that he would have us think that when one is faced with new avenues of 
thought, one should not remain static but should rather mirror the dynamism of nature, 
embracing flexibility and play.  This is a view of nature, incidentally, that runs counter 
to a Newtonian or Lockean model which would tend to see the world as conforming to 
certain immutable laws.  It is a view that is open to change, open to lack of 
conformity, open to nature’s sometimes fickle ways.  Momentary hard-headedness is 
not, however, the problem that primarily bothers Emerson; rather, it is consistent hard-
headedness, an inability to move, change, and allow oneself to be malleable in the face 
of emerging discoveries, that poses the biggest threat to intellectual vitality.  For 
Emerson, it is stasis and consistency, an unwillingness to move or be moved, that 
leads to intellectual complacency, stupor, and idleness.  Play is distinguished from 
idleness, and may even be understood as antithetical to it.      
Like a game of dress-up in which we might try on or try out different costumes 
and assimilate ourselves to the characters and attitudes that such costumes would 
represent, a willingness to try on and try out new ideas in language likewise might 
help us to determine what ideas work for us or seem wise or sensible at any given 
moment.  This movement is evident in Emerson’s thinking, for example, when he 
offers the following argument in “Natural History of the Intellect”: 
 
65 
 
No wonder the children love masks and costumes, and play horse, play 
soldier, play school, play bear, and delight in theatricals.  The children 
have only the instinct of the universe, in which becoming something 
else is the perpetual game of nature, and death the penalty of standing 
still.  ‘Tis not less in thought.  I cannot conceive any good in a thought 
which confines and stagnates.  (58) 
 
Emerson’s strong claims in “Self-Reliance” (and elsewhere) about ridding oneself of 
any perceived need for consistency, may offer compelling evidence of an apt analogy 
between the benefits of child’s play and that of playfulness or flexibility in thought. 
Consider another definition of play offered in the OED: “to move about 
swiftly, with a lively, irregular, or capricious motion; to spring, fly, or dart to and fro; 
to gambol, frisk; to flit [or] flutter.”  With this definition in mind, we may see how 
Emerson’s playful attitudes toward language also manifest themselves as he moves 
energetically between different ideas at a rapid pace, darting from here to there, like a 
fast moving bird or insect.  Thinking in these terms, we might begin to see the 
importance of play as a component of Emerson’s literary aesthetics, and understand 
how playfulness is characteristic of Emerson’s literary output, and even his writing 
style. 
But play may not only be at the heart of artistic endeavors such as literature; it 
is also at the heart of science, a subject in which Emerson took great interest.  An 
overemphasis on the importance of data to scientific “work” might distract us from the 
simple fact that such data are the results of experimentation, or, to put it another way, 
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“play.”  Often we make scientific discoveries through trial and error, by seeing what 
works and doesn’t work in any given situation, and then making conclusions and 
predicting future outcomes by relating current experience to past experience.  Other 
times we may stumble upon scientific discoveries by experimenting and bringing 
about accidental outcomes, as was the case for Danish physicist Hans Christian 
Oersted. 
But play is certainly not all fun and games, and is not necessarily to be trifled 
with.  Sometimes play in the name of pursuit of knowledge can lead to destruction, 
even self-destruction.   Some early pioneers in 18th century electrical theory found out 
this lesson the hard way.  It is easy, as argued in the previous chapter, to romanticize 
Benjamin Franklin, whose “play,” in the form of his famous kite experiment, 
demonstrated his ability to channel electrical energy and thus show not only that 
lightning was composed of the same electricity generated artificially in the laboratory, 
but also that humankind could control lightning and protect themselves from it, thus 
leading to the revolutionary invention of the lightning-rod.  Yet we are wise to 
remember that in building up Franklin as a kind of Prometheus figure, we may easily 
forget that this was the same Franklin—an imperfect, mortal man—who, as we have 
already discussed, nearly killed himself by electrocution in his attempt to cook a 
turkey with a Leyden jar.  We might forget too that Franklin’s experiment was just one 
of many dangerous electrical experiments performed around the globe, sometimes 
with catastrophic consequences, as evidenced by the death of Richmann, just to name 
one example.  While “playing with fire” may be a tired expression, we may 
nonetheless concede that trial and error can be a dangerous practice, as any young 
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would-be scientist who sticks a conductive metal object into an electrical outlet would 
know.  Safely said, while play may be a creative force, it can also be destructive. 
While play is creative, it can also lead to untruths.  In the course of imagining 
the various potentialities of experiences we’ve had or concepts we have inherited, we 
may try on and try out ideas that are fallacious, sometimes with problematic 
consequences.  For every established scientific theory, there have been countless false 
conclusions or pseudoscientific theories that have emerged.  This is certainly the case 
for the sciences of electricity and magnetism, for which related pseudoscience still 
persists to this day.  Mesmerism serves as a powerful example of how discovery of 
certain scientific truths might inspire play that would lead to erroneous conclusions, as 
speculators imagine potentialities which may bear little or no resemblance to reality.  
Yet the bodily metaphors of mesmerism might nonetheless prove to be seductive, even 
if mesmerism itself might be rejected or treated with skepticism as a legitimate 
medical cure or practice by the person who might employ such metaphors.      
Given the fact that Emerson was compelled to read extensively on the leading 
topics of the day, and considering the revolutionary nature of recent discoveries in the 
fields of electricity and magnetism, it should come as no surprise that Emerson 
deploys metaphors of electromagnetism in writing.  The groundbreaking discoveries 
of these decades in which Emerson was a young man would have a profound impact 
on the lives and thoughts of Emerson and his contemporaries.  While the obvious and 
profound influence of figures such as Coleridge, Goethe, and others associated with 
the Transatlantic philosophical and literary movement that became known as 
Romanticism undeniably left a mark on Emerson’s formulation of his own brand of 
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transcendentalism, we are yet left wondering if he unquestioningly follows their lead, 
in terms of accepting their ideas as scientific fact. 
Part of the problem in distinguishing differences between mid-nineteenth 
century literary metaphors and sincere scientific hypotheses of that era occurs because 
these categories could be so easily blurred.  In fact, from a literary standpoint, it might 
be argued that the poet who possessed a powerful enough intellect and imagination 
might through his poetic performance render the object of his imagination somehow 
real.  In other words, the adept poet would through metaphor and vivid imagery 
construct ideas or objects so seemingly real that they would appear indeed real, or at 
least real in the imagination of the reader: embodied, or at the very least virtually 
embodied, in material form.  This is expressed for example by the Scottish essayist 
Thomas Carlyle, when he writes the following in praise of Goethe’s poetic genius: 
  
 Two circumstances, meanwhile, we have remarked, which to us throw 
  light on the nature of [Goethe’s] original faculty for Poetry, and go far 
  to convince us of the Mastery he has attained in that art : […] The first 
  is, his singularly emblematic intellect; his perpetual never-failing  
  tendency to transform into shape, into life, the opinion, the feeling that 
  may dwell in him; which, in its widest sense, we reckon to be  
  essentially the grand problem of the Poet. We do not mean mere  
  metaphor and rhetorical trope: these are but the exterior concern, often 
  but the scaffolding of the edifice, which is to be built up (within our 
  thoughts) by means of them…Everything has form, everything has  
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  visual existence ; the poet's imagination bodies forth the forms of  
  things unseen, his pen turns them to shape.  (211-2) 
 
As Carlyle was a close friend of Emerson, as well as a very influential figure in 
Emerson’s life and work, we may wonder if Emerson’s view of metaphor and the 
poetic imagination might resemble that of Carlyle.  If metaphors are truly only the 
“scaffolding of the edifice,” could that mean that the poet of great intellect and genius 
could in fact through adept versification transform an aggregate of metaphors into 
concrete, material reality?  Can words actually take shape, or bring about shape?  Can 
one “body forth” “forms of things unseen,” solely through the power of the 
imagination?  If so, could the poet who employs electromagnetic metaphors in relation 
to the body actually “body forth” an electromagnetic body?  It is not clear that such 
questions would be merely rhetorical in nature. 
 Given this difficulty in distinguishing between metaphor and scientific 
hypothesis, it may be difficult to determine the extent to which Emerson truly believed 
that a great poet or orator could manipulate electromagnetic energies through 
performance.  Emerson undoubtedly had an avid interest in electromagnetic science, 
expressed for example in his interest in the research and experimentation of Michael 
Faraday, and in particular, Faraday’s discoveries regarding electromagnetic induction.7 
However, if we remember that Emerson’s primary role was that of an essayist, and not 
                                                 
7
 Eric Wilson is among a number of recent scholars who have commented on the influence of Faraday 
on Emerson’s thinking and work, noting how Faraday’s 1831 discovery of electromagnetic induction 
influenced Emerson’s later thinking, an influence expressed for example in Emerson’s 1854 essay on 
Faraday in which he writes that “when we should arrive at the monads or primordial elements, the 
supposed little cubes or prisms of which all matter was built up, we should not find cubes, or prisms, or 
atoms at all, but spherules of force.” 
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that of a scientist, perhaps Emerson’s deployment of electromagnetic tropes in his 
essays is not necessarily evidence of his faithful subscription to inherited scientific 
theories, but rather serves as evidence of his playing with such ideas and trying them 
on.  Remembering the etymology of the word essay and its derivation from the French 
verb essayer, or “to try,” we might be well-advised to remember that essays are 
exactly that: tries.  In this regard, Emerson is not necessarily interested in nailing to 
the wall certain unshakable, immutable truths, but rather he would pursue active 
engagement in the free play and interplay of ideas.  Through such discursive play, he 
may unearth new possibilities by unhinging from its moorings what might otherwise 
be considered common sense or established fact.  
Such nuance appears to be lost to Eric Wilson in his study of Emerson’s 
employment of electromagnetic tropes.  Wilson would have us believe that Emerson 
actually thought that simply by making references to electromagnetism in his work, he 
would somehow literally electrify his own writing and thereby electrify and excite his 
audiences.  Wilson argues, for example, that “an electric universe called for an electric 
style,” and that consequently, Emerson, who, “no doubt with Faraday in mind,” turned 
to language that would be “electric, capable of shocking and attracting readers, of 
overwhelming them with force, of inspiring sublime vision” (13).  But what exactly 
does this mean?  What exactly is “electric language” or “electric style”?  Surely, like 
electricity, language can be used to shock oneself or others, but is there really such a 
thing as language that is itself electric?  And even if such a thing as “electromagnetic 
language” existed, couldn’t it repel as well as attract?  Couldn’t one resist its 
“overwhelming force?”  And is this really Emerson’s modus operandi, to 
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“overwhelm” his readers and auditors by “force,” in a militaristic linguistic equivalent 
of what we now call “shock and awe?” 
Wilson puts it this way: “[Emerson] harvested real lightning in his tropes, 
deployed to shock his age into gods on earth” (14).   But such a reading fails to 
distinguish between what is in fact “real” and what is not.  It goes without saying that 
Emerson does not harvest “real lightning” in his language, and, moreover, it is hard to 
tell exactly what that would mean in practice.  Yet Emerson nonetheless playfully 
projects a model of the poet, writer, and orator as a kind of “lightning-rod” that can 
both conduct the energy of the universe without injury, and then pass that energy to 
others in the form of language, and, especially, verse.  It is an attractive and powerful 
image when used as a literary device, but not necessarily a scenario that Emerson 
believed could be replicated or reproduced in actual, material, physical practice.    
While Wilson elsewhere offers useful insight into the ways that the emerging 
science of electromagnetism informed Emerson’s thought, it is less clear that Wilson 
is correct to infer that the goal of Emerson’s writing or oratory was to electrically 
shock his audiences into submission to his will.  Are we to think of Emerson’s 
language as a sort of taser—or, from a nineteenth century perspective, a Leyden jar—
designed for the purposes of shocking—and awing—the crowd?  Surely Emerson did 
make analogies between magnetism and persuasive leaders and orators, but he did not 
think this was necessarily good.  To attribute the characteristics of Emerson’s prose 
style wholly to a single source of inspiration, as Wilson does with electromagnetism, 
seems a hasty generalization.  It would likewise be misguided to limit the potentiality 
of his language to one defining metaphor.  And, given Emerson’s predilection for 
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contradictions and his repeated calls to have his listeners and readers think for 
themselves, independent of the lessons taught by their appointed superiors, we might 
ask the following question: can we trust his cannonball-like proclamations as hard, 
concrete truths, and, furthermore, would he want his listeners to do so?  An approach 
that would claim that Emerson’s invocation of the sublime is intended to force 
submission to his presumably superior will fails to acknowledge fully the playfulness 
of Emerson’s philosophy, as well as his language.    
  To support his claim that Emerson’s words were “electric,” and, moreover, 
intended to shock his audiences into submission, Wilson offers commentary on a 
number of passages from Emerson’s work in which he compares effective writing or 
speaking with elements of electromagnetism, or, more precisely, the effects of 
electromagnetism.  For example, Wilson writes that “Emerson could claim in 1838 
that good oration is like magnetism, electricity” (109).  He goes on to assert that at this 
same time Emerson “began to associate powerful spoken words with electricity, a 
connection that he would consistently make” (109).  According to Wilson, this 
understanding of the presence of underlying electricity that charges the powerful 
spoken word soon came to be used by Emerson in application to the written word.  
Wilson points to Emerson’s observation that the written text “should become a new & 
permanent substance added to the world,” charged by “chemical affinity” (109).  Later 
in this same paragraph, Wilson observes that Emerson moreover believed that 
“eloquence, written or spoken, vitalizes its audience with electricity,” as it, in 
Emerson’s words, “thrills and agitate[s] mankind” (109).   
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Yet Emerson’s supposedly unequivocal giddiness at the thought of powerful 
orators or writers inherently delivering electricity, magnetism, or electromagnetism 
through the form of the spoken or written word is called into question when we 
consider numerous contradictory statements made by Emerson on this point.  Consider 
Emerson’s assertions in his essay “Demonology,” for example, where he writes that 
“the best are never demoniacal or magnetic; leave this limbo to the Prince of the 
power of the air” (22).  Far from applauding the supposed “magnetism” of leaders and 
orators, Emerson writes disparagingly of pseudoscientific “animal magnetism” and 
Mesmerism in this essay, as well as those who would claim to practice it or use it to 
gain advantage over others.   Clearly unimpressed by practitioners of animal 
magnetism, Emerson frankly puts it this way: “these adepts have mistaken flatulency 
for inspiration” (26).  Calling animal magnetism  a “black art,” on par with “the 
divination of contingent events, and the alleged second sight of the pseudo-
spiritualists,” and practiced by “dilletanti,” Emerson’s work in “Demonology” leaves 
no question that at least he adopts a strongly condescending attitude to animal 
magnetism as a legitimate practice and belief.  But, if Emerson is so dismissive of 
“animal magnetism,” then how are we to read his other references to electricity, 
magnetism, and electromagnetism, as they appear in other contexts, as somehow 
rooted in “legitimate” science?  In other words, when he makes use of terms and 
phrases borrowed from these fields, how do we know what to take seriously as a 
statement of fact or belief, and what to consider as convenient borrowings from 
quackery?  In essence, where do we draw the line between legitimate science and 
pseudoscience, and more importantly, where does Emerson?  Clearly, restoring such 
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omitted rejections of “animal magnetism” into a conversation on Emerson’s use of 
electricity and magnetism in his writing is important to consider, as it offers a different 
narrative than that offered by Wilson.   
We might take a similar approach to other scholarship that has offered 
extensive commentary on the link between Emerson and both the science and 
pseudoscience associated with electricity and magnetism.  In the absence of 
acknowledging and sorting out Emerson’s contradictions on the matter, a default 
conclusion might be that he somehow deploys “real” electricity and magnetism in his 
language, which can also be seen and felt through formal analysis of his “electric 
words” and “electric style.”  We can see this movement, for example, in the work of 
Ann Rutherford Carter, whose dissertation on the subject serves as an important 
precursor to this current study.  Without blinking, Carter observes for example that for 
Emerson, “through a natural extension of this transfer of energy from poet to poem, 
the reader also receives an electrical charge” (68).  While Carter is correct to identify 
this underlying current that exists in Emerson’s thinking when he imagines a model 
for the exchange between nature, the poet/writer/speaker, and his or her audience, she 
fails to acknowledge the fallacy of her claim: the reader does not receive any actual 
electrical charge, nor, I would add, is this what Emerson would have us believe.  
While we have probably all at least at one time in our lives felt a tingle in our legs or 
spines upon hearing the words and intonations of a powerful orator, just as MSNBC 
commentator Chris Matthews claimed upon hearing Barack Obama speak, it is not 
actual electricity that is transmitted from the speaker to the auditor, even if the words 
that are heard inspire neural activity that approximates this phenomenon.  In fact, as 
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Emerson’s claims in “Demonology” reveal, Emerson might view such pseudo-
scientific, “pseudo-spiritualist,” or “semi-medical” thinking as a form of black magic. 
Indeed, he might consider it part of the realm of “demonology” which he describes.  
Yet this doesn’t prevent Emerson from leaning upon such imagery in his writing, by 
imagining such a fantastical transaction occurring and employing it as a vivid trope to 
illustrate his claims.  In essence, it doesn’t stop him from playing with this imagery 
and trying it out, in the days before ideas of a “magnetic” speaker had become tired 
and clichéd, as they are today.  Through this play, he simultaneously tests out the 
scientificity of these ideas without necessarily lending them credence as scientific fact. 
Through his vivid and suggestive imagery, we may imagine fiery electrical energy 
leaping from the mouth of the orator or the pen of the poet and streaming directly to 
our eyes, ears, nerves, and brains.  
Yet some Emerson scholarship would employ a formalistic approach to 
identify the moments in his writing where electrical and magnetic energy is somehow 
transmitted and transferred, as if we could alchemically recreate Emerson’s linguistic 
experiments through language and create proverbial sparks of our own.  Eric Wilson 
does this, for example, when he attempts to demonstrate the electricity and sublimity 
produced by Emerson’s choices of words and sounds, as if Emerson had read up on 
twentieth century New Criticism during his youth at Harvard.  In this regard, Wilson’s 
approach to Emerson, while fascinating in its creativity, is strikingly ahistorical.   
In one particular section of Wilson’s study of the influence of 
electromagnetism on Emerson’s writing style, he argues that Emerson’s use of “s” and 
“i” sounds in a particular passage underscores the sublime impact of his language as it 
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recreates sounds associated with electrical phenomena, as well as the fire that may 
ensue (presumably after a lightning strike, we might imagine?).  This passage of 
Emerson’s from “Nature” serves as the subject of Wilson’s close reading:  
 
The moment our discourse rises above the ground line of familiar facts, 
and is inflamed with passion or exalted by thought, it clothes itself in 
images. A man conversing in earnest, if he watch his intellectual 
processes, will find that always a material image, more or less 
luminous, arises in his mind, contemporaneous with every thought, 
which furnishes the vestment of the thought. Hence, good writing and 
brilliant discourse are perpetual allegories. This imagery is 
spontaneous. It is the blending of experience with the present action of 
the mind. It is proper creation. It is the working of the Original Cause 
through the instruments he has already made.  
 
According to Wilson’s reading of the passage, “'s' sounds, prominent in 'rises', 
likewise pervade the passage…caus[ing] the passage to hiss with the smoke of the 
flames as the inflamed 'i's' rise” (122).   Presumably, the sizzling “s” and “z” sounds, 
in concert with the “inflamed ‘i’s,” recreate the sounds of electricity, and more 
importantly, its consequences (i.e. fire), all of which for Wilson represents the 
sublime.  What Wilson fails to acknowledge as he is carried away by the spiraling 
logic of his close reading is that there is no explicit mention of electricity in this 
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passage, nor in the entire essay from which it was taken8.  Still, if we concede that the 
passage alludes to electrical force or at least attempts to mimic its processes in some 
way, we must also stop to remember that electricity itself is soundless: the cracks and 
sizzles we might hear in the presence of a spark or bolt of lightning are simply effects 
of its energy as it reacts with air and matter.  Were Emerson recreating the sounds of 
electricity, he would be doing so with a certain degree of ignorance regarding the 
science of electricity.  Moreover, while Wilson would have us believe that Emerson 
earnestly understands “real” electricity as working via a conduit between nature, the 
writer, and an audience, he misses this key component of Emerson’s thought as 
expressed in this very passage: “discourse…[that becomes] inflamed with passion or 
exalted by thought…clothes itself in images.”  In other words, any suggestion of 
electricity or fire may be viewed as just that: imagery, clothing or vestments that one 
might try on or try out for its effects.  Emerson plays with electrical fire in more ways 
than one, if we follow Wilson’s argument to its logical conclusions.   
   Despite his disavowal of animal magnetism and its trappings in 
“Demonology,” Emerson is not afraid to use elements of this pseudoscientific thought 
as a kind of clothing or vestment for the ideas he wishes to express.  For example, we 
may find elements of it when he refers to the “electric touch” of English ideas in 
“Ability,” or, as we shall see later in this chapter, his repeated proposition that some 
human bodies are more conductive than others.  We must wonder to what extent 
Emerson was moved by his friend Margaret Fuller’s assertion that a woman has a 
“superior susceptibility to magnetic or electric influence” (74).  The sense of being 
“inflamed with passion” also, not coincidentally, ironically strikes a chord with 
                                                 
8
 The excerpt is extracted from Chapter 4 of Emerson’s essay “Nature.” 
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notions of Mesmerism and animal magnetism, in that such a condition could also be 
viewed as an illness and not necessarily a positive trait.  Fuller, a chronic sufferer of 
headaches and other physical ailments, and a woman who generally subscribed to 
notions of animal magnetism after finding relief from self-ascribed “physicians” who 
employed its methods, acknowledged this pseudoscience as potentially true.  We may 
wonder to what extent she is self-referential when she argues in Woman in the 
Nineteenth Century that “women of genius…are likely to be enslaved by an 
impassioned sensibility” (67), and observing that such women are “overladen with 
electricity” (67).  According to such pseudoscientific thinking, an overabundance of 
electrical fluid in certain areas of the body, particularly in the head region, could lead 
to a state of “phrenzy,” or inflammation of the brain, which could only be “cured” by a 
trained Mesmerist who would pass hands over the body and restore the balance of 
electrical energy.  So when is an abundance of enthusiasm or passion, dressed in the 
clothing of electromagnetic conductivity, too much?  When is an overabundance of 
electrical energy understood as a trait of greatness or genius, and when is such 
abundance dangerous, even to the point of fire in the form of spontaneous combustion, 
as is so vividly and memorably illustrated in Charles Brockden Brown’s novel 
Wieland?   
 Emerson never offers a clear answer on this point, nor does he make it clear as 
to what extent he finds some measure of truth in this sort of thinking.   Rather, while 
in one breath he damns animal magnetism as a “black art,” in another he describes it 
as an “exampl[e] of Reason’s momentary grasp of the sceptre,” as he does in 
“Nature.”  Given such contradictions, we may begin to wonder if Emerson distances 
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himself from animal magnetism when it is convenient to do so, preferring to illustrate 
his ideas with examples taken from more accepted and acceptable scientific theories 
regarding electromagnetism and galvanism.  Yet his clarity and consistency on the 
subject is compromised when he blurs the distinction between science and 
pseudoscience at other moments.   
After closer inspection, then, we may find Emerson’s language not so easily 
tamed, and, in fact, we may find it too playful to be bound, limited, or reduced by a 
literalist, New Critical approach such as that employed by Wilson.  There is no 
question, as Wilson argues, that Emerson was keenly interested in the potentiality of 
electromagnetism, and Wilson persuasively offers evidence to that effect.  However, it 
was not so much that electromagnetism influenced Emerson’s manipulations of 
sounds in his prose, but rather that elements of electromagnetic science and associated 
pseudoscience sparked his imagination and offered him a new vocabulary and a new 
toolbox of images from which to draw.  Such vocabulary and imagery might help him 
reshape or reframe his expressions of understanding of the inner workings of life, 
nature, and corporeality, as he simultaneously grappled with ways to represent 
unification between supposedly disparate spheres of art, nature, and science.  In short, 
Emerson’s playful experiments with science, pseudoscience, and language allowed 
him room for flexibility of thought—a relief from tautness and stasis— that might lead 
to creative discovery.   
*** 
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Nowhere is Emerson’s penchant for discursive play more evident than when 
we reconsider his appropriations and revisions of Thoreau’s image of the spine as a 
lightning-rod, by which we began this chapter.  While it is surely impossible to 
reconstruct fully the conversation that transpired between Emerson and Thoreau that 
prompted the former’s journal entry in the summer of 18529, it is possible nonetheless 
to imagine the general thrust and context of the conversation—and pinpoint its origins.  
We may do this first by exploring Thoreau’s articulation of his thoughts on the matter 
in his own journal entry, written mere days before that of Emerson.10  Suddenly 
shifting from vivid observations on the pleasing vista from atop Bear Hill, where he 
could just make out a vague glimpse of Mt. Monadnock on the horizon, Thoreau 
launches into an extended description of the remains of an ash-tree that had fallen 
victim to a lightning strike in the previous week.  The damaging effects of this 
phenomenon are extensive and manifold:  not only is the tree scorched from top to 
bottom, but a good portion of it has exploded into segments, and its bark has been 
completely stripped.  He notes that the impact of  the lightning bolt was of such strong 
force that it extended not only to the roots of the tree, but also to the cellar of a nearby 
house, some thirty feet away, “scorching the tin milk-pans, and throwing dirt into the 
milk” (253).  Presumably, it is this particular lightning strike—and, particularly, its 
effects and consequences—that inspired Thoreau to bring up the topic with Emerson 
and discuss its significance.  Moreover, it is likely that it was this specific instance that 
likewise inspired Emerson’s journal entry. 
                                                 
9
 See Appendix 1 to see Thoreau’s June 27, 1852 journal entry in its entirety. 
10
 A conversation between the two men on the subject of lightning-rods must have occurred sometime 
near the end of June or the beginning of July 1852, as Thoreau’s journal entry on the topic is dated June 
27th of that year, and by July 6th, Emerson referred to the conversation as happening just “the other 
evening.” 
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   If Thoreau’s narrative of the lightning strike were merely descriptive, and 
lacking in didactic import, it is possible that it may not have had much staying power 
in Emerson’s mind.   But Thoreau indeed attempts to draw a lesson from what he had 
witnessed, a lesson whose significance he may have communicated to his friend just 
days later.  We may see Thoreau’s shift from descriptive nature writing to moralizing 
when he moves to the following simple question: “for what purpose?” (254).  Thoreau 
writes that the lightning strike was caused by “a Titanic force, some of that force 
which made and can unmake the world,”  in a turn of phrase that almost anticipates the 
title of literary critic Elaine Scarry’s book, published over a century later.  Thoreau 
imagines his identification with the stripped and splintered tree, which might have 
been his own body had he been standing in that spot at the time of the strike.  This 
near brush with death is also a near brush with the sublime; the scene of destruction 
offers evidence of the massive power of nature to rip away, suddenly and violently, 
the life that it has given.   
Such a narrative would be an easy jumping off point to reinscription of a 
familiar Calvinistic scenario that would infer that the inhabitants of the nearby house 
were somehow selected by an ancient and divine force for this nearly very violent fate 
because of their own inherent sinful nature.  Such a move would be typical at a time in 
New England when resistance still existed to the notion of placing a lightning rod on 
top of a church steeple, as this might be a blasphemous affront to God’s will.   
Thoreau does begin down this well-worn path, but then, surprisingly, goes on to 
undermine that very formulation.  Although he vaguely hints at theological 
apologetics when he rhetorically asks if the act were “guided by intelligence and 
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mercy,” or, later, when he claims that “science assumes to show why the lightning 
strikes a tree, but it does not show us the moral why any better than our instincts,” he 
stops shy of pursuing further what might be a prime jumping off point for defense of 
religious beliefs.  Instead, he argues that “it is our consciousness of sin probably which 
suggests the idea of vengeance, and to a righteous man it would be merely sublime 
without being awful” (255).  Thoreau turns his attention not to the nature of God, but 
rather the nature of the self.  The lightning strike offers a moment for introspection, as 
well as a study of how a close encounter with the sublime can be differently perceived 
depending on one’s own understanding not only of God but of oneself.  He refutes the 
notion that the lightning-strike is proof of the act of a vengeful God seeking retribution 
against sinners, but rather infers that it is the belief in one’s own sin as well as in a 
vengeful God that would bring an observer to view the phenomenon in this way.   In 
other words, from Thoreau’s point of view, the phenomenon is only understood as a 
divine act if the observer believes in such narrative: the secular witness would simply 
be left awestruck, rather than ascribe the act some religious significance.  Thoreau 
stops short of calling the lightning strike an act of God, instead choosing to use it as an 
example of how an encounter with the presence of sublime force can be perceived 
differently depending on one’s own self-perception and belief system. 
If the witness of such a destructive act of nature firmly believes in his or her 
goodness, and is by all accounts good, then, by Thoreau’s logic, it would seem that 
whether or not he or she believes in divine Providence, he or she would not see the act 
as that perpetrated by a God bent on revenge, as there would be nothing for that God 
to avenge.  Belief in oneself and one’s own inherent goodness—a kind of inner 
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divinity—would serve as a shield from viewing the lightning strike as the act of a 
vengeful God.   Adoption of such an attitude would allow the observer to enjoy the 
phenomenon for its natural sublimity, rather than understand it as a possible 
reincarnation of a narrative of Sodom.    
Thoreau then shifts from addressing the problem of perception to the question 
of protection, as he imagines a pathway to feeling secure and at home in nature.  How 
can one feel safe, secure, and in the right place at the right time, given random acts of 
destruction that occur?  Is it possible for mind to overcome matter?  If we strongly 
believe we are safe, are we indeed safe in the midst of destruction?  Does belief in 
oneself and one’s own divinity work as a talisman to ward off danger or render 
protective effects?  Such questions would prove to be rich and fertile territory for 
thought, as Emerson—and later, Melville—would discover.  
Such a line of questioning undoubtedly yields key lessons for Thoreau.   
Rather than only inspiring awestricken fear, the encounter offers an opportunity to 
envision a way we could feel safe in the embrace of nature which could easily 
“unmake” us.  But what proves more provocative, and, arguably, more influential on 
Emerson, is Thoreau’s next logical move.  Changing gears from his brief 
contemplation of how the lightning strike might be interpreted as having some 
religious significance, Thoreau quickly turns to discussion of the necessity of 
lightning-rods: 
 
This is one of those cases in which a man hesitates to refer his safety to 
his prudence, as the putting up of a lightning rod.  There is no 
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lightning-rod by which the sinner can avert the avenging Nemesis.  
Though I should put up a rod, if its utility were satisfactorily 
demonstrated to me, yet, so mixed are we, I should feel myself safe or 
in danger quite independently of the senseless rod.  There is a degree of 
faith and righteousness in putting up a rod as well as trusting without 
one, though the latter, which is the rarer, I feel to be the more effectual 
rod of the two. (255) 
 
Rather than seeing the near miss of the lightning strike as an impetus to adorn his 
house with a “protective,” decidedly phallic lightning-rod, Thoreau instead maintains 
precisely the opposite: that he is better off without one, that his own sensibility and 
manhood is enough to protect himself from harm and he needs not be reliant on the 
purchase of a “senseless rod.”  Contrasting his own sensibility with that of the 
“senseless” rod, Thoreau prefers to have more faith and trust in himself than he does 
in the rod.  If Thoreau believes and trusts in his own safety, then he will indeed be 
safe, irrespective of whether or not he places a rod atop his house.  Extending this idea 
to others, Thoreau appears to believe that trusting in one’s own safety and goodness in 
the midst of impending calamity would have a sort of placebo effect: “it is the faith 
with which we take medicine that cures us” (255).  Thus, for Thoreau, rather than 
being struck with fear and terror at the threat of lightning, one should regard lightning 
“with serenity, as are the most innocent and familiar phenomena” (256).  Although 
“serenity” may not be the first word that might come to mind when one considers the 
violent aftermath of a lightning strike, and the prospect of having’s one body 
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destroyed in the fashion that the tree was destroyed, that is precisely the attitude that 
Thoreau suggests that one should adopt.  It is as if by feeling an inner, confident 
tranquility in the presence of nature’s awesome destructive power —a feeling of being 
at home or being in the right place at the right time—one could ward off its potential 
danger.  In other words, adopting the right stance in the face of danger could be just 
the medicine one needs to protect oneself from that danger. 
While it is not clear that Thoreau truly believed that one’s confidence alone 
could protect oneself from danger in a thunderstorm (especially if one stood on a hill 
atop the oak trees most prone to lightning strikes), he may at the very least resist the 
notion that one must necessarily always be equipped with protective gear such as 
lightning-rods, just as he would in Walden advocate living simply without the burden 
of excessive material accoutrements.  Taken in the context of his arguments made 
elsewhere on the need for self-reliance and independence from the materialism of 
industrialized society, it may be that he believes that a more serene, less fearful 
attitude toward life and its dangers will indeed result in better overall health, and even 
an ability to withstand, survive, and defend oneself against threats to one’s health.   
This is exemplified in a key point which was undoubtedly the focus of his later 
conversation with Emerson:  
 
There runs through the righteous man’s spinal column a rod with 
burnished points to heaven, which conducts safely away into the earth 
the flashing wrath of Nemesis so that it merely clarifies the air.   This 
moment the confidence of the righteous man erects a sure conductor 
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within him; the next, perchance, a timid staple diverts the fluid to his 
vitals.  (256) 
 
Thoreau’s imagery draws us away from the “senseless” metal rod, and brings us to 
imagine a kind of “rod” existing within the human body, within one’s very spine.  In 
at least a figurative sense, one becomes and is a lightning-rod, and it is one’s own 
sense of confidence and righteousness that lends itself to this formation and existence 
of a protective “rod” within oneself.  Therefore, following this logic, if one conducts 
oneself with propriety and confidence, one might develop the ability to conduct the 
dangerous electrical “fluid” safely away to the ground without having any harm done 
to one’s body.  If one’s confidence is reduced to timidity, however, the “rod” may as 
easily become a “timid staple,” “divert[ing] the fluid to [one’s] vitals”—in essence, 
allowing the powerful electricity to overwhelm the organs so that instantaneous death 
may occur.  
 Thoreau’s formulations may resonate with the development of neuroscience in 
the nineteenth century.  While it was widely understood that the brain was the primary 
nerve center in the body, it was also increasingly understood by the late nineteenth 
century that the spine or spinal cord served as a conduit for bodily energies to be 
transmitted to other parts of the body.  In fact, it was understood that the spine itself 
was central in this process, that, like the brain, it also served as a “nerve center” or 
contained numerous “nerve centers.”  Consider, for example, this excerpt from George 
Dallas Lind’s 1882 Teachers' and Students' Library, a “compendium of knowledge” 
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designed to help give rural American schoolteachers the background they needed to 
teach with authority on a vast number of subjects: 
  
  The spinal cord not only originates impressions but is a medium of 
  communication between the distant parts of the body and the brain.  
  Note that it is composed of gray and white matter: the former may  
  originate impressions (reflex action) and the latter transmit impressions.  
  It is, however, an unsettled question whether the transmission of  
  impressions is always direct, or whether it is by aid of the gray matter 
  of the cord acting as relays, or aids to the nerve force.  (190) 
 
If it were already common knowledge by 1882 that the spinal cord was itself capable 
of both originating and transmitting impressions, then perhaps similar discourse may 
have been already available to Thoreau some thirty years earlier.  If the spine or spinal 
cord could potentially originate and transmit impressions somehow autonomously 
from the brain, could the brain somehow train the spinal cord to become stronger or 
more impervious to those impressions?  Could the brain intercede and prevent the 
spinal transmission of certain impressions (for example, the influx of electrical current 
from a lightning bolt)?  Thoreau addresses these unsettled questions by proposing the 
idea that if one adopts an attitude that eschews timidity in the face of danger, one 
might actually prevent the transmission of dangerous current to the body.   Could he 
have had such medical knowledge in mind, or is his attitude representative of the 
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linguistic constructions and a priori knowledge necessary for physicians to formulate 
their later theories on neuroscience?          
  While it may be tempting to consider Thoreau’s claims as scientific 
hypotheses in the making, it is not clear that these constructions are to be understood 
as delving beyond anything but the figurative realm.  For Thoreau, romantic and 
hyperbolic imagery may trump the material and the practical realities of medical fact.   
Would he have us believe that he was truly a proponent of a kind of pseudoscientific 
theory or alternative medicine that would suspend our understanding of the lethal 
effects of massive electrical force applied to the body?  Or is he simply using this 
example as a convenient trope that illustrates a pathway by which he and others could 
adopt a more relaxed attitude toward natural phenomena that might otherwise render 
them fearful?  While Thoreau was “correct” about electricity to the extent that the 
electricity found in a lightning bolt is the same electricity found within the human 
spinal cord (just as Franklin was right in his guess that the electricity found in a 
lightning bolt was the same electricity that could be controlled and manipulated in a 
laboratory setting), Thoreau would have surely been foolhardy to believe that it 
naturally follows that one who had confidence in one’s safety and righteousness had 
nothing to fear from a lightning bolt.   
If Thoreau truly believed that one could become one’s own best and safest 
lightning-rod, then that belief would be challenged by the plentiful accounts of 
unfortunate souls who, due to no apparent fault of their own, involuntarily became 
human lightning-rods, victims who succumbed to the powerful forces of nature.   
Writing in the summer months, Thoreau was writing at a time when the danger of 
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being killed by a lightning strike was by no means trivial: it was the peak time of 
danger.  In his 1858 treatise on electricity, Swiss physicist Auguste de La Rive noted 
for example that “in the short period from 1835 to 1852, [lightning] has killed not less 
than thirteen hundred and eight persons in France” (152), the majority of those deaths 
occurring within the summer months, the very time in which Thoreau was writing.  
This number did not take into consideration those killed by fire or other causes 
indirectly stemming from lightning strikes.  To argue that all of these victims of direct 
lightning strikes merely had weak constitutions, brought on by lack in self-confidence, 
would be a truly unwinnable argument.  To consider the chances of getting fatally 
struck by lightning in the United States, we may turn to De la Rive’s estimate that the 
number of deaths due to direct lightning strikes in this period exceeded fifty per year.  
While one might trivialize this number and diminish its significance by comparing it 
with other far more common potential causes of fatalities, it is impossible to trivialize 
the stories of each human life lost, which might well have been prevented, had better 
precautions been taken.   
Consider, for example, the story of Francis Nye, Jr., killed in the cellar of his 
paint shop on Martha’s Vineyard in late July of 1851.  Just as occurred with the 
lightning strike that Thoreau described, the electricity from the lightning bolt in this 
instance descended into the ground and into the nearby cellar.  The fatal difference 
between this case and that described by Thoreau was that the cellar was at the time 
occupied by a person, namely, Mr. Nye.  According to the account given in the 
Vineyard Gazette: 
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The fluid entered the building from the roof, striking the chimney, 
which it shattered, passed below, breaking out the windows, and 
rendering the shop a complete wreck.  A portion of the fluid descended 
to the cellar, instantly depriving Mr. Nye of life.  It struck him on the 
head and shoulder, and passed off by the hip and feet.  The skin was 
peeled off and the flesh badly burned.  Mr. N’s shoe was cut directly in 
two, lengthwise.  Mr. Nye was a business man of excellent character, 
and his loss is greatly to be deplored.  He leaves a wife and one child. 
 
Would Thoreau have us believe that had Mr. Nye held a different attitude, a certain 
righteousness or confidence, then he might not have met such a tragic end?  Would 
Thoreau have really believed that a lightning-rod would not have been helpful in this 
case?  Was he really an opponent of this technology, or was he merely seeking a way 
to live comfortably and in harmony with the universe, without the clutter of 
unnecessary technology and the burden of unnecessary fears of natural phenomena 
that may be out of one’s effective control?  
However we might imagine possible answers to these questions for ourselves, 
we can be sure that Thoreau’s ideas must have taken strong hold over the imagination 
of his friend and mentor Emerson.  We can know this with a full measure of certainty, 
as their brief conversation inspired Emerson not only to take note of it in this 1852 
journal, but also to include it in at least two separate essays, written and revised over a 
period of many years: first, written in the form that introduces this chapter, in an essay 
called “Aristocracy,” and secondly, in a different form in a later essay entitled 
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“Worship,” which appeared in his 1860 collection Conduct of Life. As we have 
already seen in this chapter, electricity and electromagnetism had long been an interest 
of Emerson’s, as noted by Emerson scholar Eric Wilson, among others.  As we shall 
also see, though, it may be worthwhile to consider the possibility that this brief 
utterance of Thoreau’s sparked a sudden, illuminating connection to his earlier trains 
of thought, enough so to inspire revision of his earlier writings.  By playing upon 
Thoreau’s idea and imagining its potential and its possibilities, Emerson arrives at an 
epiphany that strikes a powerful chord with his own earlier observations on the 
significance of electricity and electromagnetism. 
 To underscore the lasting impact of Thoreau’s “lightning-rod man” imagery 
on Emerson’s thinking, we may begin by examining its re-emergence, albeit 
significantly revised, in “Worship.”  Thoreau’s language has been significantly 
altered, although the general sentiment remains the same: “the lightning-rod that 
disarms the cloud of its threat is [every man’s] body in its duty” (123).  Yet in this 
version of Thoreau’s original idea, we find that the subject has shifted from the 
specific body of Thoreau as the locus of the protective lightning-rod which will 
supposedly ensure safety and prevent bodily harm, to a more generalized version, 
where the “body” in fact represents the body of “every man”— presumably, every 
human body, or, more precisely, the ideal body.  What began as Thoreau’s initial 
musings and meditations on the necessity of installing a lightning-rod on one’s home 
becomes, in Emerson’s hands, seeds that might blossom into an aphorism regarding 
the human condition.   
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So why does Emerson appropriate Thoreau’s idea and then transform it by 
changing its subject from a specific human body (i.e. Thoreau’s) to a broader 
generalization about “every man,” or, to put it another way, an ideal to which 
humankind may aspire?  Tellingly, in his own journal entry, Emerson follows a similar 
logical progression to that made by Thoreau.  Like Thoreau, Emerson begins with 
specific observations about nature, and then from these observations he develops 
broader philosophical generalizations, removed from his immediate geographic 
context.   As was the case for Thoreau, his reference to a lightning-rod spine more 
closely resembles an opaque parable than it does a prescription for specific action.  
Taken too literally, Emerson’s words might lead one to consider putting oneself in 
harm’s way, as if it were actually one’s “duty” to conduct and thereby “disarm” the 
cloud of its “threat.”  Yet it would be implausible to think that Emerson would think 
that one should actually strip off one’s clothing in the midst of a thunderstorm, stand 
at the highest possible point in the landscape, and, in so doing, attempt to rob the 
clouds of their deadly electric force.  There is little evidence in Emerson’s essay that 
might warrant such an absurd reading.  Taken figuratively— and placed in the context 
of Emerson’s overall philosophy—Emerson’s words might lead one to the image of a 
vital and self-reliant individual who is able to overcome fear and boldly take risks, an 
individual who is able to channel the energies of nature toward doing what is good and 
right in his or her own mind, without necessarily relying upon— or being limited by—
what he or she is told to do or think by others.     
While the idea of a human body used beneficially as a lightning-rod may make 
little sense to us when understood in literal terms, we may understand why Emerson 
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may have been attracted by the image as a powerful illustration of his own philosophy 
of life.   Long before comic book heroes like Captain Marvel could serve as a model 
for such thinking, it offers him the image of a superhuman hero who not only could 
withstand intense natural threats but who might also embody not only strength and 
goodness but the ability to control and convey natural forces in a way that could only 
rival the gods.  Emerson is attracted by the image of a kind of Promethean, 
superhuman, divine quality to which one might aspire, or even foster and nurture 
within oneself.  He admires the imagery of a magnetic, conductive superhuman figure 
for its poetic potential, even if he is not necessarily a believer in such a being as 
scientific fact.  Dabbling in science, then, Emerson plays with electromagnetic 
language and terminology as a springboard to reimagine and reconstruct the body’s 
relationship to natural forces, not only for himself but also for his readers, for whom 
discourse on electricity and electromagnetism may appear novel and exciting.  In 
short, it is not so much that he thinks that one should actually conduct lightning bolts 
to one’s body, nor is it that he believes that his style of writing would in any way 
convey actual electricity to his readers, as Eric Wilson would imply.  Rather, he is 
fascinated with the literary potentiality of electromagnetic imagery, and in so doing 
also reflects a similar fascination shared by a larger reading and listening audience.        
Emerson leans on Thoreau’s vision of the body as a lightning rod as a 
hyperbolic trope that might illuminate his views on the best course of human conduct.   
Echoing and building upon Thoreau’s assertion that “it is the faith with which we take 
medicine that cures us,” Emerson observes in “Worship” that if one has a “high aim,” 
it is “curative,” and, as such, has a revitalizing effect on “the organs of the body.”   
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Whether or not Emerson truly believes in this as scientific fact is a matter of 
conjecture, but nonetheless, it offers him a framework by which he might sketch out 
his vision of a connection between vitality, ambition, and goodness of purpose that 
might serve as a goal and incentive for anyone who might aspire to greatness.  
According to this line of thought, in the absence of the intervention from divine 
Providence, one’s strong will and belief in the goodness of one’s purpose could serve 
as one’s shield in the face of danger.  As Emerson writes, it could for example help a 
man “run into flame or bullets or pestilence, with duty for his guide.”  While this 
formulation may to us resemble a version of the clichéd concept of mind over matter, 
we must remember that Emerson’s return to Thoreau’s imagery of a lightning-rod 
spine nonetheless must have served as a fresh and powerful image at a time when the 
popularity of animal magnetism ran high.  But Emerson’s playfulness in choosing an 
electrical trope to depict this concept might also make us consider the possibility of his 
playful punning on the word “conduct,” which appears in the title of this collection of 
essays.  Suddenly the “conduct of life” may be understood as not only a set of rules 
regarding how one should behave and carry oneself, but also how one might 
“conduct” electricity or life force. 
Moving from “Worship” for a moment, we may now return once again to the 
sentence that appears at the outset of this chapter.  Emerson’s statement appeared in 
the essay titled “Aristocracy,” published for the very first time posthumously in 1883 
as part of Emerson’s complete works, yet apparently given in the form of a public 
lecture over a period of many years.  Incidentally, this version is not to be confused 
with another of Emerson’s works, also titled “Aristocracy,” which appeared as a 
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chapter in the 1856 collection English Traits, differing completely in content and 
focus as it centered specifically on English history and the development and 
significance of its feudal system.  Despite the late date of its publication, 
“Aristocracy” was actually derived from a lecture originally read by Emerson in 
England in 1848.  We may be sure that Thoreau’s meditations on the body as a 
lightning-rod must have significant resonance with Emerson, as they were appended, 
with revisions, to his talk given four years earlier, which apparently he re-worked and 
revised, yet never published, over the course of the rest of his life.    
So why did Emerson feel the need to append Thoreau’s speculation on the 
body as a lightning-rod?  Why, specifically, in “Aristocracy?”  We might begin to 
think about this by examining the context in which this revision of Thoreau’s work 
appears.  In this essay, Emerson offers criticism of a system that would confer 
aristocracy on individuals simply based on their heredity.  Emerson muses on this 
topic, for example, in the following way: 
 
I observe the inextinguishable prejudice men have in favor of a 
hereditary transmission of qualities.  It is in vain to remind them that 
Nature appears capricious.  Some qualities she carefully fixes and 
transmits, but some, and those the finer, she exhales with the breath of 
the individual, as too costly to perpetuate. (33) 
 
What Emerson appears to be driving at is that distinctions of class, as they are 
arranged by humankind, do not necessarily reflect any natural superiority of one group 
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over another.  Simply because one is born into aristocracy does not mean that one 
possesses refined tastes and sensibilities; in fact, such an individual may be 
remarkably dull.  According to Emerson’s thinking, no advantage in money or 
parentage could alone bring the inferior man the qualities that might render him 
superior.  Emerson unfortunately insists on making all such references masculine, 
although it is unclear to what extent women may be included, if at all, in his thinking.  
As such, while Emerson may have been an early proponent of equal rights, he did not 
believe in the inherent equality of all human beings, nor did he believe that the 
aristocracy should be abolished.  Rather his arguments demonstrate that he believed 
that aristocracy should not be based on fortunate upbringing, but rather on merit: “the 
existence of an upper class is not injurious, as long as it is dependent on merit” (38).  
His call is not for abandonment of the class system, but rather for an aristocracy that 
deserves to lead precisely because they are good leaders: “men of aim must lead the 
aimless; men of invention the uninventive” (39). 
    Waxing poetically on exactly what characteristics might describe such “men of 
aim,” Emerson’s language soon begins to resemble the Thoreau of the aforementioned 
journal entries, a Thoreau who had already read his Emerson.  We may begin to see 
Thoreauvian tendencies creeping into Emerson’s thinking when he describes these 
“men of aim” as “men who are charmed by the beautiful Nemesis as well as the dire 
Nemesis,” echoing Thoreau’s observation in his journal entry that “there is no 
lightning-rod by which the sinner can avert the avenging Nemesis.”   Both writers 
make allusion not to Christian theology, but rather to Greek mythology.  While the 
name Nemesis, derived from the Greek némein or “to give what is due,” is today in its 
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lower case version associated primarily with actions made by a maleficent antagonist 
and avenger, Emerson and Thoreau’s invocation of the name merely implies a neutral 
force that either rewards or punishes based on whatever merit—or, lack of merit—a 
given individual might possess.  In both Emerson’s and Thoreau’s arguments, it is 
clear that a person of above-average character and constitution, who attempts to 
achieve aims that are both good and right, will be— or, at the very least, ought to be—
given what is due.   What Emerson seeks to uphold and engender is a vision of an 
ideal, civilized man of heroic proportions, who rises to the forefront of society because 
he truly deserves that place.  The body of such a man must be strong and unassailable, 
and must channel the energies of nature toward achieving excellence.  Emerson puts it 
this way:  
 
And since the body is the pipe through which we tap all the succors and 
virtues of the material world, it is certain that a sound body must be at 
the root of any excellence in manners and actions; a strong and supple 
frame which yields a stock of strength and spirits for all the needs of 
the day, and generates the habit of relying on a supply of power for all 
extraordinary exertions.  (43) 
 
This pipe-like man—or, to put it another way, rod-like man—is able to conduct both 
virtue and power.  And not only is such a man exemplified by inventors, such as those 
who applied concepts of electromagnetism to create the electric telegraph, but also by 
those who are, in fact, magnetic: “not only the phrenologist but the philosopher may 
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well say, Let me see his brain, and I will tell you if he shall be poet, king, founder of 
cities, magnetic…” (44). For Emerson, this right sort of leader is not of “puny 
constitution” but is “well mixed” (43).   Again this echoes Thoreau’s language from 
his journal entry, when he trusts in himself more than his lightning rod, associating his 
imperviousness to the effects of the threat of a lightning with the notion of being “so 
mixed.”  The word “mixed” implies not that the individual is of a superior breeding or 
genetic “mix,” but rather the right combination of abilities, sensibilities, and 
perceptions.     
 Emerson chooses to employ the example from his conversation with Thoreau 
by speaking again of “place.”  After at length making sure to show that he in no way 
seeks to defend “gradation in the universe,” in other words, that he does not seek to 
somehow justify the caste or the relative success of the few in contrast with the vast 
suffering of the many, Emerson writes the following: 
  
The only relief that I know against the invidiousness of superior 
position is, that you exert your faculty; for whilst each does that, he 
excludes hard thoughts from the spectator.  All right activity is amiable.  
I never feel that any man occupies my place, but that the reason why I 
do not have what I wish, is, that I want the faculty which entitles.  All 
spiritual or real power makes its own place. (47) 
 
For Emerson, it is one’s “faculty”—or, to put it as we have before, one’s “mix” of 
abilities, sensibilities, and perceptions—that entitles one to one’s “place” in society.  It 
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follows that if one feels somehow displaced or dissatisfied with one’s place, one is 
lacking in the correct “mix.”  The only remedy to this, if there is one at all, is that one 
must use one’s “faculty” both rightly and to the best of one’s ability so that “place” 
and “power” might naturally follow.   But this idea of “place” also brings up another 
idea that directly relates to the marketing techniques of those who would sell 
lightning-rods.  In order to persuade someone to purchase a lightning-rod, the seller 
must make a potential buyer fearful and uncomfortable in one’s own home—in short, 
out of place.  Lightning strikes those who are truly in the wrong place at the right time: 
atop a relative high point in the landscape, too near in proximity to a window, or, as 
was likely the case in the story of Mr. Nye, in close contact with conductive material, 
with nothing to insulate the body from the surging electrical current.  Yet, as 
Emerson’s logic would have us believe, if one feels safe, secure, and comfortable in 
one’s own place, then there is no need for fear, hence, no need for a lightning-rod.  
Thus goes Emerson’s argument when he offers the following logic: 
 
We pass for what we are, and we prosper or fail by what we are.  There 
are men who may dare much and will be justified in their daring.  But it 
is because they know they are in their place.   As long as I am in my 
place, I am safe.  ‘The best lightning-rod for your protection is your 
own spine.’  Let a man’s social aims be proportioned to his means and 
power.  (47) 
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It is unlikely that Mr. Nye’s feelings of relative security or sense of place would have 
helped him to avoid certain death.  We may ask: wouldn’t it make more sense to 
simply install a lightning-rod?  Even more so than was the case with Thoreau, for 
Emerson it is not so much that he is railing against the sales and distribution of 
Franklin’s lightning-rod, but, rather, that he implies that one should not feel out of 
place, either at home, in society, or among natural surroundings.  Just as a lightning-
rod salesman might make one feel fearful, insecure, and out of place in order to sell 
his wares, so too might a person who holds a superior position in society propagates 
similar feelings of fear and insecurity among those deemed inferior in order to 
maintain power and control.  Yet, for Emerson, those intrepid individuals who dare to 
feel always “in their place” will not be led to cower.  Again, this appears to be more 
parable than prescription.  Emerson is attracted to the symbolic power of Thoreau’s 
image of the magnetic, conductive individual who can act as his or her own best 
lightning-rod, even if it is doubtful that he would actually believe that one should go 
without one in reality.   Emerson plays with Thoreau’s imagery to open up creative 
possibilities that might suit the purposes of his prose, without necessarily proffering 
his ideas as earnest scientific hypothesis. 
 We may see how the idea of literally having a lightning-rod spine—or at the 
very least, a lightning-rod that is attached to your spine—is laughable to a nineteenth 
century audience when we find this idea explored for its comic effect in a short article 
entitled “Lightning-Rod Down the Spine,” published in an 1858 edition of Musical 
World: 
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There is a most singular individual in the Twentieth Ward, whose 
conduct on certain occasions for the past two months has created no 
little surprise and amusement.  He has always been accounted as a man 
of strong common sense.  Yet he has not ventured into the street for 
many weeks, during a rainstorm, without a lightning-rod attached to 
him.  It is an iron rod about five feet in length, with a trio of prongs at 
the top, and so bent that it hangs or sits upon the crown of his hat, 
where it is fastened, with the upper end rising some ten inches above 
him; and the rod running down his back outside, being held in place by 
a band about his waist.  The lower end hangs out at an angle of forty 
degrees, like a monkey’s tail, so as to convey the electric fluid some 
distance should he be struck while walking.  On all other subjects of 
conversation he is sane, but when the lightning-rod subject is touched 
upon, he discourses seriously on the necessity of such an arrangement 
when it rains, believing that the air is filled with electricity, whether it 
is a thunderstorm or not. 
 
It is precisely this kind of preposterous attitude, a sense of fear of nature—and lack of 
feeling in place or at home in nature, taken to an absurd extreme—that is surely a 
target of both Thoreau and Emerson’s critique of lightning-rods used as a prophylactic 
measure against danger.  It is not the lightning-rod that is the problem.  What is 
problematic—and what would most likely concern the two writers— is the danger of 
succumbing to undue fear that one cannot save oneself from destruction without the 
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constant protection of something outside the self, not of the self.  Rather than feeling 
threatened by the fear of feeling out of place, or the insanity that might ensue from 
such a feeling, it might be preferable to be your own best lightning rod, figuratively 
speaking.  It would be better to feel safe in your own skin, to feel comfortable in your 
environment, than to succumb to fear and fall prey to those who might capitalize on 
that fear. 
Emerson’s playful approaches to scientific and pseudoscientific hypotheses 
regarding electromagnetism and its potential effects on the human body help us to 
understand why Thoreau’s image was so attractive, as it reopened connections to his 
prior thinking and writing, and demonstrated the interplay and overlaps between 
metaphorical and self-ascribed “scientific” discourse.  To understand this discursive 
interplay, we might ask ourselves a question similar to that posed by sociologist Bruno 
Latour when he writes the following in relation to the numerous metaphors that 
pervade the work of Louis Pasteur:    
  
 Is it possible to use [philosophical] categories and figures of speech 
  (even if it means reconfiguring them again), not to obscure the  
  scientists’ work but to make it both visible and capable of producing 
  results that are independent of it?  (133) 
 
With regards to Emerson, I would answer this question with an emphatic yes.  In 
metaphorizing scientific/pseudoscientific discourse on electromagnetism and the body, 
Emerson not only renders it more “visible” and more easily understood, but also 
103 
 
complicates and develops our understandings of electromagnetic corporeality in ways 
that might produce new “results,” results that could in fact lead to further discovery 
and insight.  When Emerson states in “Self-Reliance,” for example, that “the world 
has been instructed by its kings who have so magnetized the eyes of nations,” are we 
to believe that this statement exemplifies Emerson’s belief that kings and national 
leaders actually magnetize the eyes of their respective peoples, as a mesmerist would 
supposedly magnetize the bodies of his patient?   Or, does this imagery operate as 
effective, vivid, and dramatic literary device that provides a new conceptual model 
that might persuade and move his audience to reconsider or reconfigure their 
understanding of monomaniacal leaders?  In this way, Emerson synthesizes art and 
science, bringing about union between the figurative and the real, by applying 
inherited scientific theory to poetic expression.  Does he in this regard subscribe fully 
to the notion that electromagnetism might provide the key to a unified theory of life, 
as Oersted would offer?  Or does Emerson’s metaphorizing of electromagnetism 
merely apply pressure to this concept, by playing with it and thereby seeing how far 
and how well it will carry his ideas before disintegrating into illogic?  I would argue 
that the latter is the more appropriate question to answer affirmatively.    
Although science is often not thought of as being informed by metaphor, a 
study of the “crude and hasty” metaphors used to describe electricity and 
electromagnetism will reveal that metaphor plays a larger role in scientific thinking 
than we might suspect.  Certainly Benjamin Franklin was aware of this as he coined 
terminology to describe electricity and its effects, and such a position is not without 
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support in the scientific community today11.  Metaphor is not only something which 
understanding depends upon, but something that can actually be a catalyst for new 
understanding.  In other words, while it can never be fully “cleansed” from discourse, 
neither should it be, as metaphorical constructions and linguistic play can lead to new 
scientific discoveries.  Metaphors are powerful tools to convey meanings and explore 
new ideas.   
The power of metaphors can also have damaging and destructive effects, 
however.  Scientists Matthew Chew and Manfred Laubichler observe, for example, 
that “metaphors introduce a fundamental trade off between the generation of novel 
insights in science and the possibility of dangerous or even deadly misappropriation,” 
and offer the example of eugenics to illustrate how scientific fact could be dangerously 
misused or misappropriated.   Emerson’s suggestion that poetic genius is something 
possessed by only some rare individuals, individuals who could somehow conduct 
natural energies and convey them in verse, is not far removed in philosophy from 
those phrenologists who might argue that the shape of the head of a Caucasian person 
would predispose them to superior intellect to that of an African or Native American 
person.  By resorting to “crude and hasty” metaphors to offer a model of poetic genius, 
Emerson takes a significant risk, a risk that could in the wrong hands have very real 
                                                 
11
 To consider one example of the support that members of the scientific community have shown for the 
notion science—and our understanding of science—is informed by metaphor, we can look to a 2003 
article in the journal Science, written by Matthew Chew and Manfred Laubichler, both science 
professors at Arizona State University, who, observing that “metaphors are ubiquitous in science,” 
argue that “simplicity and intuitive appeal are…the main reasons why scientific language has never 
succeeded in “cleansing” itself from metaphorical “impurities”… Indeed, metaphors appear to be 
essential to all forms of language and understanding. But if scientific language is by necessity to some 
extent metaphorical, then interpretation of its content depends on the cultural context that generates the 
metaphors that are used.  (52) 
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and very dangerous consequences.  At the same time, by straddling the figurative, 
imaginary realm with what we might call for lack of a better term the “real,” Emerson 
is able to vividly illustrate his ideas and at the same time clothe them in vestments that 
will maximize the effect and potentiality of the ideas he would attempt to express.   
It would be misguided to suggest that the playfulness of Emerson’s language 
choices demonstrates that he is merely whimsical, arbitrary, or lacking in seriousness.   
That said, it is also folly to assume that Emerson always whole-heartedly believed in 
what he was writing and saying as irrefutable scientific truth.  Such belief is 
questioned by Emerson’s firm assertions of his resistance to accepting inherited theory 
without question, for example when he notes in “Self-Reliance” that “when we have 
new perception, we shall gladly disburden the memory of its hoarded treasures as old 
rubbish” (125).  So while a reading that takes Emerson strictly at his word might make 
one think that he actually offers credibility to followers of pseudoscientific ideas such 
as animal magnetism when he writes of kings “magnetizing” their people, his words 
elsewhere in the same essay reveal a contradictory view.  This lack of consistency is 
further underscored by Alfred Ferguson in his introduction to volume three of 
Emerson’s collected works, when he notes that Emerson derisively referred to animal 
magnetism in private as “mumbo-jumbo” (229).  In this way, he fully lives up to his 
creed that one ought to have no fear of contradicting oneself, as he sometimes does so 
even in the same essay, or the same collection of writings.  While in “Demonology” he 
casts aspersions upon adherents to theories of animal magnetism, in other essays and 
lectures, he appears to be more open-minded to this pseudoscience.  However, in his 
essay on Plutarch, published in Letters and Biographical Sketches, he praises the fact 
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that Plutarch’s “own cheerfulness and rude health are also magnetic” (235).  Given 
such stark contradictions, we may see that what pseudoscientific theories of animal 
magnetism had in common with theories more universally accepted in the scientific 
community is that they offered Emerson new models for thinking, new ways of 
perceiving.    
While the current, common, clichéd usage of the term “mesmerize” now 
precisely coincides with Emerson’s usage of “magnetize” in the aforementioned 
passage from “Self-Reliance,” we must remember that for Emerson, this was the result 
of an experiment in language that led to a new formulation of thought.  Across his 
body of work, we may see how Emerson plays with ideas, considering and 
reconsidering them, constantly revising and reframing them, and never being afraid of 
contradicting himself, almost as if the revolving interplay of theses and antitheses will 
lead him and his readers somehow closer to some sense of universal truth.  Although  
Bruno Latour concedes that metaphors can have “the unfortunate consequence of 
aestheticizing the work of science and weakening its claim to truth” (136), I would 
argue that metaphor has the power to offer imaginative associations that might make 
truth more readily visible or understood.  Therefore, metaphor does not always 
necessarily lead to untruth, but, rather, it can sometimes reveal or lead to further truths 
that scientific method may be incapable of reaching through observation alone.  
Writing on the topic of metaphor, philosopher Clive Cazeaux summarizes the views of 
predecessors such as of Max Black, Carl Hausman, and Paul Ricoeur, when he writes 
that “an original, freshly minted trope…is an instance of creative, subjective language 
yet far from producing nonsense, a new metaphor offers insight on its subject, and, as 
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such, could be said to be objective or to contain an objective component” (1-2) .  If we 
adopt an approach to metaphor similar to that laid out by Cazeaux, we see how we 
might dissolve traditional binaries that would equate scientific method with objectivity 
and metaphor with subjectivity.  In this way, the practice of creating metaphors is not 
necessarily antithetical to empiricism, as it would make observations and test out 
scientific hypotheses against experience, even if its power relies on imaginative 
projection of associated words and imagery, rather than resting on data compiled via 
controlled observation.   
By metaphorizing electromagnetic corporeality, Emerson is indeed 
hypothesizing, able to try on an idea today, only to reject it tomorrow.  Yet at no point 
does Emerson demonstrate his full, unquestioning subscription to the tenets of 
established, legitimate science.  Nor does he subscribe fully to the “mumbo-jumbo” of 
animal magnetism, or other pseudoscience not accepted or authorized fully by the 
legitimized scientific community.  His truth seeking is motivated by a spirit of 
experimentation, a resistant skepticism toward inherited theory and dogma, an 
enterprise that allows him to arrive at revelations such as that found in “Solitude and 
Society,” published in The Atlantic in 1857, in which he observed that “all 
conversation is a magnetic experiment.”  It is through his play, his oscillation between 
different poles of thought, that he would have his readers arrive at their own 
understandings of truth.      
Approaching Emerson’s writing in this way, we might better understand that 
Emerson’s essays ought not to be taken as statements of faith or belief in inherited 
philosophy, but rather as playful experiments.  Lee Rust Brown argues along these 
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lines when he writes that “Emerson’s essays cast themselves…[as] “experiments” 
within a larger enterprise, an enterprise that promised to revise and reform all its initial 
positions” (129).  By understanding Emerson’s essays as experiments, we may 
understand that we are not necessarily to take everything he says as a sincere 
affirmation of his own unshakable faith, but rather as pathways to shake up his own 
faith in inherited ideas, as well as our own.   
When Emerson writes in “The Poet” that “man is the conductor of the whole 
river of electricity,” are we to believe that his ideal man or ideal poet would actually 
be composed of more highly conductive material, and that he would actually serve as a 
better lightning-rod than his fellow men?  Taken literally, Emerson’s observation that 
unlike the ideal man or ideal poet, the common man is unable to allow “the rays or 
appulses” to “reach the quick,” we might think exactly this: Emerson actually believes 
that some men are more conductive of electromagnetic energy than others, and that 
this is what leads them to genius—in short, this is what makes them good poets.  
Again, such thinking would have us believe that Emerson sincerely and 
unquestionably believes in the pseudoscience that had become so prevalent even 
among the highest intellectual circles in New England, as well as abroad.  This would 
likewise make one think that Emerson was predisposed to be sympathetic to notions 
that some human beings were better designed to be geniuses, in anticipation of 
unfortunate theories of phrenology and later, of eugenics, theories that would have 
devastating consequences, not only for the people who suffered as a consequence of 
such thinking, but also for the kind of aspiration to personal liberty and empowering 
oneself through knowledge espoused so eloquently elsewhere in Emerson’s writing.  
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Such are the sometimes destructive consequences of play: playing with ideas can 
potentially lead to effects that are both dangerous and undesired.  Yet I would argue 
that such a reading of Emerson’s essay would not fully do justice to the playfulness of 
Emerson’s writing.  Just as Emerson’s playfulness exhibits his own penchant for 
creativity, so too does it attempt to invoke our own.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
110 
 
CHAPTER 2 
 
“DARING TO TAKE THE ‘FULL FORCED SHOCK’: EMERSONIAN 
ELECTROMAGNETIC CORPOREALITY IN MELVILLE’S “THE LIGHTNING-
ROD MAN” AND MOBY-DICK 
 
For did ye three but once take the full-forced shock, then mine own electric thing, that 
had perhaps expired from out me. Perchance, too, it would have dropped ye dead. 
      —Herman Melville, Moby Dick 
 
Standin’ at the shore/A hurricane calls my name/Beyond all I dream/The electric 
 ocean 
        —The Cult, from “Electric Ocean” 
 
 Comparative analyses in literary scholarship of the work of Ralph Waldo 
Emerson and Herman Melville have tended to be presented as studies in contrasts.  
Dating from early on in his posthumous re-emergence into the spotlight of literary 
criticism in the first half of the twentieth century, Melville has often been categorized 
and placed in a position of antithesis or counterpoint to Emerson.  In his 
comprehensive biography of Melville, Andrew Delbanco reminds us of how, in the 
context of a cultural moment “after the fascists had seized most of Europe,” American 
scholar F. O. Matthiessen interpreted Melville’s Ahab as a figure who “provided an 
ominous glimpse of what was to result when the Emersonian will to virtue became in 
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less innocent natures the will to power and conquest” (qtd. in Delbanco 175).  
Matthiessen’s view, while certainly a product of its historical era, also typifies literary 
criticism of its time, as it places the two writers into opposition and posits Melville as 
exploring the less innocent, less idealistic, more intrinsically evil aspects and 
consequences of Emersonian logic that might embody the proverbially “darker” 
shades on a chiaroscuro canvas of antebellum American literature.    
At first glance, the basic facts of the two writers’ formative experiences do 
lend themselves to stark contrasts. Surely, the worldviews of both writers—and the 
tone and subject matter of much of their later writing— were shaped by the very 
different lives they led in their youth.  These stories bear repeating, despite their 
familiarity to us.   
Despite his New England family ties, Melville was a native New Yorker who 
spent his young life as a surveyor on the Erie Canal, and later, famously, sailing on 
whaling ships to faraway locales in places such as the islands of the South Pacific.  
Emerson, on the other hand, spent his life as a young man studying for the ministry as 
an heir apparent to his father’s pulpit at the First Church of Boston, following an 
inevitable pathway that would lead through the gates of Harvard.  From a purely 
geographical standpoint at least, the two writers were indeed remarkably distanced 
from each other as young men, especially given that the state of early to mid-
nineteenth century transportation and communication made their relative locations and 
experiences worlds apart by today’s standards.   
 But the distance between Emerson and Melville was not merely one of 
geography: Melville lacked direct access to Emerson, and only knew him through his 
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books, never spending personal time with the man.  In relation to Emerson and other 
New Englanders who had risen to literary prominence in antebellum America, 
Melville was effectively an outsider, despite the friendship he formed with Nathaniel 
Hawthorne, Emerson’s prominent yet sometimes critical friend.   While Hawthorne 
was a member of Emerson’s generation (they were merely a year apart in age), and 
shared numerous friends and acquaintances with his Concord neighbor, Melville was 
never a part of the literary and intellectual circles that centered on Emerson’s Concord.   
Moreover, following his brief flirtation with Transcendentalism and his time spent at 
Brook Farm, Hawthorne actively distanced himself intellectually from Emerson, 
Fuller, and others who associated themselves with the literary circles of Concord.   As 
Hawthorne and Melville were such close friends, so, too, we may be led to imagine a 
similar intellectual distance occurring between Emerson and Melville, a distance 
typified by what some have argued to be Melville’s mockery of Emersonian 
Transcendentalism in his novel Pierre.  This oft-repeated view may be found for 
example in literary critic Michael McLoughlin’s claim that Melville’s characterization 
about the love between Pierre and Lucy works as a kind of “mock rhapsody,” a 
“burlesque parody of the lofty attitudes held by the Transcendentalists” (94).  The 
notion that Melville mocks Emerson and the Transcendentalists in Pierre is further 
underscored by Steven Hymowech, for example, when he notes that “the novel clearly 
mock[s] the Transcendentalists” (109).   
The tendency among literary critics to emphasize Melville’s mockery of 
Emerson, and, moreover, to make claims regarding Melville’s perceived responses to 
Emerson’s thinking and writing (undoubtedly resulting in some acknowledged or 
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unacknowledged variation of Bloom’s “anxiety of influence”), may also be explained 
by the significant generation gap between the two writers and the heights to which 
Emerson’s scholarly and literary star had already risen during Melville’s formative 
years.   As Delbanco points out, the 1840s was a decade of national debate in which 
American writers, led by voices such as that of Ralph Waldo Emerson, argued for the 
necessity of a national literature separate and distinct from England, no longer 
dependent on English culture, but arising directly from native-born American 
experience.  By the time Melville joined the chorus of voices making claims to this 
effect, asserting in 1850 that “the day will come, when you shall say, who reads a 
book by an Englishman?” he had, in Delbanco’s words, “joined the discussion 
belatedly” (77).   Arriving late on the scene, Melville was in his own time never able 
to ascend to the heights of fame achieved by Emerson.      
One thing is clear, however: whatever Melville may have thought of Emerson, 
Emerson did not think much about Melville, if indeed he ever thought of him at all.  It 
is not trivial to note that Emerson was already a sixteen year old college student at 
Harvard at the time of Melville’s birth, and, in a parallel universe, Melville may very 
well have been seated alongside Henry David Thoreau as a member of the Harvard 
audience when Emerson addressed its students in his now famous lecture known today 
as “The American Scholar.”  Yet, although Melville and Thoreau were near the same 
age, Melville’s lack of proximity and access to Emerson never allowed him to enter 
Emerson’s radar and inner circle in the same way that Thoreau did.  The effect of the 
generation gap and resulting lack of proximity between the two writers is underscored 
when we consider literary critic William Braswell’s 1937 observation that there is 
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“apparently no record of Ralph Waldo Emerson’s opinion on Herman Melville,” even 
though an apparently unread volume of Melville’s novel Typee was found as part of 
his collection.  Not only did Emerson not know Melville personally, but he did not 
know much of him, and, given the absence of evidence, it is difficult to know if he 
held him in high or low regard, or if in fact he had any regard for him at all. 
Traditional contrasts made between the two figures often extend beyond 
biographical considerations and indeed are often carried to their relative aesthetics and 
literary styles.  A prime example of this occurs in F. O. Matthiessen’s seminal work 
American Renaissance, in which he muses on how he might improve the drama of his 
own work of literary theory by placing the authors in binary opposition: the 
“optimistic strain from Emerson to Whitman” would contrast with “the reaffirmation 
of tragedy by Hawthorne and Melville”(179).  While, for his part, Matthiessen does 
back-pedal from this all too pat binary, attempting to blur the sharpness of the 
distinction he makes by observing that such a “black and white contrast would be too 
dramatic,” and noting that “it would tend to obscure the interrelations between 
[them],” he nonetheless significantly contributes to constructing a sharp contrast, a 
contrast more apparent by the division of his work on these writers into distinct, 
separate chapters.  Even in qualifying this distinction, Matthiessen surely reifies it. 
Melville was at times privately and even openly critical of Emerson and his 
work, and evidence of such attitudes does little to mitigate the persistent 
contradistinctions between the two writers in literary scholarship.  Not only is Melville 
understood to be mocking Emerson in Pierre, but he also said to caricature Emerson 
through the character of Mark Winsome in his 1857 novel The Confidence-Man.  Rob 
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Wilson is among the critics who adopt such a view, writing for example that 
“Melville’s mock-Emersonian character, Mark Winsome, cannot tell the difference 
between faith and fraud, parable and life” (239).    There is a remarkable resemblance 
between Wilson’s characterizations of Melville’s attitudes toward Emerson in The 
Confidence-Man, and the oft-repeated claims of literary critics who would argue that 
Nathaniel Hawthorne mocks Margaret Fuller with the character of Zenobia in his 
novel The Blithedale Romance, widely understood as a thinly veiled satire of the 
Transcendentalist experiment at Brook Farm.  As F. O. Matthiessen pairs Melville and 
Hawthorne as part and parcel of a darker turn in American literature, revealing a 
“reaffirmation of tragedy” and an “antithesis” to Emerson and Thoreau (179), we may, 
if we follow Matthiessen’s lead, be unable to distinguish between the two friends and 
fellow writers.   As such, we may be led by such critics to believe that as goes 
Hawthorne, so too goes Melville.  If Hawthorne expresses derision toward Fuller, and 
Fuller was intimately associated with Emerson and Thoreau, then, according to this 
logic, it would naturally follow that as Hawthorne’s friend, Melville would express 
derision toward Emerson.  
Yet to argue that Melville’s attitudes toward Emerson’s scholarship and ideas 
are best described as derisive may lead to hasty generalizations and 
oversimplifications of the matter.  A movement that would pigeonhole Melville as 
only a contemptuous critic of Emerson may not fully do justice to his treatments or 
considerations of Emersonian ideas in his writing.  As Hymowech concedes, in Pierre, 
Melville demonstrates that his ideas “deriv[e] from that which is ridiculed” (109).   
Emerging scholarship over the past three decades has muddied the waters of such 
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generalizations by significantly complicating contrasts traditionally made between the 
two writers, and in so doing, blurring or even dismantling binaries constructed by 
Matthiessen and others.  Some scholarship has even gone as far as to argue that 
Emerson indeed had profound sway over his younger contemporary, as seen in John 
B. Williams’ 1991 book White Fire, just to name one prominent example.   Given the 
surge in the number of contemporary Melville scholars who have challenged the 
assumptions that undergird the diametric opposition between the two writers, it is no 
longer adequate to think of them merely in terms of their contrast.  Instead, we might 
further examine and interrogate the extent to which Emerson influenced and impacted 
the work and philosophy of the younger writer. 
We can observe this more recent turn in Melville criticism by following the 
lead of Sidney P. Moss, who argues not only that it is fallacious to assume that 
“Melville's emotional and intellectual temperament was attuned to Hawthorne's,” but 
that it is also a mistake to view Melville as “anti-Transcendentalist and especially anti-
Emersonian.”  But even if we agree with Moss that Melville is not anti-Emersonian, 
does that mean that he is necessarily pro-Emersonian?  It might be more accurate to 
say that Melville’s reception of Emerson was mixed.  Ramón Espejo Romero suggests 
a certain ambivalence and inconsistency in Melville’s approaches to Emerson and 
Emersonian thought, writing for example that Melville’s “often quoted” letter to his 
friend Evert Duyckinck, in which he expresses his “disappoint[ment] in Mr. 
Emerson,” in fact “establishes a pattern of simultaneous embrace and rejection of 
Transcendentalist ideas.”  Following this train of thought, we may find that Melville 
does not so much respond to or reject Emerson as much as he rather enthusiastically 
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enters into conversation with Emersonian concepts that had already flooded the 
marketplace of ideas upon Melville’s arrival to the antebellum American literary 
scene.   
In fact, throughout much of Melville’s career, he often expressed open 
admiration for Emerson, even if his admiration was not without condition.  This 
conditional admiration and sympathy is exemplified by his reaction after hearing 
Emerson speak for the first time on a short trip to Boston in 1849, when he wrote to 
Duyckinck, “say what they will, [Emerson]’s a great man” (qtd. in Sealts 25).  While 
Melville acknowledges that Emerson is not above criticism, he nonetheless appreciates 
and acknowledges his contributions.  Regardless of whatever critique he might offer of 
Emerson’s ideas, it is clear, at least in this instance, that he held the man himself in 
high regard.   
Although Emerson was not apparently a reader of much if any of Melville’s 
literary works, the reverse surely cannot be said.  Although Melville was not formally 
introduced to Emerson’s ideas until after he had already become an established 
novelist and contributor to periodicals in the late 1840s and early 1850s, the 
marginalia written in his volumes of Emerson demonstrate his marked and avid 
interest in Emerson’s prose. A reading of Melville’s marginalia reveals that although 
he sometimes felt disenchanted by Emerson’s Platonic tendencies, he often employed 
the word “noble” when reacting to significant passages in Emerson’s work, bringing to 
light his sympathy with Emerson’s sentiments, if not wholly all of his ideas.  Moss 
observes, for example, that “the annotations Melville made in [Emerson’s] books 
indicate a sense of discovery, and are, on the whole, in approbation of Emerson” 
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(126).  While Emerson’s view of Melville remains at best mysterious and at worst 
non-existent, Melville’s conversations, letters, and other written works reveal that his 
view of Emerson may be understood as one of overall appreciation, even though he 
certainly recognized fallacies and flaws in the elder writer’s thinking.  What must be 
remembered is that the marginalia that Melville left behind in his copies of Emerson’s 
works amply demonstrate that he was an enthusiastic and active reader of Emerson, 
even if he occasionally took issue with certain points made by the so-called “Sage of 
Concord.” 
 It is not my intention, however, to settle the longstanding debate regarding the 
extent of Emerson’s influence, or lack of influence, on Melville.  Instead, I intend to 
examine briefly one area in which Emerson and Melville demonstrate remarkable 
similarity: namely, their shared interest in the burgeoning science of 
electromagnetism, and the related pseudoscience of Mesmerism, also known as animal 
magnetism.  Not only did both writers demonstrate through their writing a keen 
interest in electromagnetic science and the pseudoscience that emerged alongside it, 
but both were especially eager to mine and explore developments in these fields for 
their potentialities for poetics, as a novel source of vivid sensory imagery.   Their 
shared interest in electromagnetic science is not surprising when we consider the 
widespread and growing interest that existed at that time in antebellum American 
culture as a whole, as evidenced by previous chapters.  The degree to which Melville’s 
thinking on these matters might have been specifically informed by Emerson’s 
approach to the subject is unclear, if indeed we find any evidence at all.  Still, an 
examination of the overlaps and intersections between the two writers’ relative 
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approaches to the topic yields remarkable insight: Melville and Emerson are curiously  
similar in their readiness to deploy a new, emerging vocabulary associated with 
electromagnetic science and pseudoscience in order to speculate and imagine that 
one’s own inherent electromagnetic conductivity—and, more importantly, one’s 
ability to conduct electromagnetic energies safely and then transmit them to others in 
the form of language—could be something that could be replicated in real life, outside 
the realm of literature.  In playing with this idea, both Melville and Emerson 
demonstrate their entry into an ongoing discourse in the mid-nineteenth century, in 
which metaphors of bodily electricity were increasingly confused and conflated with 
scientific or pseudoscientific hypotheses.   Both writers express ambiguity and 
ambivalence toward the idea that electromagnetic energies could be conducted and 
conveyed by individual bodies through the medium of communication, as they wrestle 
with new conceptualizations of bodies and minds that recent scientific and 
technological developments, such as the advent of the telegraph, would inspire and 
engender.    
 So, how are these writers’ attitudes toward electromagnetism similar, then?   
What about it inspired their fascination?  We might first examine both Emerson and 
Melville’s attractions to the “fluidity” of electromagnetism, as it darts and travels 
through the atmosphere between charged particles and bodies.  From the outset of 
electrical theory, dating back to Franklin and other natural philosophers of the mid-
eighteenth century, electrical movement was likened to “fluidity” in the language used 
to describe it.  Although electromagnetism was shown by Oersted, Faraday, and other 
pioneers in electromagnetic theory of the early to mid-nineteenth century to be in fact 
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a “force,” and not a fluid as had been originally thought, vocabulary that would 
associate electromagnetism with “fluidity” continued to persist in language and 
literature, surviving into the mid-nineteenth century and beyond, remaining with us to 
today.  With terms such as “flow” and “current,” words that we would typically 
associate with the movement of water, we still find that notions of “fluidity” 
predominate in discussions that would capture in words the appearance of 
electromagnetic phenomena, despite the long-proven dissimilarity between 
electromagnetism and fluids.  As such, the persistent belief that electricity is somehow 
like a fluid—or, even more problematically, that it is a fluid— has permeated and 
saturated popular thought to the point where the concept is not only rarely questioned, 
but has often resulted in misprision inspired by faulty reasoning.   
A prime example of this misprision is found in animal magnetism.  Long 
before scientific consensus determined that electricity and magnetism were two 
inseparable components of an electromagnetic “force,” rather than two separate types 
of “fluid,” as was previously commonly believed, believers in the pseudoscience of 
animal magnetism imagined that magnetic “fluid” could build up in parts of the body, 
causing anguish and disease.  Such disease could be remedied only by passing of 
magnets, a wand, or merely the bare hands of a trained mesmerist who would open 
blockages and regulate the flows of magnetic energies through the body.  This could 
be done for an individual patient, or even for a large group if necessary.  Using an 
instrument called the “baquet,” defined by Robert Fuller as “little more than a large 
oaken tub around which up to twenty people at a single sitting could be supercharged 
with animal magnetism,” Mesmer could “prance about waving a wand at one patient 
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after another” (Fuller 6-7).  Mesmer believed that “with sufficient concentration and 
willpower, a healer could capacitate, store, and transmit potent energies from his own 
person to the patient” (Fuller 6).  A presumably healthy body would be able to receive, 
circulate, and pass on the magnetic fluid without any impedance in its flow.  The 
healer, by storing energies and then transferring and passing them to the “sick,” could 
then bring about cure.   
When electricity and magnetism were finally proven to be inseparable by 
Oersted, the result did not dissuade believers in animal magnetism from holding fast to 
their beliefs, but, rather, the discovery bolstered their beliefs, as the union between the 
two branches of science might serve as further evidence that would show that Mesmer 
was somehow correct in believing that one cure could treat all manner of illness.   
Given the previous legitimation of medical electricity (i.e. application of electricity 
directly to the body for its supposedly curative effects) in the previous decades by the 
established medical community, it suddenly became possible for mesmerists to believe 
that their suspicions had been confirmed, rather than denied.  If medical electricity 
could be legitimized, and electricity and magnetism were part of the same force, then 
animal magnetism could therefore also be legitimized.  As the news of developments 
in electromagnetic theory spread and became part of the American consciousness, 
enthusiastic imaginations ran wild.  Those who would choose to ignore the amply 
demonstrated lack of similarity between electromagnetism and more familiar fluids, 
such as water, might jump to hasty conclusions.  One such conclusion was the 
persistent thought that if only one could somehow manipulate these electromagnetic 
“fluids,” through mystical or medical means, then the overall health of the human 
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body could be improved.  Given the fact that even some established practitioners of 
medicine adopted such pseudoscientific views, the line between medicine and 
mysticism might be quite significantly blurred.  As medical doctors replaced older 
notions that would regulate bodily fluids through bloodletting and other manipulations 
of the “humors,” with regulations of electromagnetic fluids, using means and 
justifications equally dubious and equally resting on shaky foundations of logic—or, 
more precisely, lack of logic—fallacies ensued and became widespread. 
But could such fallacies prove useful and productive?  From a modern day 
standpoint, it might be easy for us to dismiss such pseudoscientific, pseudo-medical 
thinking as quackery, pure and simple.  But what happens when we apply notions of 
the supposed workings of electricity and electromagnetism to conceptions of the 
fluidity of thoughts and language, words written, spoken, and unspoken?   Is this 
quackery as well?  What happens if we think of language as moving in currents, just as 
electromagnetic force is described?  Could language, like electromagnetic force, flow 
between and exert influence on individual bodies?  If so, could we free language from 
being fixed or limited to any one specific origin, untethered from any particular 
individual or any discrete material object?   Could thoughts and words be freed up too, 
if only we could somehow remove the blockages that might impede their flow?   
Asking questions such as these within the context of an early nineteenth century 
worldview, we might come to see how a Lockean epistemological model that would 
have us think of the impressions that experience engraves on our brains might be 
displaced by new models that would understand experience as engendering flows of 
communication.  Like electricity, such flows might be understood as constantly 
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moving and dynamic, surging and coursing between and through ourselves and other 
bodies.  Through endless transfers of energy, such flows could orient others toward 
different courses, moving in different directions and toward different poles than might 
have otherwise been suggested by their original or intended trajectories on a given 
plane, or between planes.  Decided misprision of electromagnetic science could thusly 
inspire creative individuals toward innovations in imagining how human 
communications operate. 
 Enter Emerson.  We may see Emerson’s admiration for the fluidity of 
electromagnetism, as well as his application of the supposed “fluidity” of electricity to 
a reframing and reimagining of how humans communicate ideas, in his 1844 essay 
“The Poet.”  In one passage in particular, Emerson paints a vivid image of a poet 
struggling and stammering to find the power within to express experiences in the form 
of language, who then finds this imaginative power in the form of a kind of electricity: 
  
  Doubt not, O Poet, but persist!  Say “it is in me, and shall out.”  Stand 
  there baulked and dumb, stuttering and stammering, hissed and hooted, 
  stand and strive, until, at last, rage draw out of thee that   
  dream-power which every night shows thee is thine own; a   
  power transcending all limit and privacy, and by virtue of   
  which a man is the conductor of the whole river of electricity. 
   
Vividly associating electricity with the natural powers of the coursing water of a 
raging river, Emerson speculates that imaginative power, like electricity, may be 
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brought to move freely without limitations or boundaries, as an energy drawn from 
and flowing in from one’s natural surroundings.  The fluid, watery imagery of the 
“river” recalls other key moments in Emerson’s essays that pivot on “currents” and 
“flows.”  Such moments are best exemplified by the famous “transparent eyeball” 
passage from the essay “Nature,” in which he writes that “the currents of the Universal 
Being circulate through me.”  Similarly, in “The Poet,” the influx of currents of 
“dream-power” demonstrates that one can draw upon a naturally occurring power that 
one may encounter in sleep but may not realize is there in waking hours.  Such power 
is characterized by its fluidity: it is not bound within the territory of any one particular 
individual but rather transcends individuals and borders.  The knowledge that such 
power is accessible and available to all humankind if called upon can then become an 
epiphany that might help the stammerer to find the energy necessary to transform that 
power into words. To put it another way, the energy supplied by this dream-power 
might refresh, animate, and invigorate the individual who conducts it, who then might 
transfer that energy to others in the form of the poetic utterance or line of verse.   
Emerson casts the image of a body that draws upon the resources of nature and 
harnesses that energy in a way that would transform it into powerful, effective verse, 
in tune with and in harmony with the nature from which it was at least in part derived.   
As argued in the previous chapter, Emerson’s employment of electricity as a trope in 
“The Poet” and elsewhere, both as a device for understanding flows of communication 
and for translating experience into poetic composition, unlocks a novel comprehension 
of the poet as “conductor.”  Such a poet may magnetically draw in energies and 
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experiences, as well as lead and direct others to share in those energies and 
experiences by transferring them in the form of the spoken or written word.   
 Examining Melville’s works, we might see how, like Emerson, he too called 
upon vivid imagery that would liken human communication to electromagnetic 
“fluidity.”  Such electromagnetic imagery would surely resonate with audiences for 
whom electromagnetic science, and the pseudoscience that emerged from it, were still 
spectacular, inspiring wonder and inciting speculation and interest.  Clearly, Melville 
shared with Emerson the notion that language at its best could, like electromagnetic 
energy, flow into and circulate through the body before being passed on to others.   
 As Richard Hardack suggests, this love of fluidity is apparent in an 1851 letter 
to Hawthorne, in which Melville writes, “I thank you for your easy-flowing long letter 
(received yesterday) which flowed through me, and refreshed all my meadows, as the 
Housatonic—opposite me—does in reality” (140).  Given the persistence of likeness 
between electricity and fluid that we have already seen, we may see the connection 
between Melville’s “Housatonic” and Emerson’s “river of electricity.”  Melville’s love 
of linguistic fluidity and fluidity of thought is surely translated into his own literary 
practice, and this is reflected by how often the word “fluidity” is used to describe 
Melville’s own manipulations of language.  This is evident for example in the work of 
Arthur Versluis, who observes that “the narratorial fluidity of Moby Dick highlights 
the general fluidity of Melville’s thought itself” (100), or that of Richard Brodhead, 
who writes that “Melville’s fluidity of mind is also expressed in his penchant for 
attaching multiple, incrementally accretive significance to key images in the action” 
(25).  Given the oft-mentioned “fluidity” of Melville’s work, he may put into practice 
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Emerson’s assertion that the writer/poet should resemble a “conductor” of the “river of 
electricity,” who can then translate that “electricity” into powerful, fluid language that 
will move and affect others.      
Yet, if we study the character of Ahab in Moby Dick, published some seven 
years after Emerson’s “The Poet,” it becomes apparent that the influx of electricity or 
“dream-power” may not always be such a welcome visitation.   Melville’s 
characterizations of Ahab in the chapter entitled “The Chart,” as well as other places 
throughout the novel, may point to some revisions he might have made to Emerson’s 
otherwise “noble” observations in “The Poet.”   In “The Chart,” Ahab obsesses over 
the charts before him as he imagines his pursuit of the white whale.  After carrying 
these obsessions with him to sleep, Ahab soon finds that they bring about uninvited 
intrusions of his dreams into his waking thoughts, creating discomfort and even 
madness.  Interestingly, the intense energy of these dreams is likened to electricity, in 
the form of lightning: 
 
Often, when forced from his hammock by exhausting and intolerably 
vivid dreams of the night, which, resuming his own intense thoughts 
through the day, carried them on amid a clashing of phrensies, and 
whirled them round and round in his blazing brain, till the very 
throbbing of his life-spot became insufferable anguish; and when, as 
was sometimes the case, these spiritual throes in him heaved his being 
up from its base, and a chasm seemed opening in him, from which 
forked flames and lightnings shot up, and accursed fiends beckoned 
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him to leap down among them; when this hell in himself yawned 
beneath him, a wild cry would be heard through the ship; and with 
glaring eyes Ahab would burst from his state room, as though escaping 
from a bed that was on fire.  
 
Ahab’s anguish, as well as the “phrensy” that he experiences, may be understood as a 
symptom of an overabundance of electromagnetic energy in his inflamed brain.  A 
trained Mesmerist might understand this as the result of a blockage of the circulation 
of electrical fluid within his body.   Along these lines, we may wonder what may 
happen if this lack of regulation of fluid were left to continue unabated.  This might 
lead Ahab’s body to fail, in a kind of aneurism that might resemble a fiery explosion 
or burst of energy—or, in a nightmare scenario, a kind of spontaneous combustion 
along the lines of Charles Brockden Brown’s Wieland.  
 But to what extent does this description of Ahab’s torment work as merely 
Melville’s attempt at vivid sensory imagery, and to what extent does it work as a 
pseudo-medical description of Ahab’s physical and physiological breakdown?  Given 
an audience still quite open to the likelihood that there was truth to be found in the 
pseudoscience of animal magnetism, it is reasonable to conclude that Ahab’s physical 
as well as his mental and spiritual ailments might have been plausibly brought on by 
lack of proper flows of electromagnetic energy within the body.  Could it be that a 
healthier version of Ahab, with a better balance of energy flows, could become, in a 
better situation, a poet such as that described by Emerson, able to conduct the energies 
around him and pass them on in the form of beautiful language, rather than in the form 
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of a “wild cry” or wretched scream?  In short, is Ahab’s inability to translate his 
experience into more coherent, intelligible forms of communication a sign and 
symptom of his failing physical and mental health?   Does Ahab suffer from a 
condition that could be cured, if only he would follow Mesmer’s claim, as Robert 
Fuller reminds us, that there was “only one illness and one healing” (5)?        
Further similarities in Emerson and Melville’s treatment of the subject of 
electromagnetic corporeality may be found when we consider how both writers 
imagine the body as a kind of lightning-rod and electrical conductor.   In their imagery 
and depictions, both writers consider how flows of energy might be transformed into 
thoughts and words also drawn from or conducted from nature, and both opine on how 
such energies, in the form of words, might be transferred or transmitted to others.   
Returning to Emerson’s “The Poet,” we find that Emerson claims that one who 
possesses poetic genius is more conductive of natural energies than others, is better 
able to regulate these energies, and, more importantly, may pass on these energies to 
others in the form of verse: 
 
Too feeble fall the impressions of nature on us to make us artists.  
Every touch should thrill.  Every man should be so much an artist, that 
he could report in conversation what had befallen him.  Yet, in our 
experience, the rays or appulses have sufficient force to arrive at the 
senses, but not enough to reach the quick, and compel the reproduction 
of themselves in speech.  The poet is the person in whom these powers 
are in balance, the man without impediment… (215) 
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Emerson imagines the poet as kind of lightning-rod—a conductor of natural energies 
who, via “appulses,” is able to direct these energies to a central point, namely, the self.  
By applying such an Emersonian perspective to analysis of Melville’s character, we 
might ask: is it merely that Ahab would represent a counter-example to his description 
of the ideal poet or artist?  Is Ahab’s problem that he cannot “report in conversation 
what had befallen him,” that his “powers” are not “in balance,” that he is a man with 
“impediment?”  With regard to the “phrensies” he experiences after obsessing about 
the white whale, the answer would seem to be yes. 
Yet Ahab is also a kind of lightning-rod, not only in the modern-day clichéd 
sense of one who attracts attention, infamy, and controversy, but also in a much more 
real and physical sense.   We might infer from the novel that his body involuntarily 
became a lightning rod when he miraculously survived a direct lightning-strike, long 
before the action of the novel begins, pondering the open sea from the perspective of 
the crow’s nest in the at the mast-head of a ship.  Certainly, he has the scar to show it.  
While competing narratives in the novel might offer different explanations for the 
lightning-like scar which travels from Ahab’s head to his toes, a lightning strike would 
best explain why the scar traversed the entire length of his body.  The scar is described 
most fully in the chapter simply titled “Ahab”: 
  
His whole high, broad form, seemed made of solid bronze, and shaped 
in an unalterable mould, like Cellini's cast Perseus. Threading its way 
out from among his grey hairs, and continuing right down one side of 
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his tawny scorched face and neck, till it disappeared in his clothing, 
you saw a slender rod-like mark, lividly whitish. It resembled that 
perpendicular seam sometimes made in the straight, lofty trunk of a 
great tree, when the upper lightning tearingly darts down it, and without 
wrenching a single twig, peels and grooves out the bark from top to 
bottom ere running off into the soil, leaving the tree still greenly alive, 
but branded. Whether that mark was born with him, or whether it was 
the scar left by some desperate wound, no one could certainly say. By 
some tacit consent, throughout the voyage little or no allusion was 
made to it, especially by the mates. But once Tashtego's senior, an old 
Gay-Head Indian among the crew, superstitiously asserted that not till 
he was full forty years old did Ahab become that way branded, and 
then it came upon him, not in the fury of any mortal fray, but in an 
elemental strife at sea. (184) 
 
Although the “old Manxman” who speaks shortly thereafter is older than both 
Tashtego and the “old Gay-Head Indian,” and therefore is treated with more reverence 
and considered more credible than the other fellow sailors who gathered to speak 
about the origins of Ahab’s scar, the narrative that he offers is not necessarily 
convincing.  Although the old Manxman believes that Ahab’s scar is in fact a 
“birthmark” that runs “from crown to sole,” it is doubtful that this would in fact be the 
case.  While a birthmark that ran from “crown to sole” would be an extremely rare if 
not impossible occurrence in medical history, a similar scar left by a lightning strike 
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would not, especially for one sitting atop the main mast in an era before lightning-rods 
were regularly installed on ships.  A more plausible scientific explanation of the scar 
would be that the lightning struck the ship’s mast near to Ahab’s head, and that the 
electrical current traveled through the entirety of his body on his way down the mast to 
be discharged into the ship and the water below.  Keeping this in mind, we might 
argue that the old Gay-Head Indian’s narrative, pinpointing an “elemental strife at sea” 
(or, to put it another way, a “strife with the elements while at sea”) as the origin of 
Ahab’s scar, would be far more plausible.  This version is lent further plausibility if 
we consider that the old Gay-Head Indian had actually known Ahab for some time, 
serving under him as a member of the crew, whereas the old Manxman had only just 
met Ahab for the very first time.  
As we might imagine, if we reconsider Thoreau’s observations of the aftermath 
of a lightning strike discussed in the previous chapter, such vertical scars like that on 
Ahab’s body, would not be unusual for trees that are struck by lightning.  If someone 
had only seen trees after they had been struck by lightning but had never seen its 
effects on an actual human body, that person might imagine that human bodies would 
carry similar scars resembling those found on trees.  In reality, this proposition would 
be false, however.   It would be more likely for an actual lightning scar to be not a 
slender vertical line, but rather to branch out in a flowery, zigzagging, lightning-like 
pattern.  This might lend more credence to the old Manxman’s theory that the vertical 
scar on Ahab’s body was a birthmark, albeit a very unusual one.  Yet, without access 
to images of actual lightning scars, either from his personal experience or from 
photographic evidence, Melville may have had to rely on documentary, anecdotal 
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evidence, or even oral testimony, in order to construct this image.  Given the 
prevalence of lightning strikes on ships of Melville’s area, particularly whaling ships, 
some of this testimony or anecdotal evidence may have even come from fellow 
sailors, or entries from ship’s logs.  This may help to explain the dissimilarities 
between the scar described by Melville and actual lightning scars that we might 
observe in photographic evidence today. 
One prevailing myth that was propagated in the mid-nineteenth century was 
that when lightning struck an object in close proximity to human body, the outline of 
that image could be somehow burned onto the skin of the victim.  We find this for 
example, in an 1857 article from the periodical Life Illustrated, in which the author 
refers to the experiences of a woman from Lugano in Italy in 1847: 
 
…[she] was sitting near a window during a thunderstorm, and 
perceived the commotion, but felt no injury; but a flower which 
happened to be in the path of the electric current was perfectly 
reproduced on her leg, and there it remained permanently.  (70) 
 
Could it be that Ahab’s “branding” was the result of Melville’s imagination that a 
similar action could be possible, that the image of the lightning-struck mast, a kind of 
“rod” in its own right, could have become perfectly reproduced on the entirety of his 
body?   Could it be his proximity to the lightning, and its failure to cause bodily 
injury, that left the scar but failed to kill him?   
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A counterargument against the possibility of Ahab’s scar being the result of a 
lightning-strike is that the “lividly whitish,” “rod-like” mark little resembles actual 
images of lightning scars that we might examine today.   It is likely that an actual 
lightning scar on a human being would be reddish in color rather than “whitish,” like 
Ahab’s, although it is certainly possible that a scar that was initially red could whiten 
in color, given the passage of time.  Still, Melville’s choice of language in calling the 
scar “rod-like,” indeed evokes an unmistakable resemblance between Ahab’s 
conductive body and that of a lightning-rod.   
Moreover, the notion that Ahab’s body is “rod-like” is further reinforced by the 
fact that Ahab’s body is initially described in this passage in metallic terms, as “made 
of solid bronze.”  While not nearly as conductive as other metals such as copper, 
bronze is certainly conductive and therefore would attract lightning strikes.  Melville 
would have us imagine a statue placed at the top of a large building or dome, also 
often the target of lightning strikes in an age before lightning-rods were regularly 
installed.  Such imagery is found in the chapter entitled “The Mast Head,” which 
specifically concerns the day to day vicissitudes of the statue-like, monument-like men 
who are assigned to perch atop the crow’s nest: 
 
Of modern standers-of-mast-heads; mere stone, iron, and bronze men; 
who, though well capable of facing out a stiff gale, are still entirely 
incompetent to the business of singing out upon discovering any 
strange sight.  There is Napoleon; who, upon the top of Vendôme, 
stands with arms folded, some one hundred and fifty feet in the air; 
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careless, now, who rules the decks below; whether Louis Philippe, 
Louis Blanc, or Louis the Devil.  Great Washington, too, stands high 
aloft on his towering main-mast in Baltimore, and like one of Hercules’ 
pillars, his column marks that point of human grandeur beyond which 
few mortals will go.  (225) 
 
While in reality the man who would be assigned to the mast-head would in fact inhabit 
a lower rung of the ship’s hierarchy, the view from high above allows one to imagine a 
temporary upending of such social hierarchies.  From this high vantage point, akin to 
standing atop the Washington Monument or the column at Vendôme (both sites, 
incidentally, honoring early military leaders of democracies forged in bloody 
revolution), he can imagine that he himself could be, in a sense, captain—or at least 
captain of himself—immune from the orders of whatever captain may govern the ship 
below.   
 The job of manning the mast-head also brings with it—or should bring with 
it—a sense of responsibility and duty to the crew below, as the job entails spotting 
both danger lurking ahead and alerting the crew to opportunities of hunting whales 
that may be spouting at the horizon.  Yet the monotony of the job may lead to a certain 
aloofness or indolence that might bring the man to ignore or miss the dangers or 
opportunities that might arise.  To effectively man the mast-head requires someone of 
particular patience,  fearlessness, and resilience, who is willing “to not be driven from 
his place by fogs or frosts, rain, hail, or sleet”—in short, someone who would “di[e] at 
his post rather than be moved” (224).  Such resilience requires certain rigidness, a 
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certain “rod-like” quality, a quality that is underscored by Melville’s association of the 
“mast-head-standers” with phallic, “rod-like” monuments erected to honor military 
leaders.  If we understand that Ahab once inhabited the mast-head, much like Ishmael 
later inhabits the mast-head, we may then understand that, upon being struck at sea, 
Ahab’s body “became”—or was rendered as— a lightning-rod.  And somehow, due 
either to Ahab’s metallic composition or his rigid, “rod-like” composure, forged in 
fire, he lived to tell the tale.   
To recap our reading of the passages we have examined from Emerson’s “The 
Poet,” then, we may paraphrase the essay in the form of the following argument: while 
the average person may not be able to survive conducting energy to the “quick,” the 
poet or artist does.  As I have argued, Ahab does, as well.  So, is Ahab therefore 
somehow similar to Emerson’s vision of the ideal poet, and if so, how?  What exactly 
was it about Ahab’s composition or composure that let him live when others would 
have—or should have—perished?  Has his near-death experience somehow changed 
the flow and balance of energies in his body, “magnetizing” him on a new course and 
mission, i.e. capturing and killing the white whale?   Certainly Melville hints that 
Ahab’s “rod-like” mark, along with his missing leg, represents life experiences that 
mysteriously compel him to undertake action counter to the work for which the 
Quaker owners of the Pequod have commissioned him, as he monomaniacally and 
selfishly seeks revenge against the whale, rather than conforming to the productivity 
demanded by the investors and profit-seekers who pay his wages.  But could these 
mysteries be explained by a pseudo-medical cause, namely, that the disruption of 
electromagnetic energies in his body caused by a lightning strike at the mast-head has 
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brought about changes in flows that might lead to blockages and inflammation, 
therefore resulting in a “phrenzied” state of health?    
 To become a “poet” or “artist” in an Emersonian sense, Ahab must somehow 
translate the energies from his experience into words that could move and affect 
others.   And this is precisely what Ahab seems moved to do.  As it would be near 
impossible for Ahab to carry out or complete his mission without the assistance of his 
crew, he must magnetize others toward a mission that would gravitate from the 
original intended purposes of the Pequod’s voyage.  Not only does Ahab merely 
conduct natural energies to the “quick,” but he is compelled to translate the energy of 
his experiences at sea into some force or fluid that he would work on to pass on to his 
crew members, just as a trained Mesmerist would pass hands over a patient and 
correlate the patient’s flows of magnetic energy with his or her own.  In this way, 
Ahab may mesmerize or magnetize his crew to accept the fateful mission, which to the 
rational mind may have appeared impractical, mad, and even suicidal.  Yet, given a 
lack of practicability of a pseudoscientific “transference” of electromagnetic “fluid,” 
he must rely solely on language as his medium and vehicle that might allow him to 
hijack the ship so that he might satisfy his own selfish desires.  
We are introduced to Ahab’s mesmeric techniques in “The Quarter-Deck” 
chapter.  Gathering his ship’s mates into a small circle, and having them cross their 
lances (a type of harpoon), Ahab dramatically touches the axis of the crossed lances of 
his ship’s mates with his hands.  In so doing, Ahab would “shoc[k] into them the same 
fiery emotion accumulated within the Leyden jar of his own magnetic life” (240).  
Despite his will to do so, the task proves impossible, or, at the very least, it is not 
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immediately evident that the experiment has succeeded.  Straddling the line between 
hyperbolic romantic imagery and the invisible brush strokes of a master Realist, 
Melville leaves it unclear as to the extent that this scene might describe an actual 
physical process that could be recreated outside the realm of fiction.  This leaves it an 
open question as to whether or not Ahab’s imagination of transference of energy to his 
mates was merely yet another symptom of his growing madness.  In fact, at a time 
when animal magnetism was a topic over which very smart, very well-educated people 
could earnestly debate without being laughed out of the room, the idea that one could 
transfer energies stored in oneself in order to change or realign the energy flows of 
others was not necessarily a mad, preposterous, or absurd one.  In other words, such an 
occurrence might be understood as just plausible enough that one could read it not 
only as vivid imagery, but as something that human beings could in fact do.    
During an era when leading intellectuals such as Margaret Fuller could 
effectively persuade audiences, for example, that “the especial genius of Woman [is] 
electrical in movement,” or that “women of genius” might be characterized as having 
the “depth of eye and powerful motion [that] announced the conductor of the 
mysterious fluid,” it would not be absurd in this context to understand Ahab, too, to be 
a kind of “genius,” albeit a destructive one, unlike the life-giving “women of genius” 
described by Fuller in Woman in the Nineteenth Century.   Likewise, in a time when 
one might find the baquet to be a legitimate medical instrument, it very well could be 
that Ahab could, somehow, in a pseudoscientific variation of Franklin’s “circle 
shock,” actually transfer and transmit the energy and experiences of his life into the 
waiting conductors of his assembled crew, despite being for whatever reason unable or 
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unequipped to do so in his experiment on the quarter-deck.  Or it could be that Ahab’s 
madness blinds him from distinguishing between fantasy and reality to the point where 
he cannot realize that such a “circle shock” without the presence of a Leyden jar 
would only be the product of his active imagination, not something that could actually 
be accomplished in scientific practice and experiment.  In any case, Ahab imagines 
that he could effectively polarize his crew, much in the way that a trained Mesmerist 
might realign the electromagnetic energies of patients.   Yet while a Mesmerist would 
presumably manipulate the power of electromagnetism to heal, Ahab would do the 
same for a nefarious purpose, namely, to kill. 
While this situation offers Ahab a moment to lead his crew to achieve a bond 
that will polarize them in the direction he would take them, it is also a moment of 
betrayal of those who remain at home on land, who demand productivity and profit 
that the pursuit of the white whale is sure to threaten and destroy.  In this way, the act 
is one of non-conformity and defiant rejection of the capitalism and the work ethic that 
reigns on land, and, as such, is a moment of ultimate selfishness and self-reliance: 
Ahab is determined to follow his own lead and act and think independently, rather 
than follow and obey those who hold the purse-strings, namely, the owners of the 
Pequod. 
 But to what extent are we to sympathize with Ahab’s self-reliance and 
independence of thought, attributes so often lauded by Emerson?  To what extent 
might he resemble attributes of Emerson’s “poetic genius,” and to what extent is he 
merely mad?  In short, to what extent may he be considered truly a hero, and to what 
extent an anti-hero, or villain?  Such questions are central to our readings of the novel, 
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yet the fluidity of Melville’s language and narration in the novel make such questions 
truly difficult and even impossible to resolve.  It is a difficult balancing act, and a 
dilemma that Melville never satisfactorily answers.  Considering the passage we 
considered from “The Charts,” we may wonder if what separates Ahab from 
Emerson’s “poet” is not that Ahab lacks the ability to conduct natural energies to the 
quick, or that he lacks the skill to successfully transfer them to others through 
language or other means, but rather that he lacks the ability to keep such powers in 
“balance.”  From the perspective of one who might believe in animal magnetism, one 
might say that Ahab’s constitution is such that he is thrilled, excited, and agitated by 
the touch of nature, yet the inherent blockage of energy flows in his body is what leads 
to the excruciating, howling pain of his throbbing, inflamed head.  It is not necessarily 
that Ahab doesn’t have the raw potential to become an artist in the Emersonian sense, 
but rather that he is a failed artist, or, alternatively, an artist who has taken on an 
impossibly large or immensely unpalatable task, as his chef-d'oeuvre.  While 
mammoth in its ambition, his quest of killing the white whale is one that others might 
find repugnant or repellant.   
If Ahab truly suffers from intracranial inflammation, as was implied by the 
passage we previously examined, this could help to explain why he is led to such rash, 
life-threatening, irrational decisions, such as his decision to resist Starbuck’s pleading 
to lower the ship’s lightning rods into the water in order to conduct destructive energy 
away from the ship in the midst of an electrical storm so strong that it lights up the 
masts at their tips.  In this chapter, entitled “The Candles,” we are presented with 
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exactly this image, the image of a ship whose three masts are lit just like candles, due 
to the electromagnetic phenomenon known as St. Elmo’s Fire:  
 
All the yard-arms were tipped with a pallid fire; and touched at each tri-
pointed lightning-rod end with three tapering white flames, each of the 
three tall masts was silently burning in that sulphurous air, like three 
gigantic wax tapers before an altar.  (669) 
 
Unphased by this impressive phenomenon, and impervious to the certain doom that it 
would portend, Ahab instead stands “erect,” even “rod-like,” in the face of the 
impending and ominous threat to life and limb.  In this way, he might embody the man 
whose own spine is his best lightning-rod, in an Emersonian or Thoreauvian sense.  
Even though by the publication of Moby-Dick in 1851 Emerson had not yet composed 
the aphorism in which he claimed that “the best lightning rod for your protection is 
your own spine,” this scene clearly correlates with Thoreau’s suggestion to Emerson 
to this effect, discussed in the previous chapter.  While it is not clear that Melville had 
come to compose this scene after having specifically encountered Emerson’s ideas (or, 
to be more precise, Thoreau’s), it is remarkable to observe how both writers, through 
very different journeys, conclude that somehow the defiant, self-reliant body, that can 
stand erect and with rod-like spine in the midst of a thunderstorm, might somehow 
better survive its danger.  Ahab would prefer to be his own best lightning rod, even if 
it means the destruction of the ship and its crew, rather than rely on a technology that 
could save his life, that could “carry off the perilous fluid” into the water.   
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If we agree that Ahab survived a lightning strike in the past, we may see why 
he has no reason to believe that he will not survive lightning strikes again, and why he 
is filled with self-confidence at a moment when Starbuck and the crew are ready to 
shrink in terror.  That this was the case is shown by the passage that follows, in which 
Ahab effectively admits that the scar that he carries is not something he has worn from 
birth but rather is a mark that was given to him while on the seas, as the “old Gay-
Head Indian” had thought: 
 
‘Oh! thou clear spirit of clear fire, whom on these seas I as Persian 
once did worship, till in the sacramental act so burned by thee, that to 
this hour I bear the scar; I know thee, thou clear spirit, and I now know 
that thy right worship is defiance.  (672) 
 
As the St. Elmo’s fire has lit the ship’s masts like tapers before an altar, the ship 
becomes a kind of site of worship, recalling an earlier time Ahab spent on the high 
seas in which he engaged in a similar form of worship, a “sacramental act,” in which 
he was burned by the “spirit of clear fire.”  This act of worship which resulted in his 
being burned—and indeed “branded”— has left a permanent scar, a scar that to him 
represents a life lesson: “defiance” is the “right” stance to adopt in the presence of the 
“clear spirit” that is the object of his apostrophe.  In this act of singular defiance, in 
which Ahab would attempt to attain a kind of invincibility or immortality, as a 
Promethean figure who has mastered divine energy and is therefore no longer afraid of 
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it, Ahab serves as a perfect example of the fearless self-reliant figure so lauded by 
Thoreau and Emerson. 
Yet we are left once again wondering, is Ahab merely mad, or is he a “genius,” 
in the sense employed by Emerson or Fuller?  Are both possible simultaneously?  
How sympathetic is Ahab, really? Again, Melville does not help us to sew up answers 
to these questions.  If we agree that Ahab is “mad,” or, alternatively, an example of a 
“genius” gone horribly wrong, then we might agree with Matthiessen’s assertion that 
Ahab’s “less innocent nature” and resulting “will to power and conquest,” with 
disastrous, deadly consequences, offers persuasive counterargument against 
Emerson’s “will to virtue.”  
From this, an easy route to adopt would be to argue that Moby-Dick is 
effectively a satire of Emerson’s works.  So, we might ask: by testing out the limits of 
a variation on Emersonian logic and following it to what modern-day readers would 
consider as irrational, absurd ends, does Melville offer yet another example of his 
mockery of Transcendental thought, just as he is supposedly wont to do in his later 
novels, such as Pierre or The Confidence-Man?  The best answer to this question is 
both yes and no.  While it is certainly possible that Melville directly and consciously 
considered Emerson’s ideas while composing Moby-Dick, and thus used Ahab as an 
example in order to lambaste Transcendentalist ideas, the evidence of Melville’s 
sympathies with—and similarities to—Emersonian approaches to electromagnetism 
reveal an opposite sentiment: a shared interest in finding a language to describe, at 
least figuratively speaking, how one might be marked for genius, and how one might 
transmit that genius to others.  What Emerson and Melville share is a reliance on 
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playful incorporations of imagery borrowed from electromagnetic science and 
pseudoscience.  The lightning-rod spine of Emerson’s essay shares a commonality 
with Ahab’s “Leyden jar” of his “magnetic life.” In imagery such as this, both writers 
tend to posit the body as a kind of conductor.   In this process, they incite inquiry as to 
how one might characterize or define “genius,” as they also imagine a model of how 
“genius”—or the products of “genius”—might be transferred or conveyed.   
Despite their skepticism toward animal magnetism, their invocations of it help 
them to imagine language as something that, like electromagnetism, could flow 
between individuals freely, without limits or boundaries, and without conforming to 
prescribed social hierarchies.  Through all this, they similarly value a masculinist ideal 
of a defiant, self-reliant, fearless, “rod-like,” “erect” individual, while at the same time 
warning us of the dangers of those who might use their powers of manipulation for 
tyrannical or destructive ends.  In these and other ways, the two writers appear more 
similar than different.  This is not to say that Moby-Dick shows us that Melville 
necessarily agrees with Emerson on these points, but rather that his fiction helps to 
illustrate concepts similarly engaged by Emerson, as he imaginatively and empirically 
tests out such ideas with and against his own experiences as a sailor on a whaling ship.  
Melville takes up—or takes on—concepts inherited from Emerson and others, and 
plumbs their depths to see what might emerge or be discovered.          
Whether or not Ahab directly acknowledges or even realizes the echoes of 
Emersonian thought that are apparent in his behaviors, his actions in “The Candles” in 
fact amply demonstrates his full faith in the maxim later asserted by Emerson: “the 
best lightning rod for your protection is your own spine.”  Although Emerson had not 
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yet composed this line by 1851, the year of the novel’s publication, and although there 
is no conclusive evidence that Melville had come to this idea after having encountered 
Emerson’s ideas, this overlap in the thinking of the two writers at a similar moment in 
American literary history demonstrates the existence of a larger phenomenon and 
larger leap in logic occurring in American culture at the time: a merging and 
conflation of a Franklinian notion of the lightning-rod as protector of the body with 
the idea that the body itself could become its own best protector, that the body could 
somehow become a lightning-rod.  In this light, by being composed of the right 
materials, or by simply adopting the right attitude or stance in the face of danger—or, 
to put it another way, being adequately “rod-like” or “erect”—one could protect 
oneself from threats of the most sublime nature.  This phallocentric construction may 
sound plausible to some at least in an abstract sense, but when applied to real-life 
experience, such as that which Melville himself experienced as a sailor on whaling 
ships on very deadly seas, the idea sounds far less palatable or plausible, and could in 
fact produce a deadly result.   
Further parallels between Emerson and Melville’s approaches to 
electromagnetic corporeality may be found in their considerations of its relation to 
“place.”  Just before Emerson offers his aphorism on the lightning rod and the spine, 
he puts “place” squarely in the center of his discussion: 
 
There are men who may dare much and will be justified in their daring.  
But it is because they know they are in their place.   As long as I am in 
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my place, I am safe.  ‘The best lightning-rod for your protection is your 
own spine.’ 
   
Emerson encourages those who would read his work to be “daring” and not to fear for 
their safety, as long as they know they are “in their place.”  Yet being struck by 
lightning is a matter of being in the wrong place at the right time.   At a time when 
lightning-rod salesmen might instill fear in the hearts of potential customers by 
making them feel out of place, Emerson finds a different stance more appropriate, by 
privileging an attitude of self-confidence and self-reliance, and inferring that one’s 
certainty and assuredness of being in the correct place at all times can itself work as a 
protective shield, a talisman against danger.  It is precisely this issue of feeling at place 
and at home in one’s skin and one’s abode that Melville would explore further, not 
only in Moby-Dick, but also in his short story “The Lightning-Rod Man.”     
Yet it is doubtful that Emerson himself would follow such advice, given a 
raging thunderstorm outside his Concord abode.  Surely, from the safety of inside, it is 
easy to make grand claims as to how one’s force of will might help one to survive 
direct lightning strike.  It is another matter altogether when such thinking is put into 
practice.  It is unclear that Emerson truly feels that one should go without the 
protection of lightning rods, or for that matter, that he truly believes that protection 
from lightning is merely a question of mind over matter.  But it is also unclear that 
Emerson offers his unsolicited advice as self-help, as rules that one should follow to 
achieve self-improvement, or whether he offers them as illustrations of didactic 
principles.  That the seductiveness of these electromagnetic tropes brings him to 
146 
 
employ such vivid imagery in the form of a parable allows him to play with and toy 
with such ideas without necessarily subscribing to them as gospel truth.  For Emerson, 
impressing upon his readers the importance of self-reliance, independence, and 
confidence is valued over and above offering a guidebook on the practical concerns of 
assuring one’s survival in a thunderstorm. 
 Skirting the borders of “faith and fraud,” or, alternatively, “parable and life,” 
(to borrow binaries from Rob Wilson), Melville tests out what we might call 
Emerson’s view of electromagnetic corporeality, by examining and exploring how 
ideas expressed by thinkers such as Emerson or Thoreau would operate if actually put 
into practice.  Melville reminds us of the concreteness of electromagnetic corporeality, 
as he also reminds us very real dangers that would accompany one’s decision to dare 
to take the risk of an electric shock without taking the precautions of proper insulation 
or protection.  At the same time, he stands up in a decidedly Emersonian way in favor 
of self-reliance, albeit an extreme form of self-reliance.  In this way, Melville might 
demonstrate the folly and absurdity of over-reliance on technology to ensure one’s 
protection and safety.  In Moby-Dick, Melville employs an empirical approach to 
Transcendentalist understandings of electromagnetism and its effects on the body, 
intrigued by considerations of how it might be possible for the human body to conduct 
natural electromagnetic energies to its core without injury and then somehow transfer 
or transmit those energies to others in the form of powerful, magnetic language.  Yet, 
at the same time, his novel works simultaneously as a cautionary tale, as its repeated 
suggestions of Ahab’s madness leads us to question the validity of such 
pseudoscientific thinking. 
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As the novel never satisfactorily resolves or answers the question of whether it 
is primarily an epic tale of heroism featuring Ahab as a modern-day Odysseus gone 
wrong, or whether it is more akin to a cautionary tale warning us against the dangers 
of monomaniacal tyranny, we might instead focus on the lines of inquiry that the novel 
inspires. For example, Melville might lead us to pose questions such as: is it really 
possible for one to insulate and protect oneself from threat in the form of lightning 
through sheer willpower, and the adoption of an erect, confident stance, and a feeling 
that one is not out of “place”?   Or, to put it another way that might emphasize the 
phallocentrism of the construction, can one protect oneself from danger by becoming 
“rod-like,” without somehow relying on someone else’s “rod” for protection?  Would 
such an approach be a reasonable one for one to adopt in the face of danger, one we 
could applaud or look to as a model for the future, or would such an approach be 
irrational, something to be avoided at all cost?  Could a “charged” individual 
effectively “mesmerize” or “magnetize” others so that they might be led to follow a 
course against their collective will, as is the case with Ahab’s magnetic influence over 
his crew, and if so, how?  Could a strong, self-reliant individual “resist” such magnetic 
influence?    
How we answer such questions might depend largely on the extent to which 
we understand Ahab as hero, antihero, or villain in the novel.  If we sympathize with 
Ahab’s quest to achieve some sense of victory over the forces that would supposedly 
oppress or subdue him, from God, to nature, to the bourgeois owners of the Pequod, to 
whatever else one might fill in the blank, we might find him to be heroic, or, at the 
very least, antiheroic.   But if we find Ahab completely unsympathetic (an equally 
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plausible conclusion), as an impossibly mad, misguided, misanthropic cretin who 
abuses his power as he seeks to exact revenge on a rare and beautiful creature, then we 
might find him indeed a villain.  If we find Ahab at all sympathetic, we might see him 
as embodying characteristics that Emerson holds dear, and if we do not, we might see 
him as exactly the sort of tyrannical practitioner of demonology that Emerson might 
despise.  As Melville straddles both possibilities in the novel, it is difficult to 
determine whether such characterization of Ahab would be more accurately seen as 
mockery of an Emersonian approach, or one that might be sympathetic to one. 
However, further clarity regarding Melville’s approach to Emersonian 
electromagnetic corporeality, and a better understanding of the degree to which he 
might have us sympathize—or not sympathize—with one like Ahab, who would 
choose to reject prophylactic measures such as lightning-rods when faced with the 
threat of severe thunderstorms, can be found through examination of Melville’s lesser 
known short story, “The Lightning-Rod Man.”   While this story is less widely read 
today than Melville’s more frequently anthologized stories such as “Bartleby, the 
Scrivener,” it was, at least according to Melville scholar Joshua Matthews, a story that 
“achieve[d]…and long term popular appeal” (57), following its publication in 
Putnam’s in 1854.  Matthews attributes this popularity at least in part to the 
“widespread cultural awareness” of a general public that was well versed in the 
vocabulary of lightning-rod salesmen, as they would have likely “encountered 
lightning-rod sales pitches both in person and in print” (57), which may help to 
explain why the story was, as Hayford observes, “the one Melville tale regularly in 
print and available to the public throughout the remainder of his lifetime” (qtd. in 
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Matthews 57).  This may be true, but the story would also resonate with the general 
public in the mid to late nineteenth century as they became increasingly aware of the 
science of electromagnetism and its related scientific and pseudoscientific metaphors.    
In “The Lightning-Rod Man,” the unnamed protagonist, living in self-imposed 
isolation among hilly terrain (presumably a high point in the landscape particularly 
susceptible to lightning) is assailed by a traveling lightning-rod salesman, who, in the 
midst of a raging thunderstorm, speaks in tones of serious exclamation, attempts to 
manipulate the protagonist to purchase a lightning rods by persuading him through 
methods of fear and intimidation.  The salesman informs the owner of the house that 
he should, for example, stay away from the window and the fireplace, and (absurdly) 
to stand on a small rug at the center of the room to avoid being struck by the deadly 
lightning that flashes outside.   Issues of “place” become pivotal to the story’s action.   
The homeowner/narrator of the tale is unphased by the dire warnings communicated to 
him by the salesman.  Feeling secure in his home environment, he first listens to the 
sales pitch, humoring the salesman, and then responds by mocking the salesperson, by 
sarcastically referring to him as “Jupiter Tonans.”   What begins as gentle ribbing soon 
turns to full-fledged ire, as the homeowner/narrator becomes fed up with the notion 
that he is somehow out of place in his own home, to which he responds by violently 
removing that which is out of place, namely the salesman and his wares.   The story 
thus ends in a climactic moment, when the salesperson’s persistence has so raised the 
ire of the protagonist that he destroys the rod that is presented to him, and, 
immediately thereafter summarily ejects the salesperson from the premises.  
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  In “The Lightning-Rod Man,” the protagonist’s sense of place is very much 
akin to that of the individual idealized by Emerson in the passage we previously 
analyzed:  he “knows” his place, and he would prefer to be his own best lightning rod 
rather than succumb to the will of another who might take advantage of him for his 
own profit.  We may have every reason to believe in this story that our sympathies 
should lie with him, and it is certainly easy to identify with his plight.  It is easy to 
laugh along with the narrator and scoff at the audacity of this would-be “Jupiter 
Tonans,” who would strike fear into the hearts of his potential customers in order to 
sell his wares.  It is likewise easy to rejoice at the narrator’s defiance as he seizes the 
rod from the salesman and snaps it.  Yet, if we remember Ahab’s rash refusal to 
deploy the lightning rods that would insulate the Pequod from harm, might we not 
stop to wonder if the narrator’s flat rejection of this product of technology in favor of 
preservation of his own self-reliance and confident sense of place could, as was the 
case with Ahab, also portend his doom and self-destruction?  Surely, the chances of 
the protagonist’s house being struck by lightning at any given moment may seem slim, 
but living as he does in the highlands of the “Acroceraunian hills,” he might indeed 
face an elevated risk of being struck, in comparison to the average homeowner.   Just 
one lightning strike could instantly turn his house to ashes.  Melville leaves it as an 
open question as to where our sympathies should lie in this matter, essentially playing 
both sides of the coin: aligning himself with admiration for what we might call an 
Emersonian brand of self-reliance, while at the same time exploring the limitations 
and dangers of such self-reliance when taken to extremes.     
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With our readings of Moby-Dick and “The Lightning-Rod Man” in mind, then, 
we might argue that, despite the persistent contrasts made between Emerson and 
Melville, and the various kinds of distance that existed between them that has led 
historians and literary scholars to place them in separate categories, a study of their 
approaches to electromagnetic corporeality shows that they may be closer in their 
thinking than it might otherwise appear.  Once we realize the remarkable similarities 
in the epiphanies at which they arrive through their imagery, we might see how they 
are representative of a collective thought process and discursive turn occurring in 
antebellum American culture: one that would applaud the body that forgoes insulation 
and is marked as somehow impervious to the danger of conducting electrical current, 
while also finding genius in the body able to convey that current to others without 
harm.   
In this sense, the imaginary “Benjamin Franklin” of West’s painting, who 
offers a bare knuckle to the lightning bolt without fear of harm, becomes in mid-
nineteenth century America, Emerson’s poet, who boldly persists and overcomes a 
stammer by conducting the “river of electricity” and saying “it is in me, and shall out,” 
or Ahab, who refuses the rods and stands fearless in his place, despite the flaming 
masts lit by the electrical charge of St. Elmo’s Fire.  But as Emerson’s poet is more an 
abstraction than a person, the thought of imminent death resulting from conducting 
electricity never seems a vital issue: the poet can conduct the “river of electricity” 
without harm, because the “river” seems purely metaphorical.  By contrast, while 
Ahab is a fictional character and therefore a figment of Melville’s imagination, he is 
nonetheless understood to represent, at least in the context of the novel itself, a very 
152 
 
real and mortal human being.  The threat of danger for Ahab is thus a very real one, no 
doubt inspired by Melville’s understanding that life on a ship was particularly 
dangerous, as it left one especially prone to lightning strike.  Because the threat that is 
posed to Ahab is more real, he seems more courageous than Emerson’s poet, and by 
extension, his decision to go without the lightning rods seems far more truly self-
reliant, as he embodies Emerson’s claim that “the best lightning rod for your 
protection is your own spine.”  But just as Ahab may be more courageous, he is also 
more foolhardy, as is the narrator of “The Lightning-Rod Man.”  In putting into 
practice the notion of becoming one’s own best lightning-rod, both Ahab and the 
narrator of “The Lightning-Rod Man” amply demonstrate the recklessness of such an 
attitude.  Melville’s blending of realism and romanticism therefore illustrates how 
Emerson’s “noble” characterizations of his poet/conductor might lead to lethal 
consequences if they were fully realized in practice. 
  That Emerson’s references to electromagnetism appear well-suited to being 
understood solely in figurative terms, rather than as earnest scientific or even pseudo-
scientific descriptions of physical or physiological phenomena, demonstrates that 
Emerson toys with concepts borrowed from science and pseudoscience in which he 
does not wholeheartedly believe, if he believes in them at all.  Through his 
deployment of this relatively new vocabulary, he might find vivid imagery to capture 
ideas of how poetic genius may manifest itself.  At the same time, he offers images of 
electromagnetic corporeality in the form of parabolic abstractions.  In these 
abstractions, Emerson likens language to electromagnetism to playfully suggest the 
good that could be done by thinking of a model in which one’s sensitivity to nature 
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could translate to beautiful verse.   Only on rare occasions (as he does in the essay 
“Demonology”) does he revise that thinking by asserting that mesmeric manipulation 
of energy was a dark art practiced by fiends and dilettantes who would abuse their 
own power to achieve their devious purposes.   
Melville, for his part, plays with the same concepts and empirically tests them 
against his own very real experience on the open sea, stressing the devastating results 
when translated into “real” practice by fiends who might engage in a form of 
“demonology.”   But for someone like Melville, whose experiences on ships made him 
well-versed in the very real dangers of being hit by lightning, he writes about 
electricity with a tendency to be understood not necessarily in only abstract or 
allegorical terms, but considered in terms of the very real, very practical concerns that 
it poses for sailors and others, whose very ship’s compasses could be disturbed by 
changes in electromagnetic forces.  For those who make their living on the open seas, 
having a sense of place in the world is vitally important.  Electromagnetic interference 
with the navigational instruments and compasses held within the ship’s binnacle could 
disturb one’s sense of place, and, indeed, make one feel out of place, unable to sail 
away from rising tempests, unable to return home.  Playing with electromagnetic 
energy in real life, and imagining that one could will oneself to become impervious to 
its powerful effects, was thus for Melville not only a dangerous proposition, but a 
lethal one.  Yet the tendency of both Emerson and Melville to imagine free flows of 
energy and fluidity of language and to incorporate such fluidity in their writing, as 
well as their tendency to value independence and self-reliance over and above 
obedience to inherited laws and hierarchy that would imprison rather than empower, 
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made electromagnetic vocabulary attractive.   Emerson and Melville through their 
writing express preference for a model of corporeality by which the individual would, 
at least in figurative terms, dare to take the full forced shock of powerful energy, 
rather than live a life of fear, submission, and dependence, even if the consequences of 
such thought, when translated into very real physical action, could be truly self-
destructive.  
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CHAPTER 3 
 
THE ELECTRICAL “CHARGE OF THE SOUL”: WHITMAN, AUTOMATA, AND 
THE SUPERCONDUCTIVE BODY 
 
Is it a fact — or have I dreamed it — that, by means of electricity, the world of matter 
has become a great nerve, vibrating thousands of miles in a breathless point of time? 
   —Nathaniel Hawthorne, from The House of Seven Gables 
 
What is marvellous?  what is unlikely?  what is impossible or baseless or vague?  after 
you have once just opened the space of a peachpit and given audience to far and near 
and to the sunset and had all things enter with electric swiftness softly and duly 
without confusion or jostling or jam. 
   —Walt Whitman, from the Preface to Leaves of Grass (1855)      
 
 In May of 1846, young Walt Whitman was presented with the rare opportunity 
to interview the great showman P. T. Barnum.  Filled with modern “marvels,” 
Barnum’s famous “American Museum” opened in Whitman’s own neighborhood—
right at the intersection of Broadway and Ann Street in New York City.  Whitman 
often visited this location, presumably walking by the museum on his way between 
work and home12.  In one brief, unattributed article, published on May 25, 1846 in the 
                                                 
12
 As Whitman scholar Brett Barney notes, not only did Whitman make frequent visits to the 
neighborhood, but there is also documentary evidence that Whitman at least twice visited Barnum’s 
museum, as he made note of it in newspaper articles to that effect (29) 
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Brooklyn Daily Eagle, he wrote the following lines to record his encounter with 
Barnum, who had just returned from a whirlwind tour of Europe: 
 
[Barnum] told us all about his tour through all the capitals of Europe, 
and his intercourse with the kings, queens, and big bugs.  We asked 
him if anything he saw there made him love Yankeedom any less.  His 
gray eyes flashed: “My God:” said he, “no!  not a bit of it: Why, sir, 
you can’t imagine the difference, —There everything is frozen—kings 
and things—formal, but absolutely frozen; here it is life.  Here it is 
freedom, and here are men.”  A whole book may be written on that 
little speech of Barnum’s.  
 
Barnum makes an analogy between “formality” and “frozenness,” suggesting that the 
effect of monarchical rule on high European culture was to engender a level of 
decorum of behavior and mannerism that, through its coldness, stiffness, and 
frozenness, seemed antithetical to life itself.  Barnum depicts the European aristocrats 
and royals as inanimate and dead—no longer human beings, but rather “things.”  
“Life,” on the other hand, is equated or associated with “freedom,” and a specifically 
“American” brand of freedom at that.  In Barnum’s vision, it is only in this land of 
freedom that true “men” reside; to not be endowed with such freedom as that which 
exists in America renders a human being not truly a “man,” but rather a “thing.”  That 
Barnum’s anecdote was the only part of the interview that made the cut to be included 
in his short article underscores Whitman’s fascination with it, a fascination so intense 
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that it might inspire his editorial comment that  “a whole book may be written” on it.  
But why exactly was Barnum’s brief utterance so fascinating, and how might 
speculations on Whitman’s fascination with it help to shed light on his later thinking 
and literary production?     
To begin to answer this question, we might first consider how Barnum’s binary 
opposition of “frozenness” and “freedom,”—or, even more importantly, “frozenness” 
and “life”—accrete further meaning and significance, especially when we consider the 
automata that formed such a significant part of the collection in his own museum.  His 
automata—mechanically animated clockwork dolls— attracted, excited, and 
exhilarated audiences precisely for their ability to escape the “frozenness” of their 
static doll-like condition.  The automata displayed in these exhibits miraculously 
presented the semblance of life through their mechanical animation, their inner 
workings and cogs seamlessly hidden from view for an audience of enchanted 
onlookers.  Such automata, often dressed in the attire of royalty and other “big bugs,” 
yet sometimes possessing the faces of apes or other animals—or, even more 
disturbingly, grotesque racial caricatures of Africans or other non-Europeans—would 
often become focal points of some of Barnum’s most attractive and attention-getting 
exhibits.  In these exhibits, the deadness, “thing-ness,” frozenness, or general lack of 
humanity of European royalty was mocked and made the object of derision, ironically, 
by giving these inanimate dolls the appearance of animation or “life.”   We may 
wonder, however, if such irony was lost on the showman himself.  Given his damning 
assessment of the European aristocracy, could it be that was he in on this cruel and 
unfortunate “joke,” or was he indifferent to the ethics that they suggested?  Such a 
158 
 
“joke” would play upon racial stereotypes by associating the state of being “animated” 
with being more like an animal than a “man,” thereby giving credence to beliefs that 
animals—and by extension, racially and ethnically othered human beings—shared 
more in common with soulless automata than they did “true men.”   The “humor” of 
this is difficult to parse and comprehend from our modern standpoint, however.  Are 
we to understand that these aristocratic automata possessing faces marked by racial 
caricature were humorous because they were animated and imbued with an 
overabundance of life, thus ironically the antithesis of the “frozenness” of the 
European aristocracy?  Or are we meant to laugh because these automata, like the 
aristocrats, only display the semblance or appearance of life without being truly alive, 
autonomous, or “free” in the sense that Barnum identifies?   Given that Barnum had 
acquired many of these automata from the very European aristocrats he would 
elsewhere criticize, we may wonder to what degree their “humor” was self-
deprecating and to what degree the “joke” was on them.  
One of the reasons that the elaborately designed and crafted automata of 
Barnum and others became marvels—marvels that were increasingly shown, 
displayed, and collected in the mid-19th century—was precisely their seamless 
blurring of the animate and the inanimate.  The “lifelike” appearance and movements 
of these mechanized dolls, moving without strings as if by their own volition, wowed 
and fascinated audiences precisely because this phenomenon brought to “life” 
otherwise inanimate objects.  Yet, given significant speculation in this era that 
inorganic artificial materials were not the only objects that could be somehow 
“brought to life,” this was not merely a matter of advanced puppetry or progress 
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toward robotics.  The bodies of dead animals, preserved via taxidermy, were also 
made to move once again, sometimes in ways that would have them perform acts that 
never would have seemed possible when they were alive.  For example, through the 
insertion of mechanical clockwork inside their hollowed carcasses, squirrels or other 
small rodents could be brought to perform acrobatics, play cards, or dressed up to 
perform other “human” activities.  Birds, removed of their internal organs and other 
remnants of any sentient existence, could be brought to flap their wings and “sing” 
again, through the craftsmanship of skilled artisans who would render them once again 
“animate,” if not sentient.   Part of the appeal of these Victorian automata was their 
ability to bring audiences to marvel at the craftsmanship that brought them into being, 
craftsmanship so well-executed that it might bring one to at least momentarily suspend 
disbelief and imagine that a miraculous animation or re-animation had occurred, truly 
bringing to life that which would be otherwise inanimate or dead.     
Yet automata did not only bring audiences to suspend disbelief—in other 
words, to forget temporarily what was “true” or “real”—while observing a spectacle 
that, sometimes with striking verisimilitude, made the artificial seem indeed real, or 
the inanimate seem indeed animate.  Rather, the appeal of automata drew upon a 
sincere belief held by many: that through modern scientific means, one could truly 
make dead or inanimate objects come alive. Buttressing an audience’s already held 
beliefs, demonstrations of dead birds that could fly or sing—or dead squirrels who 
could play cards—further opened up the imagination of the public to the possibility 
and potential for science not only to reanimate dead flesh, but to make the dead once 
again quick.  As Benjamin Reiss notes in his scholarship on Barnum, automata, and 
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race, for example, while “serious Enlightenment thinkers scoffed at the idea that the 
artificial and the natural were indistinguishable, exhibitors of automata began to erode 
the distinction,” to the point where they would “mystify even the basic distinction 
between the real and the fake” (118).  As exhibits such as Barnum’s became more 
prevalent during the nineteenth century, and more and more audiences were 
introduced to increasingly “lifelike” automata, public belief in the possibility of 
artificially producing a being that was, at least in every outward aspect, “living,” 
understandably grew.     
Such thinking emerged with a basis in scientific discovery, flourishing 
alongside the development of electrical theory.  This came to light most famously with 
the experimentation of Luigi Galvani and Alessandro Volta in the late 18th century, as 
discussed in the first chapter.  Rejecting Galvani’s hypothesis that disembodied frog’s 
legs could themselves be the source of “animal electricity” that made them twitch 
during his experimentation, Volta demonstrated that he could replicate the twitching 
of the frog’s legs by applying two pieces of metal that could create an electrical 
current that would pass through the legs, which had been bathed in a brine solution.  
Electricity would thereby be conducted through the nerve and muscle tissue of the leg, 
as it flowed from the connection of one metal point to another, animating the legs and 
bringing them to convulse.   Such discovery would soon thereafter lead to his 
invention of what became known as the Voltaic pile, an early battery.   
Not only was Volta’s discovery a breakthrough for electrical and 
electromagnetic science that paved the way for battery-powered mechanical 
inventions, but it also had a remarkable impact on understandings of exactly how 
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electricity might be manipulated in order to animate dead matter, inspiring the 
possibility that the scientific application of electricity could allow humans to bring 
about such reanimation at will.  Yet, if this were so, the question remained: is being 
animate the same as being “alive”?  Could it be?  If scientists could reanimate flesh, 
could they create or recreate a living creature composed of dead flesh?  What does it 
mean to be alive, if we can make the non-living somehow live again through the 
application of the vital force of electrical current?  And, if all this is possible, is all that 
separates the inanimate or non-living object from the animate or living creature simply 
the degree to which electrical current runs through its body? 
Questions such as those posed above did much to spark both the popular and 
literary imagination during the Romantic period in the early decades of the nineteenth 
century. Such questions were most famously explored and imagined by Mary Shelley 
in her seminal 1818 novel Frankenstein.  Even if it could only be brought to exist in 
Shelley’s mind, Frankenstein’s monster perfectly exemplified what might happen if 
we could straddle boundaries between the animate and inanimate, collapsing such 
binaries.  Through the lens that Shelley offers, we might begin to imagine how a 
human being could, through scientific means, construct or reconstruct a living, 
animated creature from an assortment of dead or inanimate parts.  And, given this 
possibility, we might ask ourselves: are we, too, simply animated assemblages of 
parts?  If so, is death really an end or only a temporary state of being inanimate?  And 
if death is not necessarily an end to our potential animation, could we be reanimated 
once more through application of the right amount of vital force?  Moreover, if 
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electrical or electromagnetic force could be manipulated to create or recreate “life,” 
could not our own health be regulated by manipulation of such forces?   
Audiences of science fiction such as Frankenstein could be easily inspired to 
imagine such fiction becoming reality, if they did not already believe that such reality 
existed.  This proves especially true when we consider how their readings might have 
been further informed by the widely practiced pseudoscience of animal magnetism, or 
medical electricity, explored in our previous chapters.  Taken in this light, the novel 
becomes not merely a hyperbolic, fantastical inculcation of a moral lesson, an allegory 
that would have us lament the results of what happens when human beings lose 
control over the technology they create.  Rather it becomes a meditation on how 
humans might responsibly handle the very real possibility that harnessing electrical 
power and applying it to dead flesh—power that might render one a “modern 
Prometheus”— could very well result in creating, or re-creating, life.     
Given the prevalence of this speculative and imaginative thinking in the early 
to mid-nineteenth century, we may return to consideration of how Barnum’s 
disturbing and strange binary of “frozenness” and “life” may have sparked the 
imagination and interest of young Walt Whitman, who, while only mustering a few 
lines on his encounter, suggested the potentiality of “a whole book” written on 
Barnum’s “little speech.”  While it would be folly to think that this encounter alone 
inspired what would become Whitman’s first book—namely, the 1855 edition of 
Leaves of Grass—we might yet reflect upon how elements of the prose and poetry 
found in his slim edition may explore and explode Barnum’s binaries and 
formulations, even if it was not composed in direct response to them.  At the same 
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time, we might see how in an America increasingly accustomed to and familiar with 
mesmerists, medical electricians, and automata, Whitman plays upon both scientific 
and pseudoscientific understandings of corporeal electromagnetism as he works to 
collapse the binaries and dualism that would understand the inanimate and the 
animate, or the body and the soul, as distinct and discrete categories.   
Whitman employs electrical tropes in his writing to vividly capture and 
imagine a model of corporeality by which a human body might demonstrate its own 
vitality by conducting electrical or electromagnetic energies to itself.  In this way, his 
work would resemble that of Emerson or Melville.  But in Whitman’s case, even more 
so than with Melville’s, we begin to lose the sense that this is only linguistic play—not 
naturalistic accounting of very real and observable phenomena.  Like the exhibitors of 
automata that would mystify audiences as they seamlessly blurred dualistic 
distinctions between mind and matter, the animate and the inanimate, the live and the 
dead, or the real and the fake, Whitman uses language to blur such distinctions.   As 
we shall see, through this linguistic process he gives birth to a dead metaphor: the 
“body electric.”     
Whitman’s attempted resistance to dualism was a feat that had eluded many of 
his predecessors, most notably Emerson, who courted and toyed with such ideas while 
still often subscribing to a largely Swedenborgian form of dualism.  In fact, while in 
some passages of his essays Emerson appears to reject or resist dualistic thinking, in 
others he seems wholly to welcome and affirm it.  He does this quite explicitly, for 
example, in his 1841 essay “Compensation,” when he observes that “an inevitable 
dualism bisects nature, so that each thing is a half, and suggests another thing to make 
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it whole; as spirit, matter; man, woman; odd, even; subjective, objective; in, out; 
upper, under; motion, rest; yea, nay” (149).  For Emerson (at least in this instance), 
dualism was not only a fact of life but was also an “inevitable” one.    
Such binary thinking must have been puzzling to Whitman, especially 
considering the implicit (if not explicit) gender norming of Emerson’s assertion.  More 
puzzling still is Emerson’s strict adherence to and advocacy for binary oppositions, 
that counters the unification and wholeness that he would champion elsewhere in his 
work.  Emerson’s hypothesis, that would have us think that each human being is only 
a “half” searching for its other (read opposite-sexed) “half” in order to become 
“whole,” is in direct contradiction with his assertions made in “The American 
Scholar,” for example.  Omitting any suggestion that a man is only a “half” drawn 
inevitably to his other, opposite-sexed half, Emerson instead claims that society, in its 
specialization of professions, has reduced men merely to collections of parts, parts 
that could, conceivably, become whole again through revisions of one’s relationship to 
nature that would understand man as a reflection of nature rather than an entity 
altogether separate from it.  According to Emerson’s argument, one could somehow 
return to or reclaim the state of being a “whole man,” simply through adopting an 
attitude that would resist the “divided or social state” and instead appreciate and 
understand that man and nature “proceed from one root” and that “[nature’s] beauty is 
the beauty of [man’s] own mind.”   By denying the differences between man and 
nature, or between individuals and each other, we might achieve a more “whole,” all-
encompassing understanding of nature and ourselves, rather than the narrowly defined 
and specialized role that culture would assign and impart.   
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Emerson further implies that capitalistic division of labor has reduced men 
from what would otherwise be their “whole” existence, and has instead transformed 
them into walking assemblages of parts: “strut[ting] about [like] so many walking 
monsters, — a good finger, a neck, a stomach, an elbow, but never a man.”  Limiting a 
man to a narrow role, profession, and function reduces the importance or significance 
of that man’s body and mind only to the part that he is required to use, so that the 
handyman is reduced, for example, to a good hand.  But the “monstrous” imagery that 
Emerson conjures in his depiction of the partitioned man also strongly recalls the 
animated, stitched-together parts of the famous monster from Shelley’s Frankenstein.  
Building on this image, we might envision America not as a place peopled by free 
men (as was the case in Barnum’s anecdote), but rather a place peopled by walking, 
breathing automata—almost zombies rather than human beings.  Such a “monstrous” 
existence could presumably be undone by adopting a larger view that would 
understand man and nature to be part and parcel of the same entity—essentially, that 
they are the self-same entity.   But if nature is “whole,” why then would any man not 
also be already “whole”?  And why would he need to seek his other “half”— or his 
other parts—to achieve “wholeness”?  It is a philosophical conundrum that Emerson 
never fully reconciles or resolves, and one that Whitman is drawn to tackle.  
Whereas in “The Poet” Emerson deployed electromagnetic tropes vividly to 
illustrate how his ideal poet might conduct the energies of nature to his body in ways 
that might reveal an inherent affinity or sameness between his “poet” and the natural 
forces that he might conduct, his application of electrical or electromagnetic theory in 
“Compensation” may lead us to think otherwise.  In “Compensation,” Emerson 
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specifically identifies “electricity, galvanism, and chemical affinity” as examples that 
would bolster his firmly dualistic approach.  Illustrating his claim that opposite halves 
attract, he argues further that if you “superinduce magnetism at one end of a needle, 
the opposite magnetism takes place at the other end” (149).   From this concept he 
draws an analogy to human behaviors and characteristics, moving to assert that “the 
same dualism underlies the nature and condition of man” (149).   Extensions of the 
dualistic logic of “Compensation” to “The Poet” might show that the poet’s 
conduction of natural energies to his person is not reflective of his inherent sameness 
with that natural energy, but rather his difference from it.  Keeping Emerson’s 
“needle” imagery in mind, we may see how, in the model offered in “The Poet,” the 
body would be rendered a vessel and conduit of the energy or force that penetrates it, 
while itself being a discrete, distinct, and oppositely charged entity, separate from 
Nature.  As we will remember, not just anybody could withstand conducting 
electromagnetic force “to the quick” and transforming it to verse; it would take a 
person of very special genius, composed of very special materials—in short, a 
superconductive body—to perform this task effectively.  Yet, keeping “The American 
Scholar” in mind, could we not offer the retort that the handyman could return to a 
state of wholeness if only he saw himself not as society does, as one good hand, but 
rather as a whole being, reflected in the wholeness of nature of which he was an 
inseparable part?  But if man and nature, body and mind, body and soul, and mind and 
matter were all truly one in the same entity, one may conclude that anybody—any 
body—should have the potential to be the kind of poet that Emerson would imagine or 
idealize.  In other words, there would be no need for “genius.”  That this seems not so 
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is further evidence of the inherent dualism—and contradictions— of Emerson’s 
formulation.    
In the very first lines of the very first poem that appears in the 1855 edition of 
Leaves of Grass, the ambitious “Song of Myself,” Whitman takes this sort of 
Emersonian dualism and contradiction head on: “I celebrate myself,/ and what I 
assume you shall assume,/ For every atom belonging to me as good belongs to you” 
(25).   Right away, Whitman’s speaker drops any pretense that there exists some 
essential difference between poet and reader that might prevent the reader from 
switching places and being precisely the singer who sings a body that is his or her 
own.  Right away, it is established that every atom that belongs to the singer might “as 
good” belong to the singer’s audience.  Despite the fact that the poem ostensibly 
concerns “I,” the use of the second person “you” immediately extends a gesture 
toward developing a deeply personal connection and intimacy with the audience, a 
connection that might omnisciently transcend time and space.  Confidently reassuring 
each audience member that he or she shares a common atomic makeup, the speaker 
announces his affinity with the reader, despite lacking the benefit of knowing exactly 
who is reading, or, moreover, what age, gender, race, or other identifying markers that 
reader might possess.  This initial use of the second person “you” would democratize 
the reading experience by stressing the common bond and origin of all humans. 
 Such assurance of affinity, sameness, and homogeneity would stand in stark 
opposition to the dualistic, gender normative approach suggested by Emerson in 
“Compensation.”  Whereas Emerson would claim that for every abundance there must 
be some lack, for every affinity there is repulsion, or “every excess causes a defect,” 
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Whitman’s approach in “Song of Myself” would build abundance atop abundance, 
deny the necessity of opposites to attract, and would exalt the notion that excess 
breeds excess.  And, certainly, “excess” is an apt word to characterize both the stylistic 
and thematic qualities of Whitman’s poetry in Leaves of Grass.  With his extensive 
cataloguing and his lines so long that they crowd the margins and almost spill off the 
page, Whitman amply demonstrates that he cherishes and relishes his poem’s 
excessiveness, rather than worrying that it might be naturally compensated by some 
corresponding defect.   And while Emerson would insist on ascribing positive and 
negative polarities to sexual difference, arguing for example that “there is somewhat 
that resembles…the man and woman, in a single needle of the pine” (thereby 
suggesting that the electromagnetic polarity found in nature mirrors a necessity for 
male and female characteristics to be naturally and necessarily paired in every object 
found in nature), Whitman’s insistence that “every atom belonging to [the speaker] as 
good belongs to you” emphasizes and celebrates an inherent sameness between 
speaker and audience, a sameness that might cancel differences in age, gender, sex, or 
race, or erase any immediately apparent outward bodily difference.  Yet the speaker’s 
invitation would proffer not only a shared body, but a shared mind, a shared 
consciousness.   By extending an offer to share mind, spirit, and consciousness with 
the audience, the speaker might further erase any other perceived difference, so that, at 
least in the shared space of the poem, our minds and bodies might unite and merge, 
communing.         
The revelation that Whitman collapses binaries and dualistic thinking in 
Leaves of Grass is truly nothing revolutionary.  Neither would it be revolutionary to 
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argue that Whitman’s attempt to resist dualism is also often met with failure and 
contradiction.  Whitman scholar Stephen John Mack offers a succinct summary of 
Whitman’s simultaneous resistance to and embrace of dualism: 
 
…we should find in Whitman a poet who is indifferent to one of the 
fundamental truth claims of nearly every religion from which he would 
borrow: “dualism,” or the ontological distinction between mind and 
spirit.  Still, dualism seems to be everywhere in Whitman’s poetry; 
paradoxically, it even appears to be central to his entire architectural 
vision of democratic selfhood. (23) 
 
Much like Emerson, Whitman does not only often appear inconsistent in the claims 
and assertions he makes, but rather he revels (albeit sometimes through his speakers) 
in his contradictions.  Even more revealingly, he revels in his indifference to those 
contradictions.  The speaker of “Song of Myself,” for example, not only casually 
admits to his (or her) contradictions, but boldly proclaims and defends them: “Do I 
contradict myself?/Very well then….I contradict myself;/I am large….I contain 
multitudes” (85).  But the indifference that Whitman’s speaker shows toward these 
contradictions is less the byproduct of apathy than it is the result of a concerted effort 
to disturb notions of stable subjectivity or personhood.  The idea of a self 
“contain[ing] multitudes” is crucial to understanding an “I” that is less a solid 
stationary object than a fluid, moving force, a personhood that more closely resembles 
shifting sands or swirling ether than it does a defined, static body.   Whitman’s fluid, 
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multitudinous self cannot be reduced to a single definition or a single binary, a single 
opposition of a physical “self” or “body” with an ethereal or metaphysical “soul” or 
“spirit.”  With this ever-shifting subjectivity in mind, we may find upon closer 
inspection that Whitman’s “dualism” may not be so dualistic after all.  
As we read further in “Song of Myself,” we soon find that the intimate and 
democratizing second person “you” of the first few lines of the poem quickly begins to 
shift and fluidly reshape itself.  Not long after we might be led to believe that the 
“you” of the first few lines refers to us, the readers, we find that the speaker uses 
“you” to refer once again to the self, or, at the very least, an alternate version or vision 
of the self.  We might alternatively call this version of the self the “soul,” a frequent 
object of address and apostrophe in Whitman’s work, as may be found, for example, in 
the poem’s later lines: “I believe in you my soul….the other I am must not abase itself 
to you,/And you must not be abased to the other” (28).  In this instance, we are 
presented with an image of the speaker as split into separate entities.  Critics have 
often interpreted these separate entities dualistically, using them to demonstrate the 
inherent dualism that would separate body and soul—or as Mack puts it, the “mind 
and spirit”—into separate and discrete categories.   
Encountering this shifting “you” for the first time, it is as if we are suddenly 
placed in an awkward moment where we learn that the person smiling and waving at 
us from across a crowded room is actually waving to a friend, or, more appropriately 
in this case, to a mirror on the wall.  Have we been duped?  Was the “you” of the first 
few lines actually just another reference to the “soul” that is “invited” while the 
speaker “loafes” and “observes a spear of summer grass”?  Given the contradiction 
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between the “you” of the first few lines and this “you,” which may be understood as 
an alternate version of “I,” it might be tempting then to redact our initial understanding 
of the use of “you” as democratizing, and instead consider “Song of Myself” as a sort 
of pretentious, self-referential form of navel-gazing.   But, as Mack goes on to argue: 
 
 Whitman’s soul is nothing like an ethereal entity at all; it is a 
 naturalistic conception of consciousness.  It is…an elaboration of his 
 conception of natural, democratic selfhood.  The particular role that it 
 plays in Whitman’s poetry may dramatize its fundamentally social—
 and democratic—origins (24) 
 
And, in fact, with Mack’s argument in mind, we may see that Whitman’s “you,” in 
addition to being “the soul” or an alternate version of the “self” or “I,” is neither 
transcendent of nor subservient to the self; instead, there is no hierarchy between the 
two identities. Rather, they represent fluid instantiations of each other, instantiations 
not limited solely to one or the other possibility but which, as we find as we proceed 
through the poem, could also presumably exchange positions with other auxiliary 
instantiations of the self, including the “you” which is actually us, Whitman’s readers.   
In other words, rather than limiting selfhood to one half of a binary of “subjective and 
objective,” “male and female,” or “yea and nay,” as Emerson would have us do in 
“Compensation,” Whitman’s multitudinous speaker or “self” shifts fluidly between 
different subjectivities and objectivities without advance notice or warning, acting as a 
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larger, broader, more multi-layered self that encompasses far more possibilities and 
levels of consciousness than mere binary opposition would allow.         
 Given the constantly moving and shifting objectivities and subjectivities of 
Whitman’s speaker in “Song of Myself,” we ought not be surprised when the “you” of 
the poem suddenly shifts again, for example, from reference to the “soul,” to reference 
to a third person with whom we have no prior knowledge or contact:  a lover who is 
both object and giver of ardent attention and physical intimacy.   We may find this, for 
example, in these lines: “You settled your head athwart my hips and gently turned 
over upon me,/And parted the shirt from my bosom bone, and plunged your tongue to 
my barestript heart,/ And reached till you felt my beard, and reached till you held my 
feet” (29).   Suddenly the speaker, complete with “beard,” is marked specifically as 
male, deferring the possibility of female subjectivity offered by a later confident 
assertion that says as if with intimate personal knowledge that “it is as great to be a 
woman as to be a man” (44).  Suddenly the “you” of prior stanzas transforms to a 
lover engaged in unmistakably erotic interaction with the speaker, and we are left as 
unwitting and involuntary voyeurs to a scene of raw and naked sensual and sexual 
expression.  Could we too somehow be participants or objects of this attention?  
Stumbling upon these lines, it is as if we are accidentally walking in on a couple so 
engrossed with each other that they are not aware of our presence.  This use of “you” 
might place us as outsiders, far removed from the warm, intimate, inviting address we 
encountered in the first few lines of the poem.   
Yet, not long after this scene ends, the speaker asks casually, to no one in 
particular, “What do you think has become of the old men?” (30).  Who is this “you,” 
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now?  Is the speaker now returning to speak to us, the audience?  Is the speaker 
speaking to him/herself, or to another version of him/herself, a.k.a. the “soul”?  Or is 
the speaker speaking to the lover we met in the scene not long ago?  All three?  
Someone else?  None of these?  Because of the shifting subjectivity of the speaker, 
and the shifting objects of his/her address, it is truly difficult to determine exactly to 
whom the question is addressed.  Yet again this indifference toward traditional, stable 
understandings of personhood, or the binary of subject/object, is less the result of idle 
apathy or sloppiness (although the “loafing” of Whitman’s speaker may indeed be 
suggestive of both) and more the product of a calculated methodology that would 
expand definitions of subjectivity and objectivity.   Through this methodology, these 
multifarious, multitudinous subjectivities and objectivities might lead us away from 
the pitfalls and the limitations of dualistic binary oppositions, and instead lead us to 
reflect more fluidly and expansively upon the subjectivity and objectivity of others, as 
well as ourselves—in short, to help us to think in more empathetic or intersubjective 
terms.  
  Understood in this light, Whitman’s language inspires us to imagine what 
might be possible if we could truly inhabit a fluid consciousness or identity, one that 
could move and shift between forms, between people, between genders, or between 
races, without limitation or obstacle.  Possessing a consciousness that moves fluidly—
like whatever force might animate us into life and consciousness in the first place—we 
might find that suddenly any solidified, hard fast identities that we might otherwise 
latch on to could slip away fleetingly, just out of our grasp, and impossible to capture 
or hold captive.  Following this train of thought, we may begin to imagine corporeality 
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free from physical limitations, free from limitations of perspective, free from the 
“frozenness” that would otherwise limit our thinking or bring us to think of ourselves 
as somehow better or worthier than others because of our relative physical appearance 
or social condition.  In essence, we may begin to imagine a nearly if not completely 
ideal and omniscient form of embodiment or consciousness, without necessarily 
becoming what has been constructed or known as “God.”  As Whitman’s speaker puts 
it in “Song of Myself,” “…the soul is not more than the body,/ And I have said that the 
body is not more than the soul,/ and nothing, not God, is greater to one than one’s-self 
is” (82).  Through Whitman’s construction of corporeality, identity, and subjectivity, 
one could inhabit a God-like perspective without understanding God as transcendent.  
 Yet such an ideal and omniscient form of consciousness—or, to put it another 
way, such a fluid, shifting form of corporeality—would also be nearly if not 
completely impossible to replicate or experience.  While such expansive thought 
might be effective in democratizing our thinking and improving our ability to 
empathize with alternate perspectives from our own, our very real physical limitations 
would prevent us from truly inhabiting those perspectives, those bodies, or those 
sensibilities.  We might simulate or imagine an escape from the limitations that might 
be imposed by solid, immovable identities, or unshakable firm binaries, and through 
this simulation or imagination, we might feel more liberated, or might be more moved 
toward liberation of others.  But, aside from possibly expanding our ability to 
empathize with the situations or perspectives of others, the notion of fully inhabiting 
the body of another—or residing within consciousness of another—was for Whitman, 
and is for us now, something that can only be approximated or virtually experienced.  
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Like Barnum’s automata, Whitman’s shifting subjectivity and objectivity is nothing 
but an artificial representation or simulation of reality, not, as far as we know, reality 
itself.  Just as Barnum’s automata gave their audience the impression of having 
autonomous movement and consciousness by offering a “lifelike” appearance, so too 
would Whitman’s shifting subjectivities and objectivities almost magically give the 
impression to his audience that something which does not now exist in real life could 
in fact exist.  In this way, Whitman’s poetry has something in common with virtual 
reality, or science fiction.   
 In a world where we might be deceived into thinking that that which cannot 
exist could exist, truly anything is possible.  For example, if we could disrupt or resist 
the binary that would place death and life in opposition, and if we could imagine that 
there were possible instantiations of existence other than life (the presence of 
existence), as opposed to death (the lack of existence), then we could be led to believe 
in some form of immortality, an in-betweenness or otherwise purgatorial existence 
somewhere between death and life as we know it.  In a world where once-expired 
creatures may once again display signs of life, or where the body parts of formerly 
living creatures are brought to move and live again, we may suspend disbelief and 
bring ourselves to imagine or even believe that such an existence could indeed be 
possible.  If electricity could reanimate dead flesh, then we could find life after death.  
But what if living human beings could somehow attain the “fluid” characteristics of 
electricity?  What if we could not only conduct electricity but could in fact be 
electricity itself?  What if we already are?  Then we would not be limited to one 
“frozen” form of embodiment, one “frozen” form of subjectivity.  Then we would not 
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be limited by the physical constraints of time or space.  Then we could move almost 
instantly and effortlessly between identities and subjectivities, as we moved between 
points or bodies.  In essence, in a world where this was possible, we could become 
immortal, even omniscient. 
 Whitman would have us precisely imagine such impossible possibilities when 
his speaker asks the question “What do you think has become of the young and old 
men?” or “…what do you think has become of the women and children?” (30)  The 
speaker’s answer is telling: 
 
They are alive and well somewhere;/ The smallest sprout shows there is 
really no death,/ And if ever there was it led forward life, and does not 
wait at the end to arrest it,/ And ceased the moment life appeared./All 
goes onward and outward….and nothing collapses,/And to die is 
different from what any one supposed, and luckier. (30)  
 
A traditional Judeo-Christian reading of this passage might have us believe that these 
lines are suggestive of an afterlife in which one might be rewarded with heaven.  Thus, 
death would be far “luckier” than what anyone might have otherwise supposed.  But 
upon further examination, we may find another possibility, one that takes a 
hypothetical, impossible phenomenon, namely, life after death, and presents it as if it 
were literally true.  It is as if the transition from life to death were truly not a change in 
the status of one’s existence but rather a continuation that would go “onward and 
outward.”  In this sense, life would not end and become something else (the 
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“afterlife”).  Rather, life would in fact not end—consciousness would not stop when 
the brain ceased to function but rather would simply continue, just shifting position to 
a different location or form of embodiment.  In short, the passage proffers the 
hypothesis that as life is never “arrested” by death, all who die are in fact “alive and 
well somewhere.”   
If we believe further that electricity could reanimate the dead and make them 
once again living, or, moreover, if we believe that in death we could somehow become 
the electricity or animating force that could in turn animate or reanimate others, then 
death is not an end, but actually a beginning, or a continuation, of life.  Just as 
Shelley’s creation of Frankenstein’s monster might help us not only to imagine but 
believe that dead flesh could be made once again animated and living, Whitman’s 
speaker, like one who claims to have experienced death and been brought back to life, 
can help us not only to imagine but also to believe that an existence that transcends or 
outlives death is in fact possible: 
 
Has any one supposed it lucky to be born?/  I hasten to inform him or 
her it is just as lucky to die, and I know it./  I pass death with the dying, 
and birth with the new-washed babe/….and am not contained between 
my hat and boots,/ and peruse manifold objects, no two alike, and every 
one good,/ The earth good, and the stars good, and their adjuncts all 
good.  (30-1) 
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Given the speaker’s fluid and shifting identity and subjectivity, he/she is able to be 
present in the consciousness of the dying at the moment of death, and is able also to be 
present in the consciousness of the newborn at the moment of birth.  And, while the 
speaker’s consciousness may in one instance reside in a body ravished and stimulated 
for the purposes of sexual and sensual pleasures, it may in yet another instance reside 
in a form of corporeality that lacks skin, nerves, bones, or any body as we know it, 
“not contained between [his/her] hat and boots.”  Not limited by the confines of mortal 
life, or the body that would be the vessel that would supposedly contain life, the 
consciousness of Whitman’s speaker furthermore becomes able to escape the spatial 
limitations of a terrestrial perspective, able somehow to draw back his or her 
panorama to such a removed vantage point that he or she can observe and evaluate the 
entire galaxy in which the Earth resides.  In this way, the speaker/audience may “see” 
from the perspective of an astronaut, without ever having set foot out of Earth’s orbit, 
or without ever having prior access to images taken from that perspective, in a time 
when space travel was still only something that one could imagine. 
 When, in his introduction to Leaves of Grass, Whitman makes his first explicit 
reference to the term “electric,” we may stand up and take notice of how his 
understanding of electricity as “fluid” might have influenced his thinking about 
subjectivity, personhood, and corporeality in similarly “fluid” terms.  It is important to 
note that his use of “electric” was made in a time which, as his biographer Jerome 
Loving tells us, “electric” and “electricity” were not “household words” (202).  If we 
accept Loving’s claim as true, then we may understand that despite prior use of the 
term in poetry and other literature, and despite that over a century had passed between 
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Franklin’s famous kite experiment and the publication of Leaves of Grass, the concept 
of “electricity” was not fully understood or even known by the majority of the general 
public in 1855.  To use such a term in passing would not be clichéd, then, rather it 
would still seem novel.  And, in its novelty, it would conjure up and build upon the 
previous understandings of electricity that we have thus far discussed, some of which 
were based in demonstrated scientific truth, some based in speculation, 
misunderstanding, or imagination.  Whitman employs the term “electric” in this way: 
 
What is marvellous?  what is unlikely?  what is impossible or 
baseless or vague?  after you have once just opened the space of 
a peachpit and given audience to far and near and to the sunset 
and had all things enter with electric swiftness softly and duly 
without confusion or jostling or jam. (10) 
 
In this passage, Whitman’s “you” refers to the poet, and more specifically, the 
“eyesight” of the poet.  Whitman scholar Matthew Ward Miller aptly observes that the 
“peachpit” of this passage is used as a metaphor for the poet’s eye, being itself of 
peachpit shape and size (132).  Miller goes on to interpret the passage by arguing that 
“the eye-shaped pit of a peach…immediately dilates to encompass all things ‘far and 
near,’ which enter poetic consciousness ‘with electric swiftness’” (132).      
Yet what Miller may miss is the possibility that the “peachpit” of this passage 
could serve either as subject or object of the poet’s eyesight, or moreover, of his or her 
“poetic consciousness.”  In other words, while we may understand the peachpit as the 
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portal through which the poet allows the “sunset” or other distant vistas to enter his 
consciousness, we may also understand it as the small, petty object that the poet 
“opens” to new potentialities in verse, under his or her watchful gaze.  While the eye 
“opens” and dilates to let the light of experience enter, the poet likewise dilates and 
“opens” the objects of his gaze in imbuing them with life and rendering them in verse.   
Earlier in the paragraph, Whitman describes the poet as a “seer,” in a way that 
resonates strongly with the writings of Emerson and Thoreau, and argues further that 
“if [the poet] breathes into any thing that was before thought small it dilate with the 
grandeur and life of the universe.”  From this we may understand that Whitman sees 
the poet as one whose work might “breathe” life into even the smallest object, or 
conversely, whose work cannot ignore or omit the “grandeur and life” that bursts forth 
onwardly and outwardly from even the most petty or trivial item.   
The echoes of Emerson are apparent in Whitman’s formulations, and we can 
imagine how in some ways this passage (and his introduction to Leaves of Grass in 
general) develops and revises Emerson’s vision of what a poet is and what it should 
be.  From our previous chapter we will remember how in “The Poet,” Emerson 
imagines the ideal poet as a kind of “conductor” of the “river of electricity,” who, in 
effectively describing or capturing the image of a sunset, for example, is able to 
conduct the energies of the universe to the central point of his body and then translate 
that energy back into lines of verse.  However, Emerson infers that not every man has 
this power, that some are more conductive than others or otherwise better able to 
translate the energies of the universe into words and speech.  Emerson goes further to 
suggest from this that a certain poetic “genius” is necessary to become the ideal poet 
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he describes.  He would later develop this idea further in his essay “Natural 
Aristocracy” by comparing the man who possesses artistic or poetic genius to a 
rightful monarch:  
 
what is so-called in strictness, —the power to affect the Imagination, as 
possessed by the orator, the poet, the novelist, or the artist, — has a 
royal right in all possessions and privileges, being itself representative 
and accepted by all men as their delegate. 
 
Yet in an age when phrenology would help to lend pseudoscientific credence to racist 
or sexist bigotry, to justification of slavery, and to eugenics, such stratification of 
human beings into castes based on their physical attributes was a dangerous and 
deadly notion indeed.  Whitman was more than aware of this danger, having himself 
attended slave auctions during his time spent in New Orleans.  There he witnessed 
how bodies were both devalued and dehumanized while their parts were reduced to 
monetary value, and contemplated how this practice was justified and defended by 
those who would feel they possessed a natural and inherent physical or intellectual 
superiority to others on the basis of racializing difference.  It was precisely this 
phenomenon which he would later critique and undermine in his poem “I Sing the 
Body Electric,” which was initially, as biographer Jerome Loving reminds us, 
“tentatively called ‘Slaves’” (198).    
Sensitive to avoidance of such social stratification, then, Whitman revises 
Emerson’s construct by actively resisting a hierarchy that would render some human 
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beings geniuses, and others lacking in genius.  In Whitman’s view, poets are not 
somehow better than their fellow men, but rather they simply see what others don’t 
see.  It is not a matter of what poets can do, but rather what they “do.”  We find this, 
for example, in the following line from his introduction to Leaves of Grass: “[the poet] 
is complete in himself…the others are as good as he, only he sees it and they do not” 
(9).  Whether all men (and women) are similarly equipped to see what the poet sees, or 
they are not, is not clear.  The point is simply that the others don’t see, irrespective of 
whether or not they can see.  This subtle yet telling difference reflects the 
democratizing approach that underlies Whitman’s methodology: all are presented as 
being as good as each other, despite how they may or may not be differently equipped.   
This difference of equipment becomes particularly significant when we consider how 
Whitman’s shifting subjectivities might help to resist any preconceived notions that 
the poet, or the audience of poetry, must necessarily be male, or, moreover, that that 
the poet, or the audience of poetry, must necessarily be white. 
Understood in this light, Whitman’s expression of the process by which the 
poet translates experience into verse becomes quite vivid indeed, and, moreover, quite 
pregnant with meaning.   We may imagine Whitman’s “peachpit” as emblematic and 
representative of the kind of small, petty, trivial object to which he refers previously in 
the passage.  Into this very small, remarkably disposable object, the poet channels all 
his or her experience—each proverbial “sunset” that he or she has seen and 
experienced—in order to breathe life into the object and translate it into beautiful 
verse.  Conversely, the small, disposable peachpit contains within it all the “grandeur 
and life of the universe,” an energy which the poet not only sees but also can conduct 
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or channel.  Hence the “life” of the peachpit, as well as the life of “all things,” “enters 
with electric swiftness.”  What is notably missing is the object of this “entrance.”  Into 
what does it enter?  What does it enter into?  Again, Whitman’s shifting subjectivity 
and objectivity allows for manifold possibilities.    One possibility is that in an instant, 
the “life” of the object enters into the life and body of the poet or “seer.”  Another is 
that the life of the “seer” enters into the small space of the object.  Yet another is that 
the life of the object enters into new life as verse.  And another is that as verse, the 
object enters into the lives of the poet’s audience, into their single and collective 
consciousnesses.  All is made possible by a single connection and single encounter, a 
single, instantaneous transfer of life energy from one point to another.  Electricity, in 
its fluidity, its swift and instantaneous transfer, and its ability to animate or reanimate 
that which might seem otherwise inanimate, thus offers Whitman a perfect and vivid 
way to describe this complex moment of poetic inspiration.  It is no coincidence that 
he chooses the word “electric” to describe this phenomenon; it is hard to imagine 
another word in the English language that would share all of these characteristics 
simultaneously.                
 By metaphorically breathing life into a small, inanimate object, then, 
Whitman’s “poet” is rendered analogous to the scientist—or automaton designer—
who could artificially “animate” an object via application of electricity or other 
mechanical means.  But is such metaphorical, artificial, or virtual “life” merely 
metaphorical?  Could it be understood as no different from “real life”?  Like a highly 
skilled exhibitor of “lifelike” automata, Whitman obscures the difference between the 
“fake” and the “real” to such a great degree that we might begin to lose track of any 
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difference between the two.  However, it may not be that Whitman is in this regard 
acting, like Barnum, in a way that would intentionally deceive his audience or 
perpetrate a hoax.  In fact, it may even be that Whitman too has lost track of any 
difference, if indeed there is any difference to be found. 
 When Whitman returns to an image of the poet as “conductor” in “Song of 
Myself,” then, we may wonder to what extent he (or his speaker) would understand 
this conduction as an actual physical attribute that one could possess, and to what 
extent he would find it to be merely a convenient metaphor or trope, used for literary 
effect.  In other words, would he find realism in Emerson’s suggestions that the poet, 
possessing genius, or endowed with the traits of “natural aristocracy,” was somehow 
more physically predisposed to an abundance of electromagnetic conductivity—or, 
moreover, that having a “lightning-rod spine” would be a positive attribute to possess?  
Would he understand these as realistic representations of some observable medical 
truth, or would he understand them only as clever (or not so clever) turns of phrase?   
Whitman introduces the concept of “conduction” in the following lines: 
 
To be in any form, what is that?/ If nothing lay more developed the 
quahaug and its callous shell were enough./Mine is no callous shell,/ I 
have instant conductors all over me whether I pass or stop,/ They seize 
every object and lead it harmlessly through me. (53)  
 
In these lines, Whitman’s speaker simultaneously questions and advocates a fluidity of 
being that could literally take shape “in any form.”  The question is as much a closed 
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and rhetorical question as it is an open and sincere one.  The sincere and open-ended 
version of the question might be understood in this way: what would it mean if one 
could “be” in any form?  What would that look like, or feel like?  How would the 
prospect of formlessness—or, more precisely, a malleability of form—have 
ontological significance for those of us who might otherwise cling to a fixed identity?  
The poem would earnestly have us to consider such a question.  That said, that the 
question that the passage asks is also a closed-ended and rhetorical question may be 
found in the answer that follows.  The hypothetical premise that one’s existence could 
be limited to no other form of being than one—like a quahog enclosed in a hard, 
callous shell—seems to be a straw man that Whitman swiftly tears down.  Throughout 
the poem, the speaker would consistently demonstrate that other, presumably more 
“developed” identities or subjectivities are indeed possible.  In this regard, if we agree 
with the speaker that alternate subjectivities are possible, then the idea that one should 
maintain a fixed identity enclosed by a “callous shell” is a laughable precept: it is 
somehow simply inadequate, not “enough,” or, at the very least, not enough for him.    
   What is also remarkable about this particular passage of “Song of Myself” is 
how it would further play upon and revise an Emersonian formulation that would 
understand the moment of poetic inspiration in terms of the abundance of 
“conductivity”—or “superconductivity”—of the body of the poet.  While the 
difference between the poetic genius and the common man in Emerson’s narrative 
would lie in the relative differences in their inherent abilities to conduct the energies 
perceived in nature to the “quick,” the difference between the speaker/poet and others 
in Whitman’s vision lies in the quahog-like “shell”—or the callousness of the shell—
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that might surround or enclose others, but which does not surround or enclose the 
speaker.  By maintaining a more fluid, more formless, more electric form of being, the 
speaker becomes more open—and thereby more sensitive and less “callous”— to 
others, whose life energies could then be conducted through the speaker’s open, 
“shell-less” channels.  This openness or, for lack of better term, “shell-lessness,” may 
then be responsible for the poet’s greater superconductivity, as there is no barrier that 
might impede or resist the flow of energy to the poet’s mind or body.  Whitman’s poet 
would be freed of skin, freed from shell, freed from restraint or protective covering—
in essence, freed of insulation—because insulation would not be necessary.  What 
appeared to be an almost genetic predisposition in Emerson’s argument may then 
become for Whitman the product of a conscious choice, a willingness to remove 
barriers that might impede other’s ability to see like a poet.  In this way, Whitman 
imagines (or would have us imagine) not only what it would be like if it were true, as 
Emerson argues, that “the quality of the imagination is to flow, and not to freeze,” but 
also what it would be like if corporeality and identity could truly flow as freely as the 
imagination.  
As we have already seen, in Emerson’s arguments we are presented with an 
image of the poet as channeling and conducting energies or, to put it another way, 
“rays and appulses,” in a linear and unilateral fashion, to a single central point.  In this 
model, the poet stands erect, phallic, and lightning-rod-like, possessing what we might 
call a “lightning-rod spine.”  As we will recall, Melville plays upon and critiques this 
image of a “rod-like” body when he envisions Ahab, for example, with his “rod-like” 
scar, who would pass the stored energy from his “Leyden jar” body and life to point of 
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the crossed lances of his men as he embarks on his ill-fated quest to defeat the white 
whale.  In both Emerson’s and Melville’s work we find what we might call “lightning-
rod men”— erect, rod-like, decidedly masculine bodies—who represent poetic genius 
in Emerson’s work yet who veer toward madness or recklessness for Melville.  In 
Whitman’s poetry, on the other hand, we encounter exploration of similar themes, but 
with a very subtle but telling difference: his pluralization of the word “conductor” to 
“conductors.”  With this simple change, we are no longer presented with an image of 
the body as a singular rod that channels or conducts electricity to a single point: 
presumably the head—or what it inside it, the mind.  Rather we may find a body that 
conducts electricity through multiple, if not infinite, points, with presumably the entire 
surface of its skin capable of conducting—or even radiating—electromagnetic energy. 
  Certainly the most casual glance at Whitman’s poems in Leaves of Grass 
amply demonstrates that by no means does he shy away from implicit and explicit 
phallic imagery.  Whitman was, moreover, not one to bowdlerize his work and omit 
anything sexually suggestive, especially images of the male genitals.  Therefore, it is 
both curious and telling that, in imagining the poet as conductor, he would refrain 
from an erect, “rod-like” image like that pursued by Emerson or Melville.  Whitman 
creates a model marked less by static identification with a particular sex or gender, and 
more by a dynamic, more universally applicable image of the human body.  In this 
model, the body is presented as both giver and receptor of life energy—or, to put it 
another way, electrical current—through multitudinous and innumerable points, as if 
through every pore, rather than a single stroke of lightning to the mind, or a 
penetration of the eye by the light and energy that would enter it. 
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  Whitman’s speaker, superconductive and free of the callous shell that might 
impede or resist the energy that he or she might otherwise conduct, is rendered extra-
sensitive to sensual stimulation, serving as an involuntary receptacle for every 
thrilling, magnetic touch, and equipped with “conductors” that “seize every object and 
lead it harmlessly through [the speaker’s body].”  This phrasing recalls Whitman’s 
earlier image of the “peachpit,” when he wrote of “ha[ving] all things enter with 
electric swiftness softly and duly without confusion or jostling or jam.”  Free of the 
“callous shell” that would make the body impervious to this stimulation, the speaker’s 
body is not endangered or harmed by the presence of this energy, but rather the energy 
enters “harmlessly,” and “softly.”  The involuntary way in which this energy is 
conducted—conduction not due specifically to a condition of the mind or the free will 
of the speaker, but rather brought on by innumerable magnetic points on the body—
figures the speaker as a sort of automaton, automatically conducting or being 
conducted by energies from without that happen to be present in its environment, 
animated and being animated without having any sense of active control or agency.  
Yet agency or free will may be present in the speaker’s decision to remove the “shell” 
that would otherwise presumably insulate the speaker from surrounding energies.  
Thus it is not clear that it is only the speaker or poet who is capable of such openness 
to experience because of some inherent physical or intellectual predisposition, some 
“genius,” as Emerson might suggest.  Rather a decision to be open, to decide that 
being closed is not somehow “enough,” might allow anyone—any one whose body is, 
to paraphrase Whitman,  “as good”  the speaker’s—to find and experience such 
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openness, an openness to giving and receiving of life energy that might encompass 
both male and female bodies. 
The speaker’s “shell-less” sensibility leaves his body ultra-sensitive to 
stimulation from without, stimulation that brings with it an inward joy—a happiness 
or sensual pleasure that, in its excess, borders the limit that could be possibly tolerated 
without surpassing that limit: “I merely stir, press, feel with my fingers, and am 
happy,/ To touch my person to some one else’s is about as much as I can stand” (53).   
The sensual, sexual connotations of this body-to-body touch are electrical, its tactile 
stimulation resembling the release of a buildup of static electricity transferred from 
person to person.  We might be reminded of Emerson’s phrase in “The Poet” when he 
writes that for the poet, “every touch should thrill.”  For Whitman’s speaker, every 
touch not only should thrill, but does.  Being equipped with so many “conductors” 
transforms the speaker into an involuntary conduit of all electricity in the vicinity, 
electricity transferred from nearby objects or persons to his person, whether he is 
“stop[ping]” or “pass[ing],” in motion or at rest. 
Yet this “touch” does not only offer sensual stimulation for the body; it 
becomes a catalyst for a change in identity or a change in form that may become as 
ethereal and bodiless as it might also in another instance be concrete and material, 
grounded firmly in the body.  Consider the lines that follow, when the argument 
progresses to another question: 
 
Is this then a touch?....quivering me to a new identity,/ Flames and 
ether making a rush for my veins,/ Treacherous tip of me reaching and 
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crowding to help them,/ My flesh and blood playing out lightning, to 
strike what is hardly different from myself […]  (53)  
 
Not only do we get a sense of the potential of this energetic “touch” to involuntarily 
“quiver” one to “a new identity,” but we also are reminded of the treacherous or 
dangerous consequences that this electric, lightning-like “touch” might cause for the 
self, or for others who would otherwise be the object of this touch despite a supposed 
intention to “help.”  Using an image of a lightning strike to describe this touch, or to 
imagine what this touch could become when directed by misguided hands, reminds us 
how what might be otherwise a stimulating, pleasurable touch could also become 
violent, surging beyond the limits of pleasure and spilling over into what might be 
painful, or even deadly.  Thus a sense of oneness with others and other objects and 
energies from without is suddenly and shockingly disrupted by a sense of how those 
“hardly different from [the self]” could “strike” out or take advantage of others, or 
drain one’s life or energy.  One question that this might engender is this: how could 
one manipulate energies and “touch” others in a generative and life-giving way, rather 
than one that is destructive, or life-defiling?  Could the realization that that which you 
might violently “strike” is “hardly different from yourself” change your perception 
and make you think differently about “striking” in the first place?  If we are but 
different manifestations of each other, sharing an essentially common and self-same 
atomic makeup, then is our manipulation or conduction of energies for the purposes of 
harming others merely a form of self-destruction?  Writing in a time and place, for 
example, when slavery was justified on the basis of pseudoscientifically demonstrable 
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racial superiority, such a question was not merely an abstract philosophical one, but 
one with significant material and bodily consequence.       
Certainly, the question of slavery was one that was central to another poem in 
the 1855 edition of Leaves of Grass, namely the then-untitled “I Sing the Body 
Electric,” which, incidentally, would not take the name by which we would now know 
it until twelve years later, when it was added in 1867 as the first line of the poem.  
Much has been written about the extent to which Whitman’s first-hand experience 
witnessing a slave auction in New Orleans significantly influenced and inspired his 
writing in this poem.  Numerous critics have emphasized the centrality of the slave 
auction to the poem’s themes, with some going as far as to argue that it is the defining 
metaphor of the poem, emphasizing the valuation, evaluation, and revaluation inherent 
in Whitman’s extensive cataloguing and praise of each body part that would comprise 
the beauty of the male and female form.  Such cataloguing of the beauty of the human 
form would offer a starkly contrasting parallel to the ugly accounting of the bodies of 
slaves: the prices placed on the bodies of slaves—and the relative values placed on 
their body parts—by the slave auctioneer.  Through this contrast, and his speaker’s 
assertion in the final lines of the poem that “[he] who degrades or defiles the human 
body is cursed” (123), Whitman is often understood as projecting a humanist and 
abolitionist impulse in the poem.  David S. Reynolds stands as just one example 
among many critics who would identify this humanist impulse, when he observes that 
the poem “presents a profoundly humanistic variation of the slave auction” (39).    
Not all critics have gone as far in their praise of Whitman’s humanism and 
abolitionism, however.  Some have even pointed to moments in Whitman’s writing 
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when he may have appeared to hold unmistakably racist views.  Kenneth M. Price, for 
example, writes that despite having “an extraordinary impact on writers from 
disadvantaged groups,” Whitman was “hardly free of the racism of his culture” (5).  
Galway Kinnell echoes the sentiment, noting that despite being the “only nineteenth-
century poet who wrote powerfully about slavery…Whitman the old man became 
racist in his person” (420).  Whitman scholar Paul Gilmore goes further, arguing in his 
book The Genuine Article that in “I Sing the Body Electric,” “Whitman uses the slave 
body at auction as a test case for uniting all of humanity through their similar bodies,” 
despite sometimes expressing “baffl[ingly]” racist positions in his articles elsewhere 
(153).  Gilmore concedes, however, that despite the moments in Whitman’s articles 
where he appears to participate in racist thinking, Whitman nonetheless in this poem 
“creates a poetic persona and form that transcend[s] his racist journalism and bind[s] 
him and his readers to black slaves” (153).  In his later book Aesthetic Materialism, 
Gilmore builds upon this argument further, and discusses specifically why 
“electricity” and its associated concepts worked as such an important trope in 
Whitman’s critique of American attitudes toward racial difference, arguing for 
example that while “most considerations of electricity in interpreting the poem reduce 
it simply to a force allowing the material, physical body and soul to be 
one…electricity, electrical technologies, and electrical understandings of the self, the 
body, and language held important implications for thinking through racial identities 
and racial politics” (168).  If we agree with Gilmore, we might say that it is not simply 
that electricity offers yet another way for critics and readers to affirm Whitman’s 
resistance to dualism; rather, the “understandings of the self” that electricity inspires 
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helps Whitman to “thin[k] through racial identities,” as it also might in turn help his 
audiences to “think through” such identities for themselves.  Irrespective of whatever 
were Whitman’s personal views on racism, or whether or not they were contradictory, 
electrical tropes helped Whitman to imagine for his readers a pathway toward 
reconsideration of how race was constructed, by presenting them with the possibility 
of a fluid subjectivity that could dissolve hard categories of bodily difference.      
Despite the significance of the history and development of electricity on the 
poem—a significance so strong that it not only inspired its new title, but also, in 1860, 
additional lines specifically referencing electricity—many critics still emphasize the 
slave auction and its implications for racial thinking in the antebellum era while de-
emphasizing the importance of electricity in the poem.  Others, similarly lessening or 
ignoring the bearing that electricity has on the poem, emphasize its overt sexuality and 
sensuality, its open display of the naked body, and the erotic fetishization it would 
express toward body parts and bodily functions, all admittedly pervasive and 
persistent themes in Whitman’s work.  However, in diminishing the significance of 
electricity in the poem, they would elide not only its role in helping Whitman and his 
audience to imagine and reimagine constructions of selfhood or corporeality, but also 
its role in rethinking communication and language, in a time, as Clifford from 
Nathaniel Hawthorne’s House of Seven Gables points out, the telegraph would 
revolutionize the way we communicate:  
 
Then there is electricity,—the demon, the angel, the mighty physical 
power, the all-pervading intelligence!...Is that a humbug too? Is it a 
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fact—or have I dreamt it—that, by means of electricity, the world of 
matter has become a great nerve, vibrating thousands of miles in a 
breathless point of time?  Rather the round globe is a vast head, a brain, 
instinct with intelligence!  Or, shall we say, it is itself a thought, 
nothing but thought, and no longer the substance which we deemed it. 
(189) 
 
In the world that Hawthorne imagines and envisions through his character Clifford, 
electricity has made it so that communication is not just an interaction or transaction 
between bodies, but increasingly a body itself, complete with “nerves” that might send 
its electrical signals across the globe in an instant.  Whereas a society that privileged 
written communication would associate words with a certain materiality, the electric 
telegraph allowed words to be transmitted instantaneously, in a form that lacked 
materiality or substance, more like a “thought” than words etched permanently on a 
page or a stone tablet.  Through this new technology, we might come to think of 
ourselves not as individuals possessing individual intelligence, but as parts and 
participants in an all-encompassing global intelligence that would connect us all, 
despite lacking a material “body” of its own. 
We can hear echoes of Clifford’s observations in “Poem of Salutation,” the 
poem that begins the 1856 revision of the original text of Leaves of Grass: “I see the 
electric telegraphs of the earth,/ I see the filaments of the news of the wars, deaths, 
losses, gains, passions of my race.”  Such electric telegraphs, like the “tracks of the 
railroads of the earth” of the preceding stanza, would likely have a similar effect: 
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“welding state to state, county to county, city to city, through North America.”  
Through this fusion or “welding” of individual bodies or groups of bodies, 
increasingly connected via electricity by nerves or filaments, human beings would 
come to be part of a larger, less material form of embodiment.  This new technological 
reality of electrically transmitted communications opens a door to consideration of 
how all communications—whether they be oral, written, or tactile— could be 
understood in “electrical” terms.  In a time when electricity was still thought by many 
to be a fluid, and was, moreover, also understood to behave like one, we might begin 
to imagine communication itself as fluid, or acting as a fluid.  With this in mind, we 
might begin to ask, how might we be “charged” with this communicative fluid?  How 
might we “charge” others with this fluid? 
  Reflecting on questions such as these, we might see how the lines that 
Whitman added in 1860 to the poem that would later become “I Sing the Body 
Electric” reflect and echo precisely this type of imaginative thinking.  Revising the 
original lines of the 1855 edition that did not include the famous opening line, 
Whitman dropped the word “bodies” from his then-titled “Poem of the Body,” and 
instead replaced it with “armies”: “the armies of those I love engirth me and I engirth 
them, they will not let me off till I go with them, respond to them,/And discorrupt 
them, and charge them full with the charge of the soul.”  Playing on the word “arm” 
that is enveloped within the word “army,” Whitman imagines through his speaker how 
one might enclose arms around or embracing a community of bodies that is larger than 
the single human body could physically embrace, while also being enclosed or 
“engirthed” in their collective arms.  The word “engirth” may extend beyond more 
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than a hug, as its sounds suggest an embrace of the entire earth.  In this love-fueled 
circuit, the superhuman, supercharged, superconductive speaker would “respond” to 
the armies’ collective embrace through “charging” these “armies,” a word suggestive 
not only of imbuing them with an electrical “charge” that emanates from the soul but, 
also in the sense of issuing a directive that would animate them toward achieving a 
common purpose.  In this way, a “charged” being could express love, or presumably 
communicate other sentiments, through issuing a “charge.”   
Given the common belief that electricity was a fluid, this need not necessarily 
be understood only in an abstract, immaterial sense.  In writing on Whitman’s 1856 
poem “Song of the Open Road,” Sam Halliday argues that the “efflux of the soul” that 
is Whitman’s own answer to the question of what exactly it is that he “interchange[s] 
so suddenly with strangers” may be understood as a “crypto-electrical substance” 
(145).  If we understand that antebellum Americans such as Whitman may have 
indeed believed that communication could actually occur between bodies in the form 
of just such a “crypto-electrical substance,” or, moreover, that in their view it was not 
just “crypto-electrical” but indeed electrical, then we may understand that his 
reference to the “charge of the soul” may not only be a fantastical and figurative 
abstraction of reality, but rather that it could be understood at this time as a realistic 
representation of something which could indeed occur in practice.  In other words, it 
may not only be understood as merely a model for or an abstract representation of 
reality, but rather as an expression that would try to put into discourse and explain a 
not yet fully explored phenomenon, a phenomenon that was conceivably scientifically 
measurable or capable of being observed. 
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 That Whitman’s references to electricity may be understood as more than 
merely an abstraction or model, but could actually undergird already held beliefs by 
the public at a time when electricity was still only vaguely understood by most, if it 
was understood at all, is a subtlety that is lost in much critical work on Whitman’s 
“body electric.”   We may see how failure to grasp or acknowledge essential 
differences between pseudoscientific “crypto-electrical” speculation and proven 
electrical theory might complicate our understanding of allusions to electricity as only 
belonging to the realm of the figurative in the work of Whitman and other American 
antebellum writers.  The work of Ann Rutherford Carter exemplifies this critical 
failure to distinguish between “model” and “reality” when she writes, for example, 
that “Whitman’s Luminous Self recognizes in a force like electricity a fully 
appropriate natural model for itself and celebrates the extreme value of that model” 
(120).  While Carter astutely argues elsewhere about how electricity opens up new 
ways for Whitman to rethink selfhood and embodiment, what she fails to do at least in 
this instance is to acknowledge that it was not necessarily clear for Whitman—nor, 
moreover, for his audiences—that this is only a model, only a simulation of reality.  In 
a time when automata became increasingly popularized, when the dead and inanimate 
could somehow be made “living,” “models” of all kinds likewise became increasingly 
difficult to distinguish from their “real” counterparts.   In short, while it is certainly 
plausible that electricity served as a model for Whitman’s reconceptualization of 
selfhood, its fluidity allowing for imaginative considerations of multitudinous and 
shifting subjectivities, it is not necessarily so that he or his audiences would have 
perceived this only as a model or a simulacrum. 
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With this in mind, we should remember that despite slavery’s importance to 
the “I Sing the Body Electric,” and the fact that it may have been a source for the 
poem’s inspiration,  it is just one of many important aspects of the arguments and 
thinking that is animated by the poem.  That Whitman dropped the title “Slaves,” and 
then replaced it with the more generic and universal “Poem of the Body” before 
finally settling on “I Sing the Body Electric” in its subsequent versions, reveals a 
telling shift in Whitman’s thinking.  The arc of these revisions points to a movement 
toward making the poem more universally applicable to all human bodies, not just 
those subject to the evils of slavery.  Moreover, it points to a growing desire to show 
how all of these differently shaped and equipped bodies could be fluidly connected 
together by one common unified theory—a theory that could simultaneously represent 
not only that connection, but also the flows and communications of energy and love 
between human beings that might be possible in a world where such commonality 
could be embraced.  In mid-nineteenth century America, electricity served not only as 
a metaphor for such flows of communication, but also as the very real force that would 
make such communications flow. This was especially true following the advent of the 
telegraph, which would revolutionize how antebellum Americans thought about 
communications.   
Slavery was an institution that commodified the human body, reducing a 
human being to an object rather than a thinking subject.  Through this 
commodification and objectification, humans would not be valued for their individual 
intellects, feelings, or sensibilities, but rather for the relative quality of their body 
parts: strong shoulders, good hips, muscular arms, sturdy backs.  In a world infected 
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by slavery, families were split and love was devalued in favor of paying handsomely 
for one’s reproductive capacity and potential.  A good womb, for example, would be 
bought at a high price.  But in an increasingly industrialized capitalistic society, and 
one, moreover, that would increasingly use emerging scientific theory to support ideas 
of eugenics, slaves were not the only Americans who might potentially be evaluated 
based on the market value of their body parts.   Not just slaves, but all men or women 
could find themselves increasingly valued or devalued because of their individual 
bodily characteristics.  We may be well reminded of Emerson’s assertion in “The 
American Scholar” that in the increasingly specialized industrialized economy, 
Americans had become “walking monsters,” possessing only “a good finger, a neck, a 
stomach, [or] an elbow.”  Whitman’s poem would address and critique precisely this 
phenomenon that would value the body part over and above the totality of combined, 
inseparable body and spirit, and in doing so, devalue both body and spirit.  He would 
decry the reduction of the handyman to a good hand, a body part rather than a 
complete and whole being, by cataloguing and praising the body parts, both male and 
female, that would comprise the whole of human beauty, the whole of human life.    
In essence, what Whitman does in cataloguing the virtues of each and every 
body part, including those which may occasionally be expurgated from polite 
conversation or deemed somehow unclean or taboo, is to make sacred and whole that 
which might be otherwise defiled or apportioned.   In so doing, he also renders 
Emerson’s “walking monsters” less monstrous, less othered.  By stitching together 
body parts through language, Whitman rehabilitates the condition of humans who 
might otherwise be considered monsters, objects, or things, and instead celebrates the 
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common, universal humanity of all bodies.  In this stitching together of parts, 
Whitman strangely resembles Shelley’s Dr. Frankenstein.  But rather than stitching 
together dead body parts to create and animate a complete “human being,” Whitman 
stitches together words, and in so doing, simulates the creation of a “whole man” as a 
virtual body.   
But again, the idea that the simulation of the creation of a “whole man” is only 
that, a simulation, may be lost, not only on Whitman or his speaker, but on us, the 
audience.  When Whitman’s speaker “sing[s] the body electric,” this “singing” may 
not only to be understood as celebrating in verse the human body—a body that, as we 
have seen, could in many ways be understood as “electric” both in its receptive and its 
generative capacity— but, rather, it might be understood that in “sing[ing] the body 
electric,” the speaker in fact brings a real “body” to life, and not just the “body of 
work” comprised in the poem.  If we understand communication itself as “electric,” 
the speaker might then be understood as applying electricity to words and with words, 
animating words and concepts not only in ways that resemble life, but which could 
actually be generative of life itself.  In this way, the “charge” of the speaker’s “soul” 
could be transferred fluidly to its readers, charging and spurring them to enact real 
change, not only in their thoughts about the human body, but also in their actions.  In 
this way, a figurative “electrification” may be made somehow real; simulated 
animation and simulated life would translate to actual animation and actual life. 
A reading of the poem that appreciates the lack of distinction it makes between 
its simulation of electrification and its actual electrification will demonstrate how 
Whitman might live up to his illustration of the poet as one who might breathe life 
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into—and thereby electrify and animate— the smallest, most petty of objects.  Living 
in a society that privileged the eye or the hand at the expense of other body parts, 
Whitman rebuts this sentiment by praising and valuing body parts that might be 
otherwise overlooked or trivialized.  The outcome of this thinking is not so trivial, 
however.  When we praise the “peachpit” eye not over and above the armpit, we resist 
a mapping of the body that would portray some body parts as clean and others as not.  
When we praise the hand not over and above the nape of the neck, the skin, the 
intestines, the small of the back, the elbow, the nipples, the “sweet and clean” bowels, 
or the genitals, we resist the binary thinking that might cause us to devalue our bodies 
or, moreover, feel shame or embarrassment about bodies in general.  Without adhering 
to a hierarchy that might privilege the brain or the heart over and above other equally 
alive and beautiful parts of the body, life and consciousness would not be limited to 
the domain of any one particular body part but rather the composition of all, all of 
which might conduct life through their many and innumerable points.  A general 
sacredness of all body parts might lead to a general sacredness of the body, a 
sacredness that, when translated into actions toward others, would counter the 
categorization of human beings into groups of “clean” and “unclean,” or “self and 
other” that might lead to justification of dehumanizing practices such as slavery.  Such 
are the ideas that Whitman would animate, bring to life, or electrify through his 
poetry.   In this way, Whitman’s poems are types of automata: realistic simulations of 
life that, despite their animation or what they might potentially animate, may not be 
themselves “alive,” not existing as autonomous, breathing, thinking, sentient beings. 
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That Frankenstein and Leaves of Grass have more in common than we might 
otherwise imagine may be demonstrated, then, when we consider how both employ 
electricity as they conjure or recall “dead metaphors,” or, alternatively, as they attempt 
to make literal that which might otherwise be understood as metaphorical.  Analyzing 
the “dead metaphors” of Frankenstein, Elizabeth Young writes the following: 
   
…Shelley’s monster is a literary elaboration of a dead metaphor.  The 
very category of this literary figure implies a corpse….the Frankenstein 
monster can be seen as the “corpse” of the dead metaphor brought back 
artificially to life.  The reanimating process is also one of 
amalgamation, given that so many dead metaphors involve a body part: 
the neck of a bottle, the spine of a book…The Frankenstein monster is 
both a reanimation and amalgamation of the severed body parts that 
customarily populate the category of dead metaphor.  Indeed, it is not 
only that the body of the monster resembles the reanimation of the dead 
metaphor; it is also that the monster literally embodies this process of 
reanimation. 
   
If we follow in Young’s train of thought, we are to believe that, because 
Frankenstein’s monster is made of parts of corpses, and parts of corpses often figure in 
metaphors that have become “dead ” (such as the “face of a clock,” etc.), then it would 
also follow that Frankenstein is not only an “elaboration” or “reanimation” of a dead 
metaphor, but also a “litera[l] embodiment” of this entire “process.”   We might apply 
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a similar strategy to Leaves of Grass, and imagine how Whitman creates his own 
version of a “monster” in “I Sing the Body Electric,” how he takes a random 
assortment of body parts of men and women—or to be more precise, words that would 
represent body parts—and assembles them into a new form and new body, and in so 
doing, elaborates on and breathes new “life” into what would otherwise be a “dead 
metaphor,” a dead body, a poem as “corpse.”       
Such a reading, however, would forget that embodiment, at least in the literal 
sense, requires a real, concrete material “body.”  How can a literary character—or, for 
that matter, a word or figure of speech—literally embody anything?  To believe that 
this is so requires that we understand embodiment as something that can occur without 
a body, that a linguistic representation of embodiment can itself indeed be an 
embodiment.  This, however, as we may have already discovered, is precisely what the 
poems of Leaves of Grass would require of us.  It asks us to see the word as flesh, and 
in so doing, asks us to at least temporarily suspend disbelief, to at least momentarily 
forget the concrete realities and limitations of our own individual bodies and imagine 
that we could literally embody others—and, moreover, be embodied in others.  In 
“amalgamating” a series of “body parts,” Whitman, in “I Sing the Body Electric” and 
elsewhere in Leaves of Grass, figuratively animates or reanimates a more universal 
human “body,” in such a way that we might temporarily forget our own individual 
bodies or constructions of embodiment, or, moreover, that we might forget the 
limitations of bodies in general.   It is in this forgetting of ourselves—this forgetting of 
what is representation and what is real and material—that Whitman constructs and 
gives birth to a dead metaphor.    
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We may understand the “dead metaphor” as synonymous with the cliché, as a 
figure of speech that has lost the freshness and originality of its previous usage, that 
has lost its power and meaning over time.  However, we may also understand the 
“dead metaphor” more as Jacques Derrida does in White Mythology: a forgetting of the 
difference between what is real and what is not, a forgetting that a metaphor that has 
been used over time is, indeed, a metaphor.  Young’s argument on dead metaphors in 
Frankenstein itself pivots on a dead metaphor in this second, Derridean sense, since 
asserting that Frankenstein’s monster could literally “embody” anything is to forget 
for a moment what it means to be “literal.”  Embodiment, too, is then rendered a “dead 
metaphor.”  
Whereas Shelley would have her protagonist “electrify” an assembled body 
amalgamated from parts of corpses in order to simulate a kind of bodily animation or 
reanimation, Whitman’s speaker in “I Sing the Body Electric” would assemble and 
amalgamate words representing body parts and have us believe that his electrification 
of those body parts through language could not only simulate an animation of a new 
electrified body or “body electric,” but could actually animate concrete and material 
bodies in practice.  In this sense, the poet is understood as not merely offering 
representation and simulacra, not as merely giving us metaphors or figure of speech, 
but rather the poet (or, in other contexts, the orator or the artist) may be understood as 
truly a sort of electrician, one who through language manipulates, channels, and 
conducts an essential life force and passes this life force on to others in ways that 
might charge, animate, or reanimate them to take action.   
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It is in the birth of Whitman’s dead metaphor of the “body electric” that his 
creations and body of work leaves one of its most lasting impressions.  As Whitman 
blurs the real with the figurative, he seamlessly creates the semblance of life in his 
poetry just as the designer of an automaton creates the semblance of life in a frozen, 
lifeless doll, corpse, or other inanimate object.  As we forget what life in fact is—
forget what is inanimate, dead, or frozen, and what is sentient, autonomous, and 
alive—we might reshape our ontology and construction of selfhood as we become free 
from the hazards of binary thinking that might limit or delimit us.  Not only would this 
dead metaphor have profound significance for American understandings of 
embodiment and corporeality, but also for our understandings of language and those 
who manipulate it.  In the wake of the “body electric,” such manipulators of language 
might be understood as “electrifying” audiences, despite a loss of the literal sense of 
what real electrification of others would be in practice.  As we shall see, when the 
“body electric” became increasingly clichéd over the course of the next century and 
beyond, it became a convenient trope deployed by those who would manipulate us, 
through advertising and promotion, to purchase products or services that would excite, 
entertain, or other otherwise improve us.  Moreover, it became a trope embodied by 
those who would achieve fame and celebrity by demonstrating and performing an 
affect somehow “electric” or “electrifying.”           
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CHAPTER 4 
 
“DRIVING A BRAVE TRADE”: ELVIS PRESLEY, MARILYN MONROE, AND 
THE LEGACY OF “LIGHTNING-ROD MEN” AND “BODIES ELECTRIC” IN 
AMERICA 
 
 “…the lightning-rod man still dwells in the land; still travels in storm-time, and drives 
a brave trade with the fears of man.” 
    —Herman Melville, from “The Lightning-Rod Man”  
 
“She was like somebody who picked up a high voltage wire and then couldn’t get rid 
of it.  She was connected with a very powerful current but she couldn’t disconnect 
herself from it.  You often felt she was supercharged.” 
    —Saul Bellow, speaking about Marilyn Monroe 
 
“A live concert to me is exciting because of all of the electricity that is generated in 
the crowd and onstage.”  
    —Elvis Presley, speaking before the satellite broadcast 
        of his 1973 Aloha from Hawaii concert 
  
 When images of Elvis Presley’s Aloha from Hawaii concert were 
electronically transmitted via satellite to an estimated worldwide audience of a billion 
and a half viewers, the entertainer and his team had successfully created the most 
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widely viewed human performance ever witnessed in world history.  Technological 
developments had only recently made such a “world concert” possible, and Elvis’s 
transnational popularity had already made him the perfect candidate for such a 
concert.   Elvis had never travelled outside the North American continent, so he 
relished the opportunity to expand further the reach of his music by “electrifying” a 
tremendous and as-yet-unsurpassed global audience.  He would do so with his 
powerful and passionate singing, as well as his body movements—his signature hip-
shaking, his pelvic thrusts and gyrations, and his onstage karate chops and kicks— all 
of which had already brought him both considerable fame and infamy at home and 
abroad.  Those unable to attend one of his live shows due to distance or expense could, 
through the power of modern technology, enjoy his performance from the comfort of 
their own living rooms.  The result was something like science fiction come true, 
portending further possible Space Age triumphs at a time when America had, in 
landing on the moon, only recently achieved what had theretofore appeared 
impossible. Impressively, the Aloha from Hawaii concert would in fact surpass the 
1969 moon landing in both American and worldwide viewership.   
Given the technological and commercial achievement that the satellite concert 
would represent, Elvis’s entrance music, namely the tone poem “Also Sprach 
Zarathustra” by Richard Strauss, is particularly apt, as it also famously served as the 
opening theme to Stanley Kubrick’s film 2001: A Space Odyssey. As Kubrick’s film 
had been released only five years before the Aloha concert, it was an object of recent 
memory for many audience members.   The music of Strauss, with all of its 
Nietzschean overtones eerily suggestive of the Übermensch, heralded the dawn of a 
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new age, and even a new phase in human progress. Set against this background music, 
the formidable electronically transmitted image of the bejeweled and jumpsuited body 
of Elvis, broadcast to over one billion televisions worldwide, could represent 
something almost superhuman, even otherworldly, as it penetrated a diverse array of 
television sets thousands of miles away from its remote and distant satellite 
somewhere in orbit.   
Given the massive viewership of the Aloha from Hawaii concert, we might 
marvel at the profits Elvis’s concert would have earned today in the age of cable TV 
and pay-per-view.  All changes in musical taste aside, Elvis’s management team could 
have probably raked in proceeds approaching the GDP of a small developing nation, 
even if only half of the televisions that tuned in that year subscribed to the broadcast.  
When we also consider the high ticket price paid today by concert-goers who wish to 
see top-tier musical acts approaching the status of so-called “living legends,” we might 
further imagine the hefty ticket prices that Elvis could have charged those who wished 
to experience his record-setting Hawaii concert live and in person.  Imagine what 
potential audience members would pay for front row seats and the opportunity to see 
him up close, or even touch him or procure a scarf laced with his sweat, tears, or 
saliva.  Elvis did not charge money for the concert, however, despite its whopping 
production cost of $2.5 million.  Fans were able to attend both the live concert and its 
rehearsal in person for free, albeit with the suggestion that they should donate 
whatever they felt they could afford to a charitable cause of Elvis’s choosing.  The 
combined donations, which ended up totaling upwards of $75,000, would be offered to 
the Kui Lee Cancer Fund.  Elvis had, in effect, turned down a golden opportunity to 
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capitalize on the broadcast for immediate monetary gain.  While the Aloha from 
Hawaii concert was not exactly a benefit concert on the scale of George Harrison’s 
1971 Concert for Bangladesh, it was the first satellite broadcast show to use its 
proceeds for a charitable purpose, paving the way for much later large scale benefit 
concerts broadcast by satellite, such as the America: A Tribute to Heroes concert 
performed in the aftermath of September 11, 2001. 
So why would Elvis choose not to capitalize fully on such a huge money-
making opportunity?  One possible answer is that he knew that offering such an 
expensive and record-breaking concert for free, along with giving audience donations 
to charity, would further promote his public image as one who was kind and 
generous—not only to his fans, but also to the larger community.  Moreover, he and 
his management both knew that having the opportunity to spread his music and image 
across the globe could potentially more than pay back any investment made on the 
television special.  Broadcasting to over a billion homes could potentially reap 
impressive future monetary benefits, in the form of album sales, concert tickets, and 
other merchandising.  But, unbeknownst to Elvis, any prospect of a world tour of live 
concerts was impossible under his current management.  Elvis’s manager, former 
carnival barker and promoter “Colonel” Tom Parker, had failed to disclose that he was 
an undocumented illegal immigrant from the Netherlands who would likely not be 
allowed to return to the United States if he were to leave its borders.  Consequently, 
although Elvis wanted desperately to travel outside the United States, he was rebuffed 
at every turn.  The Aloha concert thus offered him a way to enter the virtual airspace 
of foreign countries, even if it did not allow him the personal pleasure of international 
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tourism.  Certainly Elvis was well aware that the concert could expand his potential 
market and increase worldwide sales, a benefit undoubtedly well known to his 
manager, Colonel Parker, who had for his part run up massive gambling debts during 
Elvis’s tenure in Las Vegas.  But for Elvis, who had from a relatively young age 
experienced nearly every imaginable luxury that money could afford, and gave often 
and freely of what he had to those around him, acquisition of money and material 
wealth was less a motivation for the concert than was the opportunity to share his own 
brand of “electricity” with the world, by sharing the vibrant energy of his performance 
with an unprecedented number of audience members, in what would be the largest 
virtual live concert ever.  
When asked about his motivations for the Aloha from Hawaii concert in a 
press conference prior to the show, it is not surprising, then, that Elvis specifically 
named “electricity” as the reason why he was attracted to live concerts, and, 
presumably, to this show in particular.  He had long craved a return to the energy that 
he felt from direct responses from the crowds during his performances of the 1950s.  
The Aloha concert would represent a watershed moment in his return to live 
performance, otherwise known as his “comeback.”  Throughout much of the 1960s, 
Elvis had been tied down to long-term Hollywood contracts by his manager, making 
over two dozen B-movies.  Although the movies were financially rewarding, Elvis 
found the work boring and unfulfilling.  Starting with his famous “comeback” 1968 
television special, he made a conscious career move to return to live performance.  
Live concerts were for Elvis more exciting, more stimulating—presumably because 
they felt more “electric.”  In a live concert, the energy, enthusiasm, and passion that 
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Elvis gave to his performances could be immediately returned in kind with mutual 
feelings from his audiences, all of which simulated a kind of ineffable “electricity.”   
In his 1970s live shows, Elvis would be just such an “electrician.”  
Coincidentally, Elvis had studied to become an electrician in the very real and 
literal sense in the days when he earned a living driving a truck for the Crown Electric 
Company, before he was catapulted to national and international fame as a recording 
artist.  Referring to this piece of biographical trivia in a 1969 press conference at the 
outset of his live Las Vegas shows, Elvis jokingly commented that he didn’t ultimately 
pursue the electrical trade because he “suppose[d] [he] got wired the wrong way round 
somewhere down the line” (qtd. in Eisenberg 120).  The fame and fortune that rapidly 
precipitated from his early recordings of the mid-1950s would change the course of his 
life so dramatically that he no longer needed to bring electricity literally to people’s 
homes by connecting their wires, outlets, and junction boxes at a time when many 
American families, including his own, had grown up with no electricity connected to 
their homes.  Instead, his musical career allowed him to bring a kind of metaphorical 
“electricity” to people’s homes by inspiring energy, excitement, and enthusiasm 
through the experience of his musical and physical performances.  Paradoxically, his 
being “wired the wrong way” is what made his latter success possible.  But in 
facetiously applying an electrical metaphor to his body, Elvis may not only be offering 
humble self-deprecation.  Rather, his statement may be indicative of a sincere belief 
that he was indeed created differently than other human beings, that God had endowed 
him not only with talent, good looks, and a beautiful voice, but also with a certain 
abundance of “electricity” or “magnetism” that made him more naturally attractive 
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than others, somehow more naturally suited to the career that he eventually adopted.  
To this extent, being “wired the wrong way” was precisely what was so right about 
him.  His faulty wiring is what would, according to this narrative, make him 
eventually so successful and famous, even if he never achieved his original career 
goal, never having completed his formal training as an electrician in the literal sense of 
the word. 
While the extent to which Elvis thought of his body as actually 
electromagnetically supercharged and conductive is unclear, his belief in the innate 
abundance of electromagnetic force of his body—in at minimum an imaginary or 
clichéd sense—is underscored by his favorite and most famous ring, known as the 
“TCB ring.”  The TCB ring, which he wore during his live performances in the 1970s 
and right up to the time of his burial in 1977, consisted of a large diamond with the 
letters “TCB” below, flanked by two lightning bolts on a rectangular field of black 
onyx.  The letters stood for “Taking Care of Business,” a personal motto he had 
adopted since the beginnings of his return to live performance in 1969, and the same 
name that he had given to his new backup band, which came to be known thereafter as 
the “TCB Band.”  The lightning bolt would represent a “flash” of light, thereby, 
according to some accounts, making the full motto read as “Taking Care of Business 
in a Flash.”  The ring further represented the “electricity” of Elvis’s onstage 
performance, as well as the performance of his backing band.  In essence, the 
“business” that they were “taking care of” was precisely the generation of the 
“electricity” and excitement that had inspired Elvis to return to the live stage in the 
first place.     
213 
 
The ring itself was based on an original logo created by Elvis that placed the 
letters “TCB” atop a single jagged lightning bolt symbol, akin to that found on the 
costume of Captain Marvel, a particularly favorite comic book superhero from his 
youth.  Numerous biographers of Elvis have remarked on the star’s affinity with 
Captain Marvel, as well as the spinoff character Captain Marvel Jr., who also rose to 
great popularity during Elvis’s boyhood.   Captain Marvel Jr.’s cape and colorful attire 
would later inspire some of the designs for jumpsuits worn on stage by Elvis during 
the 1970s.  Elvis biographer Azalia Moore goes even further to underscore the 
impression that Captain Marvel Jr. made on a young Elvis, going as far as to say that 
Captain Marvel served as a sort of “alter ego,” as “this young boy with his magical 
powers could make everything in the world balance and conform to good moral and 
ethical behavior” (Moore et al 137).  As novelist Bobbie Ann Mason writes in her 
biography of the “king of rock and roll,” young Elvis’s fascination with Captain 
Marvel had to do with the fact that “lightning bolts symbolize[d] power.”  Mason 
further observes that, inspired by Captain Marvel, Elvis would later decorate what 
became known as the “Jungle Room” in the basement of Graceland with lightning 
bolts.  Elvis’s well-documented and oft-repeated affinity for Captain Marvel has 
prompted the theory that the TCB logo, too, was inspired by Captain Marvel, whose 
chest was emblazoned with a large jagged lightning bolt.  Given the example of the 
outfits inspired by Captain Marvel during the 1970s live shows, we may wonder to 
what extent his fascination with the comic-book superhero—and his fantasies of 
embodying the character—may have continued well into his adulthood.  In a 1980 
interview, Linda Thompson, Elvis’s live-in girlfriend for a large portion of the era of 
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his 1970s live shows, commented that during the time she knew him, Elvis “was still a 
little boy…never had an opportunity to fully grow up.”  If we take Linda Thompson’s 
claim as true, it may not be unreasonable to speculate that Elvis may have continued in 
his adult life to imagine himself as a sort of Captain Marvel, Jr. figure, who could 
actually conduct and manipulate “electricity” in order to bring good to the world.   
The “Captain Marvel” theory is not the only explanation for the TCB insignia, 
however.  Others have written, for example, that Elvis’s TCB logo has a more 
nefarious origin, as its lightning bolt design may have had associations with 
symbology of the West Coast Mafia, and their slogan to “Do It Quick.”  As Elvis 
would give jewelry with the TCB logo to members of his innermost circle and 
entourage, known affectionately as the “Memphis Mafia,” the TCB logo would then 
work as sort of an inside joke.  Yet another theory claims that the TCB logo found its 
origin in the insignia of Elvis’s regiment in the U. S. Army, the 32nd Armor Regiment, 
a component of the larger 3rd Armored Division, whose “Spearhead” insignia 
contained an unmistakable red lightning bolt at its center.  Joe Esposito, one of Elvis’s 
closest confidants in the “Memphis Mafia,” served with Elvis in this regiment during 
the time they were stationed in Germany together, and surely would have understood 
this reference.  While many competing and divergent theories exist regarding the 
stimulus for the original TCB logo, one particular theory that stands out for the 
vividness of its anecdotal evidence is that propagated by Kathy Westmoreland, a close 
friend, one-time lover, and a backup singer with the TCB Band, who in her 1987 book 
includes the claim that Elvis told her he was inspired to create the logo after personally 
witnessing a bolt of lightning strike a marble statue in his Meditation Garden at 
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Graceland.  The lightning bolt reportedly left behind the exact jagged image of itself 
on the statue, a phenomenon Elvis is said to have interpreted as a sign from God, 
instructing him to shun anger and bring happiness to the world.  Presumably 
enlightened by this experience, Elvis decided, at least according to Westmoreland’s 
account, to incorporate this sign as a central symbol of his embarkation back on the 
live concert circuit. 
Whatever the inspiration for Elvis’s TCB logo, his choice of a lightning bolt as 
a defining symbol of his entertainment enterprise further demonstrates the centrality of 
“electricity” to his understanding of what his performances could do, both for himself 
and his audiences.  In a time when the phrase “electrifying performance” had already 
become tired and overused—especially in reference to musical performances—Elvis 
desired to bring new life to the cliché, by offering a show so exciting and vibrant that 
fans would not soon forget it.  Elvis’s ability to produce and reproduce “electrifying 
performances” night after night would not only be a desirable outcome in the eyes of 
fans and concert reviewers alike, but it also could become a sort of brand, a potential 
way of marketing himself.  But, if we consider the possibility that Elvis actually 
understood himself, like Captain Marvel, as privileged with special powers to 
manipulate and control electrical forces, we may see that Elvis did not think of 
electricity as only a possible brand or marketing tool; rather, he wanted truly to 
embody electricity in his live concert performances.  In other words, “electricity” 
served not merely as a cliché or a figure of speech.  For Elvis, he felt his body would 
actually generate and radiate a sort of “electricity” that could be transmitted to his 
fans.   
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 Elvis lived in an era in which “electricity” and “magnetism” had already 
become clichéd catch-all phrases to describe affect that was somehow inexpressibly 
desirable or attractive to others.  Elvis was undeniably attractive to many, in ways that 
went beyond merely his physical appearance or his musical abilities.  In a 1980 
interview conducted by David Frost, Ginger Alden, Elvis’s girlfriend at the time of his 
death, touched upon the inexpressible power of attraction that she believed Elvis 
possessed: “Elvis had a very special aura or mystical attraction about him that is really 
hard to explain.”  In a 2002 interview with Larry King, Linda Thompson, who 
accompanied Elvis to all of his live shows during the time they were dating, was even 
more specific in naming “electricity” as the reason why he was such a captivating 
entertainer in the 1970s:  
 
He had an electricity.  You know, when Elvis came out on stage, it 
 became electric.  And the way people responded to him was such that, 
 you know, I never saw that kind of response to any other performer. 
 
Linda Thompson was not alone in identifying “electricity” as a key impetus for the 
adulation of fans toward Elvis, however.  Reviewers and critics would often respond 
similarly when commenting positively on Elvis’s 1970s performances, noting their 
“electricity.”  For example, a 1970 New York Magazine film review of Elvis: That’s 
the Way it Is, a documentary that chronicled Elvis’s first year of live concert shows in 
Las Vegas in 1969, uses language that echoes Linda Thompson’s later assertions: “the 
Elvis-the-Pelvis of the fifties has very obviously developed into an electric 
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personality, a vibrant entertainer and an accomplished artist” (Crist 71).  In an article 
in Life of that same year, Albert Goldman, who would later go on to write a 
controversial and salacious unauthorized biography of Elvis after the singer’s death, 
similarly leans on an electrical trope for rhetorical effect, using it here to wax 
hyperbolically on the sexiness of the top-grossing Vegas superstar:  
 
Not since Marlene Dietrich stunned the ringsiders with the sight of 
those legs encased from hip to ankle in a transparent gown has any 
performer so electrified this jaded town with a personal appearance.  
(17) 
 
Goldman likens Elvis’ sex appeal to electricity, thereby reactivating a longstanding 
and clichéd association between electricity and sex appeal.  Yet, as Linda Thompson’s 
use of the term suggests, “electricity” captured something else, some immeasurable, 
indefinable quality about Elvis that went beyond mere sexiness.   
As Elvis’s health declined and his physical condition deteriorated, comments 
about the “electricity” of his shows soon would become displaced by comments about 
his increasing weight, as well the incoherence he sometimes displayed on stage.  The 
surge of disparaging remarks made about Elvis and his increasing age and weight 
culminated most famously in Johnny Carson’s comment on the Tonight Show in 
January of 1975 that the singer had become “fat and forty” (qtd. in Jeanssonne et al 
192).  Upon hearing of these remarks, Elvis became angry and decided he would no 
longer watch Johnny Carson’s show.  He did not find Carson’s joke funny, nor did he 
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appreciate being the butt of the joke.  That month was certainly no joke for Elvis, 
however, as by the end of the month he was admitted to Baptist Hospital in Memphis 
after “his girlfriend, Linda Thompson, found him struggling for breath” (Jeansonne et 
al 192).   He would be kept in the hospital by his doctor so that he could be treated for 
his addictions to prescription medications, addictions which had by that time already 
expanded to life-threatening proportions.  It would not be the last time that Elvis’ drug 
addiction reached a breaking point that required intervention from those close to him.  
Despite such struggles and near-death experiences, Elvis continued, however, to deny 
to the public and to his fans that he had a problem with drugs, or with his health in 
general.  More troubling was his denial to himself that he had a life-threatening 
problem.  Meanwhile, despite legions of devoted fans who continued to attend his 
shows, poor concert reviews continued to circulate, alongside increased speculation 
about his declining health and his possible addictions.  Such negative attention 
continued to trouble Elvis, right up to the time of his eventual drug-related death in 
August of 1977.  Yet he would continue, night after night, even to his last show in the 
summer of 1977, to attempt to “electrify” the crowds, doing whatever he felt was 
necessary to achieve that goal, even if he would risk his life to do so.    
Long after Elvis’s death, his doctor, George Nichopoulos (also known as “Dr. 
Nick”) continued to use electrical metaphors to describe the transformation that would 
take place each night that Elvis returned to the stage:  
 
He would change from one person to another as soon as he walked on 
the stage.  He would just go through a metamorphosis—all of a sudden 
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he flipped a switch and looked like a toy soldier dancing up there.  (qtd. 
in McKay) 
 
Given that Dr. Nick was later indicted for his role in prescribing excess medications to 
Elvis, the statement is chilling.  Elvis, who became increasingly reliant on and 
dependent on prescription medications in order to perform on a nightly basis, would 
come to abuse those same medications in the attempt to continue to perform at such a 
high energy level.  If taking one pill improved the perception that his performance was 
“electric,” then it follows that multiple pills could conceivably magnify that 
perception, and, furthermore, magnify the “electricity.”  In this way of thinking, the 
ideal performer would be a kind of “toy soldier” or automaton, impervious to bodily 
damage and abuse, who could simply “flip” a switch—or have a switch flipped— in 
order to create the effect of metaphorical “electrification” of audiences, night after 
night.  As far back as 1956, Elvis had described the act of performing itself as similar 
to conducting electricity: “it’s like a surge of electricity going through you…it’s 
almost like making love, but it’s even stronger than that…sometimes I think my heart 
is going to explode” (qtd. in Guralnick 186).  But after two decades had passed, 
Elvis’s heart had metaphorically “exploded” on countless occasions, due to such 
“surge[s] of electricity.”  The simple fact that he was not a toy soldier but was rather a 
human being—a human being with a body that was giving out on him due to years of 
drug abuse—was a fact that would, by 1977, finally catch up with him.  Elvis’s 
embodiment of the desire to “electrify” and “be electrifying” had come at a high price, 
ultimately costing him his life. 
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It may be tempting to think of the life and death of Elvis as a sort of cautionary 
tale, an example illustrating the dangers of taking the metaphorical “electricity” of 
one’s body to an unfortunate extreme.  Clearly Elvis was not Captain Marvel, 
irrespective of whatever fantasies he may have had to the contrary.  But to view 
Elvis’s life in this way is far too pat and reductive.  Furthermore, it fails to 
acknowledge a larger issue at hand: Elvis’s failure to distinguish between clichéd 
bodily “electricity” and actual electromagnetic energy is more indicative of an 
increasingly prevalent understanding that to be “electrifying,” at least in the clichéd if 
not the literal sense of the term, was a desirable goal for anyone aspiring to perform 
successfully.  What was forgotten by those who would adhere to this cliché was that 
this “electrification” was not indeed real: electricity was not in fact transmitted or 
transferred from the performer to the audience, or vice versa.   However, given the 
pervasive conflation of scientifically demonstrable electromagnetism with 
metaphorical and imaginary notions of electromagnetism in popular culture from the 
mid-eighteenth century forward—notions informed, incidentally, by art, literature, and 
pseudoscience alike—Elvis’s apparent confusion is understandable.  In attempting to 
embody clichéd “electricity,” Elvis was likely neither aware of the long history of the 
cliché, nor was he fully aware that it was indeed a cliché at all, not somehow an 
accurate reflection of concrete physical truth.  Elvis, like many other Americans, had 
confused real and imaginary electricity. 
The confusion between real and imaginary electricity is a problem particularly 
endemic to the concept, making it in some ways different from other examples of what 
we might call “dead metaphors.”  If we consider for example the “face of a clock,” or 
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the “arm of the chair,” we may agree that speakers of English would need reminding 
that the “face of a clock” is not in fact a “face” in the bodily sense, or that, similarly, 
the “arm of a chair” is not,  in fact, an “arm.”  In both cases, what may have once been 
an imaginative figure of speech has transformed through repeated usage into a word 
that defines and signifies its corresponding concept in a more literal, concrete sense.  
Such is a common phenomenon in language, and, moreover, it is a phenomenon that 
may be understood as a defining feature of language.  Yet if an English speaker were 
asked if the “face of a clock” was actually a “face,” or if the “arm of a chair” was 
actually an “arm,” that speaker would likely instantly recognize this as false.  This is 
not necessarily so for “electricity.”  When given the example of human bodies as 
somehow “electric,” one may find it difficult to distinguish between metaphor and 
concrete material fact, if for no other reason than that human bodies are in fact 
electrical, with hearts that beat according to electrical impulses, and nerves which 
send electrical signals to the brain.   
While most today would not likely believe, for example, that the human body 
could literally shoot lightning bolts from its fingertips at will, à la the Emperor from 
Star Wars, one might easily be led to imagine bodies as truly possessing 
characteristics from the realm of electrical pseudoscience or metaphor.  Hence the 
continued popularity of medical devices or treatments purported to cure ailments via 
electromagnetic means, such as magnetic bracelets or so-called “energy medicine,” 
which have little or no scientifically documented medicinal effect.  But even while we 
might criticize those who are duped into buying products marketed by modern day 
“snake-oil salesmen,” whose marketing pitch would allude hazily to electromagnetic 
222 
 
pseudoscience, we may understand the basis of the logic behind the assertions made 
by those who would market such products.  If human bodies are electrical, and 
electricity is, at least in a metaphorical sense, tied to the essence of life and feeling, 
then why, for example, wouldn’t it follow that an abundance of bodily electricity or 
electromagnetic conductivity could be somehow a good thing?  Why wouldn’t it 
follow that a redirection of electromagnetic flows in the body could improve one’s 
health and well-being?  The scientific reality of corporeal electromagnetism was 
something which had long been an object of speculation, but which became more 
readily and clearly demonstrated as the 20th and 21st centuries progressed, especially 
with progress made in the field of neurology.  Given this scientific affirmation of a 
concept which was once held only as a fringe view, as well as the long history of 
popular misunderstandings and confusion around the concept of “electricity” in 
general, it may become increasingly difficult to distinguish between imagination, 
pseudoscience, and physiological or biological fact.  In other words, it may become 
increasingly difficult to understand that metaphorical “electricity” is indeed 
metaphorical—that, when employed as a kind of dead metaphor, it is in fact “dead.” 
As discussed in the preceding chapter, Walt Whitman lived during a time when 
electricity was not a household word, and, moreover, when electricity was little 
understood—if understood at all—by the general public.  Whitman thus wrote during 
an era in which imaginary and metaphorical notions of corporeal “electricity” became 
increasingly conflated with the reality of how electricity functioned in and upon the 
human body.  In many ways, his “body electric” stands as a perfect example of that 
conflation.  Through the figurative language of Leaves of Grass, we might be led to 
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forget temporarily that imaginary electromagnetic conductivity of bodies is not the 
same as actual electromagnetic conductivity of bodies.  Likewise, in the age of online 
avatars and other “virtual bodies,” we might temporarily forget that human bodies, 
unlike electricity, cannot incorporeally “flow” between different points or 
instantiations.  In “sing[ing] the body electric,” Whitman would celebrate the 
“electric” body—or, more specifically, the superconductive electric body, the body 
possessing vitality in the form of abundant electromagnetic conductivity or energy—
as something particularly to be admired or revered, while simultaneously failing to 
acknowledge what we would later learn as scientific reality: all human bodies are both 
electrical and conductive in nature, and therefore to be an “electrical” body is neither 
unique nor special.  Yet, during the time in which Whitman composed and revised the 
poem that would become “I Sing the Body Electric,” being “electrical” or “magnetic” 
in nature became increasingly understood as a desirable human trait, rather than 
simply a feature that all human bodies share in common.  Such formulations would 
have consequences and repercussions that would continue to our present moment, 
informing and undergirding the thinking of not only Elvis Presley, but also many other 
Americans before and since.    
What was largely left uninterrogated in such formulations was this: why 
exactly was being “electrical” or “magnetic” such a desirable trait?   Why should it be 
a characteristic that one would hope to possess, or desire to achieve?   And what is the 
difference between possessing an attractive or appealing quality of behavior and 
mannerism and being literally more electromagnetically conductive as a human body?  
From Whitman’s 1870s to Elvis’s 1970s, few if any reviewers or critics gave such 
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questions much thought, largely taking the cliché for granted without necessarily 
pondering its origins as a conceptual construct. 
 Already by the time of the publication of Leaves of Grass, literary critics and 
reviewers used adjectives associated with “electricity” or “magnetism” in order to 
describe Whitman’s oeuvre, as well as its effects.  Ann Rutherford Carter, writing in 
the 1970s, is among the twentieth century scholars who have commented on the many 
references made to the “electrical” or “magnetic” qualities of Whitman’s work in 
positive nineteenth century reviews of his poetic accomplishments.  Carter cites the 
example of Anne Gilchrist, who, in her 1870 work “An Englishwoman’s Estimate of 
Walt Whitman,” wrote that she “had not dreamed that words could cease to be words, 
and become electric streams” (qtd. in Carter 114).  But references to the “electricity” 
found in Whitman’s body of work often extended further, to commentary on the 
“electric” qualities of Whitman’s physical body, personality, and voice.  For example, 
a brief note in the “Personal” section of an 1872 issue of Harper’s Bazaar, discussing 
Walt Whitman’s oration at the commencement ceremonies at Dartmouth College, 
alludes to the “electricity” exuded by Whitman, observing that the “pundits” there 
found that Whitman’s “voice is wonderfully electric, and his tall figure, sunburnt face, 
and intellectual eyes very impressive” (571).  Carter, echoing this observation, claims 
that “Whitman’s closest friends were especially sensitive to his electric personality 
and the electricity of his mature voice,” and to illustrate this, she looks to the example 
of Richard Maurice Burke, who wrote of “the magnetism…of his presence” (114).  
Burke’s comment is one of many which abound among nineteenth century critics and 
reviewers who would attribute Whitman’s poetic success to his own inherent magnetic 
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or electric corporeality.  For example, in an 1875 article in The Gentleman’s 
Magazine, the reviewer, Arthur Clive, writes that  
 
Life is intense in [Whitman], and the fire of existence burns brighter 
and stronger than that of other men.  Thus he does his reader service: he 
seems out of the fullness of his veins to pour life into those who read 
him.  He is electric and vitalizing.  (714) 
 
For reviewers such as Clive, it is not simply that Whitman addresses the topic of 
electricity or electrical bodies through his poetry; the poet himself is “electric,” as his 
body is filled with vitality and an intensity of “fire” that is “poured” into the reader, 
thereby filling the reader with similar vitality.  In Clive’s formulation, Whitman’s 
genius lies in the fact that his body is special and unique, different from “other men.”  
Whitman is overflowing with energy, here understood as a kind of electromagnetic 
energy, energy so abundant that it almost spills from his veins and onto the page, 
whereby it might be conducted by the reader.  It is not clear that Clive’s references to 
electricity are only metaphorical, nor is it clear that he sees an overabundance of 
corporeal electricity as anything but a positive and “vitalizing” attribute.  Clive would 
have us earnestly believe that a transfer of electrical force actually occurs in the act of 
reading Whitman, and that such a transfer would somehow do a reader “service.” 
Similarly, John Burroughs, writing in an 1876 issue of Galaxy, is also 
compelled to remark on the electricity and magnetism that is inherent in Leaves of 
Grass, commenting for example that he was “take[n]…[by] the tremendous personal 
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force or magnetism back of his poems” (57).  Later, writing in particular reference to 
Whitman, Burroughs observes that the works of great poets “flam[e] up with electric 
and defiant power—power without any admixture of resisting form, as in a living 
organism” (59).  Ann Rutherford Carter also notes how Burroughs would equate 
Whitman’s success as a poet with his own inherent electricity, when she remarks that 
“Burroughs thought Whitman’s ‘special gift’ to be ‘his magnetic and unconquerable 
personality’; ‘he is fluid, generative, electric’” (115).   
But Whitman’s supposed “electricity” was not only applauded by his 
reviewers; it was also used in the packaging of Whitman by his publishers.  For 
example, in an advertisement in an 1860 issue of Spiritual Eclectic, Whitman’s 
publisher, Thayer and Eldridge, invited potential readers to read the “strong and 
electric writings of Walt Whitman” (63).   The same advertisement would appear in a 
number of widely read periodicals, including the Atlantic Monthly.  One such 
advertisement, appearing in an 1860 issue of the periodical Banner of Light, places the 
advertisement for Leaves of Grass adjacent to advertisements for clairvoyants, 
spiritualists, and even an “electrician and psychometric physician” (5), suggesting 
some correlation between these practices and Whitman’s work.  Such examples serve 
as evidence and testimony that would illustrate how Whitman’s fans, as well as those 
who would profit from his fans, employed electricity and magnetism as tropes to 
applaud the poet’s work, while taking for granted the notion that electricity and 
magnetism were indeed positive attributes.  Moreover, in describing or packaging 
Whitman as an “electrical” or “magnetic” poet, such writers would fail to 
acknowledge that the poet’s words themselves do not in fact electrify or magnetize, 
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regardless of whatever feelings or emotions they may inspire, or whatever neural 
responses they may simulate or stimulate.  For her part, Carter misses this nuance, 
and, as a result, she does not place much if any narrative distance between her own 
arguments and those presented by nineteenth century readers of Whitman, instead 
largely reading with the grain of the nineteenth century reviewers she cites.  In fact, 
she appears wholly in agreement that not only are Whitman’s words “electric,” but so 
too is his body.  This example illustrates how, from the 1870s to the 1970s, the 
metaphorical “electricity” of one’s words or artistic performance could become easily 
confused or conflated with the supposed corporeal electricity of the orator, artist, or 
performer.      
 It is unclear whether or not Elvis Presley ever read Walt Whitman, or, even if 
he did, that he directly applied any of Whitman’s thinking to his understanding of his 
own body, persona, or artistic endeavors.  This has not prevented a number of 
biographers and scholars from drawing analogies between Whitman and Elvis, 
however.  Even though Elvis never composed his own music, he is often credited with 
synthesizing a number of threads and genres of American music in ways that would 
cross racial and cultural lines, by mixing elements of country, rhythm and blues, and 
gospel.  For this he is described as, like Whitman’s speaker in “Song of Myself,” 
“contain[ing] multitudes.”  Biographer Bobbie Ann Mason puts it this way: “…he 
blended all the strains of American popular music into one rebellious voice; like Walt 
Whitman, he was large—he contained multitudes…”   David Sanjek, writing on the 
music of the South, echoes Mason when he says that “Elvis contained multitudes, and 
in that variousness assimilated the complexities and contradictions of his region, his 
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race, and his nation” (393).  Charles L. Ponce de Leon goes further, writing that “in 
the spirit of Walt Whitman, [Elvis] was committed to making music that ‘contained 
multitudes,’ encompassing the richness of our tangled, complex heritage—at a time 
when virtually every force in the land was encouraging strife and disunion” (211).  
Understood in this light, we may see how Elvis may have embodied a characteristic of 
Whitman’s “electric” speaker of Leaves of Grass, who was, through a shifting and 
multitudinous subjectivity, somehow able to liquefy boundaries of bodily difference or 
limitation in order to sing and celebrate the beauty of all human bodies at a time when 
phrenologists would offer pseudoscientific rationale for the inherent superiority of 
some bodies over others.  Performing during a time of significant racial tension, Elvis 
was somehow able to bridge gaps between racially coded musical genres and 
synthesize them.  And, at a time when much of his American South was still plagued 
by the scourge of racism—where, in his very own hometown of Memphis, Martin 
Luther King was murdered—Elvis would choose to sing the song “If I Can Dream,” a 
tribute to Dr. King with lyrics inspired by King’s own speeches, as the grand finale of 
his highly rated 1968 “comeback special,” which aired just eight months after the 
assassination.  This and other examples of Elvis’s attempts to dissolve racial 
difference might lead scholars such as those listed above to conclude that Elvis, like 
Whitman’s speaker, is “multitudinous.”  What is missing from the commentaries that 
would associate the “multitudinous” quality of Elvis with Whitman’s speaker, 
however, is precisely the “electricity” that would inform the state of being 
“multitudinous.”  As suggested by Paul Gilmore, tropes of “electricity” went hand in 
hand with dissolution of racial boundaries.  In this way, Elvis may be understood as 
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further embodying Whitman’s vision, as he attempts, consciously or not, to put such 
“electricity” into practice. 
 Even Elvis’s sex appeal—and, by the same token, the overt sexuality of 
Whitman’s poetry—may be tied to an embodiment of “electricity,” understood 
metaphorically as a vital and life-giving force, somehow associated with fertility.  To 
see how this is so, we may trace clichés of sexual “electricity” back to their 18th 
century origins.  As we have already seen, medical electricity had been used, since as 
early as the late 18th century, in the treatment of health problems related to infertility.  
Early on in the practical application of electricity in medicine, it became understood 
that electricity could somehow stimulate the vital fluids of the body, restore sexual 
health, and resolve sexual dysfunctions.  In her book The Body Electric, Carolyn de la 
Peña disputes this, however, writing for example that “early physicians who 
experimented with electricity in their practices did not use it to treat sexual 
dysfunction” (146).  De la Peña goes on to characterize the use of medical electricity 
in the treatment of sexual dysfunction as a decidedly Victorian phenomenon.  Such a 
reading would have us believe that this particular medical application of electricity 
rose into being spontaneously sometime in the mid to late 19th century—in other 
words, after the publication of Whitman’s 1855 edition of Leaves of Grass.  However, 
historian James Delbourgo reminds us that such association between electricity and 
sexual health—as well as the application of such thinking—can be traced as far back 
as the late 18th century, to the very beginnings of medical electricity itself.  For 
example, Delbourgo points to the example of English physician John Shebbeare, who 
believed that “male erections resulted not from a distention of blood vessels but from 
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the action of a ‘vital fire,” while “male ‘dejection’ arose from ‘the want of sufficient 
quantity of this fire’” (117).  We are to understand that “vital fire” was in the late 
eighteenth century essentially synonymous with electricity.  This may be found in the 
work of eighteenth century English scientific writer George Adams, who wrote for 
example in his Lectures on Natural and Experimental Philosophy that “vital fire is the 
cause of muscular motion, and…this vital fire is of the same kind produced by our 
electrical machines” (322).  Those who would subscribe to such philosophy of “vital 
fire” might easily be led to accept Shebbeare’s associations of electricity, vitality, and 
sexual health. 
  Delbourgo works to illustrate how the correlation between electricity and 
sexual health translated into practice by offering examples of physicians such as James 
Graham, who “invited couples to increase their fertility in his electrified ‘celestial bed’ 
in London in the 1770s” (117), or James Walker of Virginia, who claimed that the 
cure for sterility or other sexual dysfunctions in women would be found in the 
application of electricity to their sexual organs, when, in the 1790s, he maintained that 
“the uterus may be stimulated by shocks passed through the pelvis” (qtd. in Delbourgo 
118).  Contrary to de la Peña’s claims, then, it should be clear that by the time of 
Whitman’s “body electric,” the associations between sexuality, fertility, and electricity 
had already become commonplace, to the point where it was no longer easy to tell the 
difference between metaphorical sexual “electricity” and literal electricity.  Over a full 
century before Whitman’s publication of Leaves of Grass, electricity had already 
become, in Delbourgo’s words, “the vital force of sexual libertinism,” as electricity 
already prevailed in sexual metaphors found in mid-eighteenth century literature 
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(117).  In light of this long-standing association between electricity and human 
reproduction, the fact that both Elvis and Whitman would employ electrical imagery in 
association with their artistic performance—and, moreover, their “sexual 
libertinism”— should not only seem not surprising, rather, it should be fully expected.  
 When Whitman effectively associates “electricity” with sensuality and 
sexuality in Leaves of Grass, he further undergirds and strengthens the popularity of a 
cliché that would effectively erase differences between metaphorical “electricity” and 
actual, observable electricity.  His strengthening of the popularity of this cliché would 
help to render it as common knowledge, albeit knowledge based largely on faulty 
reasoning.  In an era where electricity was still relatively misunderstood by a lay 
audience, and in an era where divisions between metaphorical or pseudoscientific 
“electricity” and actual electricity were increasingly dissipating, it is not surprising 
that the use of medical electricity in the treatment of sexual dysfunction and infertility 
became less of a radical or unorthodox treatment among physicians and instead began 
to become more fully integrated into mainstream medicine by the late 19th century.  
Carolyn de la Peña puts it this way, however:  
   
In his 1855 Leaves of Grass, Walt Whitman celebrated technology’s 
physical possibilities by referring to “The Body Electric.” Physicians 
sought to make the link more than rhetorical.  (101) 
 
What de la Peña misses is not only that Walt Whitman did not include the phrase 
“body electric” in his 1855 edition of Leaves of Grass, but also that by 1855, the 
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“link” between rhetorical “electricity” and understandings of how electricity might 
possibly be physically applied to the body in the context of medical practice was a link 
that had already been well-established in philosophical and medical circles, even if it 
was relatively little known by the general public.  In other words, it was not that 
“physicians sought to make the link more than rhetorical,” but, rather, that the link in 
many ways already was more than rhetorical. 
The increasingly prevalent practice of applying electricity for a curative 
medical purpose in the late nineteenth century, as well as the increased marketing of 
devices that would serve such a purpose, was more a reflection of the continuation or 
evolution of logical progression in philosophies that would apply understandings of 
electricity to understandings of the body, a discourse that had begun well over a 
century before.  That Whitman later chose to include the phrase “body electric” in a 
poem originally focusing on the slave trade may be indicative of a movement 
occurring on a large scale in American culture, whereby the link between “rhetorical” 
electricity and real electricity had already become increasingly invisible.  While the 
term “the body electric” is by all accounts an original coinage of Whitman, it is rather 
emblematic of a larger philosophical movement which would increasingly understand 
the healthy, vital, virile, fertile body as “electric,” and, subsequently, believe that the 
unhealthy, diseased, feeble, infertile body could be cured by electrical means.   
 From our current cultural standpoint, nineteenth century notions that read 
sexual dysfunctions as cured by electrical stimulation of the sexual organs might be 
giggle-inducing indeed, suggesting a naiveté of a bygone past that we have come to 
outgrow in our supposedly wiser, more technologically advanced age.  Playwright 
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Sarah Ruhl certainly exploits this for comic effect in her recent smash Broadway play 
“In the Next Room,” also known as the “Vibrator Play.”  In her play, women come to 
seek out the services of a medical electrician who believes that applying electricity to 
the female genitals will resolve any number of health complaints, by inducing a 
“paroxysm” that will help to induce the proper flow of blood and fluid to the affected 
regions of the body.  The recurring joke of the play is that such “paroxysms” are in 
fact vibrator-induced orgasms of questionable, true, medicinal effect, but certainly 
productive of intense pleasure in the doctor’s patients, who are, for their part, all too 
happy to volunteer to receive the doctor’s services.  At a time when the idea of the 
possibility of female orgasm was itself put into question, this is no laughing matter, 
however.  The English doctor William Acton remarked in 1857 that “the majority of 
women…are not very much troubled with sexual feeling of any kind” (qtd. in Tosh 
44).  Acton thought that, unlike men, women did not truly experience orgasm, and, 
furthermore, did not particularly pursue sexual pleasure in the same way as men.  
While Acton’s claims were not entirely embraced by the established American 
medical community, they were also not wholly rejected.  Indeed, some American 
“experts” may have subscribed to similar ideas such as those expressed by Acton.  The 
concept of female orgasm was then, at least among some “experts,” a matter of debate.   
That the doctor of Ruhl’s play would use the word “paroxysm” as a euphemism for 
orgasm without knowing himself that he was speaking euphemistically, is what helps 
to lend the play its funniest comic moments.  The audience is in on the joke, while the 
doctor is blissfully unaware that what he is saying might be perceived as funny.      
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The premise of Ruhl’s play is based on the very sincere and earnest beliefs of 
many late 19th century gynecologists and obstetricians, who, influenced by medical 
electricians, understood that women could be possibly “cured” of any number of 
conditions related to a perceived dysfunction of the sexual organs (including, 
incidentally the condition known as “hysteria,” which at that time was often associated 
intimately with uterine dysfunction) by the application of electrical impulses to their 
genitals.  One such medical electrician by the name of S. E. Morrill, wrote extensively 
on this topic in his 1882 “Treatise of Practical Instructions in the Medical and Surgical 
Uses of Electricity” in which he would essentially prescribe the application of 
electrodes to the pelvic area for any and all afflictions involving the female sexual 
organs.  Writing for example on the process of how electricity could be medically 
applied to the vagina in cases where there was inflammation of the uterus, Morrill 
writes the following: 
 
Electricity will cure all this class of diseases, both acute and chronic.  
My mode of treatment in these cases is to give general treatment all 
over the system, with the negative current attached to a plate, and the 
positive current attached to the vagina electrode, and introduced in such 
a way that the uterus is affected through the whole treatment of an hour 
for three successive days; the evening of the third day give a mild 
physic, and on the fourth day a vapor or electrical bath.  This method 
changes the circulation, driving the surplus blood from the uterus. (132) 
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Essentially, just as 18th century mesmerists trained in the arts of “animal magnetism” 
would pass their hands over the body in order improve the circulation of bodily fluids, 
medical electricians of the late 19th century would apply electrodes to the body for 
similar effect, only replacing “magnetic” passing of the hands and playing of the 
armonica with actual electrical stimulation.  And just as mesmerists produced “cures” 
in at least some of their patients (conceivably due to a placebo effect, we may 
speculate), so too did medical electricians produce “cures.”  Medical electricians 
produced enough purported “cures” to hold at least some sway among doctors who 
largely maintained more traditional practices in the field of gynecology and obstetrics.  
If Sarah Ruhl’s play bears any resemblance to the reality of the time, however, we 
may surely begin to understand why medical electricians may have received such a 
positive response from at least some of their patients.  
 Not all late-nineteenth century doctors were nearly as enthusiastic as Morrill 
about the prospects of electricity as a panacea for gynecological ailments, however.  
For example, one particularly prominent Washington D. C. surgeon in the field of 
gynecology and obstetrics, Dr. Joseph Taber Johnson, indicated his lack of enthusiasm 
at a meeting of the Medical Society of the District of Columbia on Feb 13, 1895.  
While Johnson had himself “used electricity in proper cases,” and, furthermore, “had 
relieved many patients in this way,” he nonetheless acknowledged that “after patients 
had exhausted their purses and the patience of themselves and their relatives in efforts 
to obtain relief from electricity, drugs and massage they finally came to the surgeon 
and were cured” (43).  Johnson’s remarks came after his colleague, Dr. Francis 
Bishop, had commented on Dr. Johnson’s general evaluation of the efficacy of 
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medical electricity when he had told Bishop that he “knew that no woman ever went to 
a masseur or electrician after coming from a gynecologist for there was little left to 
treat” (43).  Despite such advice from Dr. Johnson, Bishop nonetheless maintained 
that “among virgins who would not submit to local treatment it was sometimes 
remarkable to see the good done from a general toning up of the system by electricity” 
(43).  Even if electricity would not necessarily leave his patients “entirely cured,” 
Bishop believed that it might at the very least revitalize their “system,” relieve their 
pain, and improve their overall vaginal, intravaginal, or intrauterine “tone.”  Dr. 
Johnson, politely applauding Dr. Bishop as a “broad minded man who made use of all 
methods of treatment” went on to distance himself from such unconditional 
appreciation of the benefits of medical electricity in the field of gynecology.  
 Dr. Johnson was far less polite and subtle in expressing his distaste for medical 
electricity, however, in an article published in an 1896 edition of The American 
Gynaecological and Obstetrical Journal, in which he wrote the following:  
 
 The electricity enthusiast has yet to explain to us the powers of this 
  “subtle and mysterious agent”—how it is that under their wishes or 
  control it skips over or through all the tissues of the abdominal or  
  vaginal walls, the peritonaeum and viscera, attacks and dissolves hard 
  inflammatory products in the pelvis and solid fibroid tumors weighing 
  ten or twenty pounds supplied with nourishing blood conduits as large 
  as lead pencils.  That it temporarily allays pain, arrests for the time the 
  abnormal flow of blood, and proves a reviving and sometimes  
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  exhilarating tonic to the exhausted nervous system, we are quite ready 
  to admit, but the sooner the profession throws off the shackles with 
  which our electrical brethren have been trying to bind us, as well as the 
  too confiding public, the better it will be for the welfare of our patients 
  and the credit of surgery.  (20) 
 
Regardless of the skepticism of doctors such as Dr. Johnson, the idea persisted that 
electricity was tied to vitality and sexual health.  Just as mesmerists would pass their 
hands over the bodies of patients to regulate their bodily flows, so too would a trained 
medical electrician apply electrical current to the body to “unblock” flows of blood.  
While Dr. Johnson readily concedes that application of electricity could at least 
“temporarily” regulate blood flow, by “arrest[ing] the abnormal flow of blood,” he 
also strongly feels that no amount of electricity will break up a large fibroid tumor, 
despite whatever claims the medical electricians might make to the contrary.  For 
Johnson, surgery would be the only appropriate solution in such a case.  That Johnson 
felt compelled to rail against the methodology of medical electricians in an established 
medical journal amply demonstrates just how prevalent such methods were among 
those in the medical community at that time.  Johnson implies not so subtly that the 
“too confiding public” has been swindled by medical electricians, who would likewise 
resemble confidence men.  
 Johnson’s position would eventually find sympathy with an overwhelming 
majority of the medical community over the course of the first decades of the 
twentieth century.  The rising tide of medical electricity that surged in the late 
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nineteenth century medical practice would substantially subside in the coming 
decades, going the way of “patent medicines” and other “cures” of dubious medical 
effect that dominated so much advertising of the late nineteenth century.  But, despite 
this shift in established medical opinion and practices, metaphors associating 
electricity with vitality, attractiveness, and sexual health endured and continued to 
hold sway in common use, as well as in popular culture.   
 To examine the continued hold that metaphorical “electricity” had on the 
American imagination, we might look to the example of Marilyn Monroe.  One 
relatively little-known fact about the woman who came to be known by the public as 
Marilyn Monroe was that she suffered from endometriosis, a gynecological condition 
in which endometrial cells grow abnormally outside the uterus.  It has been theorized 
that Monroe’s endometriosis was in large part responsible for her infertility.  Had 
Marilyn Monroe suffered from her condition just over a half century before, during the 
era in which Dr. Johnson practiced medicine, it is very possible that she could have 
been subjected to medical electricity as a “cure” for her condition.  Had she been 
under the care of followers of the aforementioned Dr. Morrill, for example, she would 
have undoubtedly received a prescription of electrical current applied to her uterus, at 
a time when Morrill claimed in 1882, after reportedly having cured “nine out of ten 
patients treated in the last fifteen years,” that his “new method of applying 
electricity…[would] effect a certain and permanent cure for all prevailing uterine 
diseases” (120).  Incidentally, such “diseases” apparently included “nymphomania,” 
which, at a time when female sexual desire was sometimes understood by physicians 
as abnormal, “amount[ed] to an actual insanity,” to use the words of Dr. Morrill (120).  
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For Morrill, and those who would subscribe to similar philosophies, who associated 
electricity with sexual vitality while at the same time denying that the healthy female 
body would desire sexual gratification, it was understood that the application of 
electrical current would restore the uterus, or what Morrill called “the grand nucleus of 
womanhood” (128),  to normal function. 
 Whatever Monroe may have thought about Dr. Morrill’s more preposterous 
notions of the female body, she may have nonetheless found the idea of a non-surgical 
cure for her endometriosis and infertility appealing if such techniques had any proven 
medicinal effect.  When Monroe was scheduled for an appendectomy in April 1952, 
she revealed her intense fear of hysterectomy, a surgery that may have been likely 
scheduled by nineteenth century surgical advocates such as Dr. Johnson—or, indeed, 
most twentieth century physicians—in a case as severe as Monroe’s.  Writing a note 
that she taped to her abdomen before the surgery, Monroe wrote the following to her 
surgeon, Dr. Rabwin: 
 
  Cut as little as possible…The fact that I’m a woman is important and 
  means  much to me.  Save please what you can—I’m in your hands.  
  You have children and you must know what it means…For Gods [sic] 
  sake Dear Doctor No ovaries removed—please do what you can to  
  prevent large scars.  (Spoto 218-9)        
 
Despite her lifelong gynecological ailments, Monroe wanted desperately to have 
children, and she was afraid that the doctors might accidentally—if not purposely—
240 
 
remove her “womanhood.”  Given her fear of surgery, Monroe may well have opted 
for a less invasive electrical therapy, had it been possible.  But she lived in a time 
when electrical current was not applied to the uterus to cure “hysteria” or any other 
diseases associated rightly or wrongly with uterine dysfunction; rather, she lived in a 
time when electric shock was applied to the head in cases of suspected mental illness.  
Interestingly enough, the application of electricity for a supposedly medicinal purpose 
had not fallen completely out of favor by the 1950s—the main difference was the 
bodily location to which electrical current was generally applied. 
 Over a century before Monroe’s entrance to the American public eye, Margaret 
Fuller suggested that men would fear the “electricity” of a woman, observing that 
those “women of genius…who seem overladen with electricity, frighten those around 
them” (67).  Fuller would extol the virtues of women throughout history and 
mythology who, overflowing with electricity, would likewise be “over-flowed with 
thought.”  The “sickness” that would be the byproduct of such an “over-charged 
existence” would for Fuller be more than compensated by the intellectual and artistic 
vigor that would be found in such women, for whom the “electric fluid” could 
“invigorate and embellish, not destroy life” (67).  Notably, Fuller offers an example of 
the kind of woman who might fit such a bill, observing that “such women are the great 
actresses, the songsters” (67).   Had Marilyn Monroe been a stage actor in the early 
part of the nineteenth century, it might be understood by Fuller and others like her that 
Monroe possessed an abundance of electrical conductivity that was particular to 
women.  
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 However, by the mid-1950s, “electricity” was not as associated with feminine 
intellectual vigor as it was with desirable affect, physical attractiveness, or sex appeal.  
Just as many fads that would embrace the pseudosciences of animal magnetism or 
medical electricity waned over time, so too did Fuller’s belief that an “overcharged” 
existence would be an unhealthy attribute.  While associations of “electricity” with 
vitality and life-giving force continued to resonate with the general public in the 
twentieth century, the idea that being “overcharged” was dangerous diminished in its 
influence.  In an “electric age,” where the introduction of electricity and its 
accoutrements to homes represented a modern marvel, more “electricity” seemed 
better.  To be supercharged with electricity—or, to put it another way, 
superconductive of electricity—would, at least in a metaphorical sense, become a 
desirable attribute.  Moreover, the pseudoscience that would correlate the presence of 
corporeal electricity with sexual health had by the mid-twentieth century in large part 
given way to the continuation of a cliché traceable to the mid eighteenth century, 
whereby “electricity” was associated with a certain “sexual libertinism.”  Elvis and 
Marilyn, both of whom would represent in their persons some sexual liberation from 
the trappings and residue of a supposedly sexually repressed Victorian era could, when 
packaged and sold as “bodies electric,” likewise stand for exactly such “sexual 
libertinism.”         
 When understood in terms of historical context, the ironies and contradictions 
of Marilyn Monroe’s supposed bodily “electricity” are profound.  As electronic 
images of her body danced and glided across American movie screens during the 
1950s, projecting her vibrant and “electric” sexuality and vitality, she suffered 
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intensely from the severe pelvic pain brought on by her endometriosis, a condition that 
not only left her infertile, but also made sexual intercourse a painful experience.  
While in the previous century she might have been treated for her condition by the 
application of electrical current to her uterus, supplementing her supposed lack of 
corporeal electricity, in the mid-twentieth century the only viable option for treatment 
was surgery, which could potentially excise from her body everything that to her 
understanding made her truly a woman, her “life-giving force.”  As Monroe grieved 
her continued infertility, a state of health that in bygone decades would have 
previously been understood as a lack of electricity or “vital fire,” filmic simulations of 
her body were adored by fans who would appreciate her sex appeal in terms of its 
supposed “electricity.”  The chasm between the virtual, simulated, “electric” body of 
Marilyn Monroe, a fantasy projected on screen, and the real, suffering, human body of 
the former Norma Jeane Baker—which, like any other human body, produced its own 
very real electricity—was a wide one.    
 Yet during her lifetime, references to her bodily “electricity,” read as a catch-
all term to capture an ineffable quality of attractiveness and appeal, abounded.  
Monroe biographer J. Randy Taraborelli gives a perfect example of this when he 
relates an anecdote regarding a 1948 encounter between Monroe and Twentieth 
Century Fox president Joe Schenck.  After being introduced briefly to Schenck in 
February of that year, she was invited at an after hours party at Schenck’s house, 
attended by would-be Hollywood debutantes willing to offer sexual favors in order to 
gain notice in the industry.  According to this account, the party ended with her having 
sex with him against her better judgment, because she believed it would launch her 
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film career—a belief that, while cynical, was somewhat true: Schenck would 
eventually persuade Harry Cohn to look at her screen tests, a move that eventually 
landed her a contract at Columbia Pictures.  Of this encounter, she is reported to have 
said that it was “like giving up her soul.”  Schenck, on the other hand, is reported to 
have said that the aspiring actress “ha[d] an electric quality…she sparkles and bubbles 
like a fountain.”  Later, after Monroe had already achieved notice and success in the 
film industry, June Haver, Monroe’s fellow actress in the 1951 film Love Nest, spoke 
of her in terms uncannily resembling the words of Schenck, noting upon watching her 
perform a scene or interacting with others that she had an “electric something” (qtd. in 
Rollyson 42).  For Haver and others, not only was her “electricity” something that 
could purportedly attract or mesmerize anyone who met her in person, but it was 
something that could somehow be transmitted even through the medium of film, via 
her image, her virtual body.  Promoters capitalized on this perception by aligning her 
body with “electrification.” We may find evidence of this, for example, in promotions 
for the 1953 film Niagara, whose trailer contained the slogan, “Niagara and Marilyn 
Monroe: The two most electrifying sights in the world!” (Boyer 139).  Not only were 
the two spectacles sublime, but in their sublimity, they could also electrify.  Given the 
fact that Niagara Falls had actually been used as a source for hydroelectric power 
since the late 19th century, the analogy may be understood as more than merely 
metaphorical.     
 Such references to Monroe’s “electric” qualities, both in person and on film, 
would continue well after her death in 1962.  Monroe scholar and biographer, Lois 
Banner, explains this, for example, when relating her experience as a high school 
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student who had the rare opportunity to snap photographs of the movie star at a benefit 
event: “I found something magical about her as she strutted in front of my camera.  
She generated an electrical charge with each click of the shutter.”  Literary critic 
Diana Trilling, identified by Monroe scholar Carl Rollyson as the “first woman to 
recognize in print that Marilyn Monroe stood for a feminine vitality that was highly 
unusual,” similarly offers a depiction of the electrical effect that Monroe could 
generate or radiate, something like “a glow beyond the ordinarily human,” when she 
says that “…no picture could quite catch her electric quality; in posed pictures the 
redundancy of flesh was what first imposed itself, dimming one’s perception of its 
peculiar aliveness, of the translucence that infused the body with spirit” (qtd. in 
Rollyson 61).  From depictions such as those of Banner or Trilling, we are to 
understand that Marilyn Monroe “generated” or “radiated” so much “electricity,” so 
much of a “glow” of “aliveness” from her body, that the photographer behind the lens 
could only hope to capture a small glimpse of it, if at all.   
 Were Banner and Trilling identifying and observing a very real phenomenon, 
an aura of electromagnetic energy so powerful that it actually appeared to generate 
some visibly perceptible light or heat?  Or are they so smitten by her that they get 
carried away by their own metaphors, blithely losing track of any difference between 
what is real and what is imaginary?  Are they witnessing a spectacle that we could 
scientifically measure and observe, or have they already been so sold into believing in 
the marketing of her body as somehow “electric”—or, moreover, the marketing and 
popularization of “electricity” as a positive bodily attribute—that this is the highest 
compliment they can think to convey?  Given the blurring of such lines by writers 
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such as Whitman—and, moreover, those who would market and sell his work—it is 
possible that their thinking is informed by antebellum and late nineteenth century 
American discourse, whether they know it or not.           
 We may hear further twentieth century echoes of Emerson, Fuller, Melville, 
Whitman, and other antebellum American writers who employed tropes of corporeal 
electromagnetism, when we consider the following anecdote from an interview carried 
out with her close friend, the novelist Saul Bellow: 
 
  She was like somebody who picked up a high voltage wire and then 
  couldn’t get rid of it.  She was connected with a very powerful current 
  but she couldn’t disconnect herself from it.  You often felt she was  
  supercharged.  (qtd. in Grobel 14) 
 
Interestingly enough, Bellow does not associate Monroe’s “supercharged” state with 
her sex appeal.   In fact, when asked directly about her sexual attractiveness, he replied 
that he “felt no sexual attraction” for her, even though he found her “too beautiful to 
be real,” with a “curious incandescence under the skin” (14).  For Bellow, Monroe is 
so beautiful that she seems—if not superhuman—not human at all, not somehow 
“real.”  But if she is not a “real” human being, then what might she be?  An 
automaton?  A cyborg?  An ethereal unearthly fantasy?  Had Bellow been so charmed 
by her presence or mesmerized by the ubiquitous electric moving images of her that he 
could truly not recognize his friend as a living human being in the flesh? Or was he 
simply taking poetic liberties and merely exercising hyperbole and figurative 
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language?  The difficulty one may encounter in answering such questions with 
absolute assuredness offers insight into exactly how slippery the concept of 
“electricity” had become by the twentieth century. 
 Given that Bellow’s acquaintance with Monroe stemmed from her avid pursuit 
of knowledge, and, in particular, literary knowledge, a pursuit that culminated in her 
marriage to the novelist Arthur Miller, she may in this light have much in common 
with the model of the “over-charged” woman depicted by Margaret Fuller in Woman 
in the Nineteenth Century.  Not only was she attractive, but she also possessed intense 
ambition to be well-read, to attain wisdom, to be an intellectual in the literary sense, 
all attributes well-documented in recent biographies such as that of novelist and short-
story writer Joyce Carol Oates.  Might Fuller have likened Monroe to Justinus 
Kerner’s “Seeress of Prevorst,” who was in her words “roused to ecstacy or phrenzy 
by the touch of the laurel” (69)?  Monroe’s supercharged state was not only a 
metaphor for her intense power to attract due to her physical appearance, but it was 
also indicative of her naturally conductive powers, as she possessed a superconductive 
or “superexcitive” quality that was beyond her control.  It is as if she were compelled, 
like Percy Bysshe Shelley’s “Sensitive Plant,” to draw to herself everything beautiful 
in her atmosphere and environment.   But whereas Shelley’s “plant” would draw to 
itself all that was beautiful and radiant without being itself beautiful or giving off 
radiance, Monroe’s supercharged or superconductive body would be for Bellow 
precisely what would make her inexplicably attractive, and even radiant, in a way that 
surpassed mere physical beauty or sexual attraction.   
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 But this “supercharged” state of being was for Bellow not only a source of 
Monroe’s strength; it could also be a cause of weakness.  As was the case for Fuller’s 
“over-charged” woman, her condition could not only be a marker of health, but could 
also be an origin of sickness.  Bellow explores how Monroe’s “supercharged” 
condition could be damaging to her health when he speaks in similar terms in a 
different interview, this time replacing the imagery of the “high-voltage wire,” with 
the phrase “high tension cable”: 
 
  I always felt she had picked up some high-tension cable and couldn’t 
  release it…She couldn’t rest, she found no repose in anything.  She was 
  up in the night, taking pills and talking about her costumes, her next 
  picture, contracts and money.  In the case of a beautiful and sensitive 
  creature like that, it was a guarantee of destruction.  (qtd. in Clemons 
  and Kroll 130-1) 
 
Bellow’s description is telling in that it reveals similarities between Marilyn Monroe 
and Elvis Presley that go beyond their massive stardom and untimely deaths.  It shows 
that she was not only perceived as “electric” by close friends and the public alike, but 
also that her performance of “electricity,” of being “electrifying,” led ultimately to her 
self-destruction, in the form of sleep deprivation and drug abuse—both issues, 
incidentally, that plagued Elvis throughout his career.   
 While Bellow would infer that Marilyn Monroe’s “sensitivity”— her natural 
and inherent conductivity—was responsible for her attraction to unhealthy and self-
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destructive behavior, it may instead be that her own self-conscious desire to be 
“electric” in the public eye was in part responsible for her restless and reckless actions.  
Such desire would not be surprising in a culture that would place inherent value on 
bodily “electricity,” in which she would feel compelled to maintain this artifice, if, in 
fact, she realized that it was an artifice at all.  In embodying “electric” qualities on 
screen, “Marilyn”—or more precisely, the electronic image of her body—had become 
a commodity that was voraciously bought, sold, and packaged.  But in the age of 
modern media, when distinctions between image and imaged became increasingly 
blurred, that which was imaged or commodified might be understood as possessing 
precisely the same qualities or characteristics imagined or embedded in the image or 
commodity.   
 According to such logic, a supposedly “electrical” body on screen should thus 
reflect an actual “electrical” body in person, and vice versa.  Forgetting that the 
“electrical” qualities of the onscreen image were themselves imaginary might then 
create an irreconcilable situation, whereby the person in possession of the imaged 
body might imagine—or be imagined—as possessing the same imaginary traits.  In 
this way, the image of the “electric” body, which for Whitman seemed to mean in its 
fluidity a certain freedom from the limits of subjectivity as well as a pathway toward 
unraveling the arguments of chattel slavery, could become transformed in the 
twentieth century into a force that could enslave.  Truly to believe that one is 
“superconductive,” and thus compelled toward destructive behaviors as a result, 
suggests a lack of agency and free will, and a predisposition toward certain inevitable 
and even self-destructive ends.  Moreover, if a celebrity such as Monroe believes in 
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her own “superconductivity,” and also believes that in order to replicate the “electric” 
qualities desired on screen her body must somehow be marked as “electric” or 
susceptible to being overcharged (and therefore naturally subjected to an involuntary 
conductivity of forces that prevent her from choosing to let go of “the high-tension 
wire,” to borrow Bellow’s phrase), then her self-destruction seems further inevitable, 
as a sort of self-fulfilling prophecy.  She is doomed to die an early death, because of a 
predisposition to fly, like Icarus, too close to the sun.  Such a proposition seems 
patently false.  But the propagation of the “body electric” trope through the media 
could also, in inspiring others to believe such false propositions, further propagate the 
notion that imaginary bodily “electricity”—becoming like the “electric” body on the 
screen, or transmitting “electricity” like the onscreen image—is something achievable 
or desirable in fact. 
 Writing on one of the effects of what he called the “electric age,” Marshall 
McLuhan wrote that “in the new electric Age of Information and programmed 
production, commodities themselves assume more and more the character of 
information” (171).  Given that in this same “electric age” bodies—or more precisely, 
images of bodies—became increasingly commodified, we might likewise ponder how 
these same bodies or images of bodies have come to “assume” the “character of 
information.”  While Whitman, Hawthorne or other nineteenth century thinkers could 
only dream of how individual bodies could become information circulating fluidly, 
like electricity, in the public sphere, for those of us today, such a phenomenon has 
become more of a reality.  Elvis Presley and Marilyn Monroe are valued not only 
because their personal “electricity” could be witnessed and felt by their audiences (an 
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idea which, as we have seen, evokes eighteenth and nineteenth century discourse on 
the body), but they are valued because their personal “electricity” was of such 
magnitude that their bodies have been chosen to be translated into forever circulating 
electric images.  Their bodies become virtual bodies, bits of digital information 
continuously flowing in the virtual plane of existence known as “cyberspace.”  It is not 
enough that Monroe’s supposed “electricity” so great that she received a motion 
picture contract to have her body photographed, filmed, and rendered for public 
viewing in her own lifetime.  Now, at the mercy of digital technologies, images and 
interpretations of those images can be circulated, recirculated, and made immortal in a 
never-ending, infinite cycle, so that they might be replayed to simulate their “electric” 
effects again and again, long after her death, and long after the original photographs 
and films have decayed and deteriorated.  Thus we are left not only with Andy 
Warhol’s multicolored interpretations of the image of Marilyn Monroe’s face, but with 
endless productions and reproductions of Andy Warhol’s images of Marilyn Monroe, 
each of which might conceivably multiply the potential “electric” effects of the 
original.  The body may then transform into circulating “information” which can then 
be further commodified, marketed and sold by those who might profit from such 
reproductions.  This development represents a new stage in the history of 
reproductions of works of art, a stage that Walt Whitman, or, later, Walter Benjamin, 
would never live to see.  While Walt Whitman lauded a shell-less existence, an 
electric existence free of the limitations of physical, mortal bodies, he could not begin 
to envision fully how twentieth-century technologies of reproduction would, in the 
words of Benjamin, “pry an object from its shell,” and, by so doing, “destroy its aura” 
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(223).    By the same token, Benjamin could have never fully dreamed of how twenty-
first-century digital technologies of reproductions would make “destruction of aura” 
so easy and efficient, just as these high-definition reproductions become so life-like 
that it becomes increasingly difficult to distinguish the difference between the original 
and the copy.    
 In this sense, the technological innovations of the “electric age” or the “Age of 
Information” have allowed for a certain immortality—or, at the very least, virtual 
immortality—that in some ways exceeds what was imagined in the nineteenth century, 
while in other ways resembling what was imagined at that time.  While Walt Whitman 
could only imagine through the trope of “electricity” how the body could flow 
between different subjectivities in ways that would erase the limitations of mortal 
experience, our current moment finds us discovering and witnessing how such 
imagination can actually find fruition in more concrete and realistic ways.  In an 
“electric age,” the ultimate tribute to one’s bodily “electricity” would be having one’s 
image electronically transmitted, so that the “electricity” of that body could be played 
and replayed, publicized and shared for its “electric” effects, so that that body, or at 
the very least, its image, could achieve a kind of immortality.  In our new “electric 
age,” the private, individual body of a celebrity can no longer be merely conductive 
and transmissive of “electricity” during his or her lifetime; rather, that celebrity’s 
virtual body must also become publicized as a contribution to—and part of— a greater 
public “electricity,” or, as Hawthorne might put it, an “all-pervading intelligence.”  In 
the nineteenth century, such immortality could only be approximated by the massive 
circulation of one’s written or telegraphically transmitted words, the “electricity” of 
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one’s experience translated into prose or verse that could recreate or simulate its 
power for readers, even well after the death of the composer of the words.  To put this 
another way, if Whitman’s publishers could convince a quorum of potential readers 
that he was indeed “electric” and his words had an “electric” effect, then his verse 
could continue to “electrify” for generations to come.  But in an age of digital 
streaming media, holographic images, and virtual reality, such recreations or 
simulations of “electric” experience become increasingly convincing in their reality, as 
they became no longer nearly as two-dimensional and objective, but rather 
increasingly multi-dimensional and subjective.  The “electric” and “automatic” writer, 
composer, or performer can then automate—and animate— future “electric” writings, 
compositions, or performances.    
 Commenting on the aforementioned passage from Hawthorne’s The House of 
Seven Gables, Marshall McLuhan wrote the following:  
 
  When people are on the telephone or on the air, they have no physical 
  bodies  but are translated into abstract images.  Their old physical  
  beings are entirely irrelevant to the new situations.  The discarnate user 
  of electric media bypasses all former spatial restrictions and is present 
  in many places as a disembodied intelligence.  This puts him one step 
  above angels, who can only be in one place at one time.  (370) 
        
We may see how this phenomenon plays itself out in the examples of Marilyn Monroe 
and Elvis Presley.  In our new “electric age,” the image of the “electric” body and the 
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consumer of that image meet in a virtual space that in many ways resembles a 
“disembodied intelligence.”  When we watch a Youtube video of the Aloha from 
Hawaii concert, we might simulate the experience of being a live spectator of the 
original concert, or a live spectator of the satellite broadcast somewhere on the globe.  
Translated into an endlessly replayed electronic image, Elvis is rendered superhuman 
and even god-like, able to transcend limitations of time and space in a constantly 
replaying loop of “electricity.”  Through this process we too become superhuman in a 
sense, able to travel backwards in time and experience the “electricity” that Elvis 
would generate and radiate, as if we were there inhabiting that moment in time.  In this 
way, as both Elvis and his spectators simulate the superhuman, they may also become 
both sacred and sublime, as they surpass even “angels” in their physical abilities and 
capacity to inspire awe.  But again, we must remind ourselves that such fanciful 
thinking is only the product of a simulation.  It is not that users of the new digital 
media actually “have no physical bodies” but that it is as if they “have no physical 
bodies.”  It is not that their bodies “are entirely irrelevant,” but it is as if they “are 
entirely irrelevant.”  To take this a step further, it is not that their bodies become 
“electric,” but is as if their bodies become “electric.”    
 As we should have already seen thus far, the ongoing human quest for bodiless 
embodiment, inspired by the science of electricity that emerged in the mid-eighteenth 
century, was not a quest only endemic to the “electric age,” read by McLuhan as 
chiefly the twentieth century era in which electricity and electronic media were first 
introduced to homes and businesses.  Rather it was a quest also endemic to the 
supposed “pre-electric age,” one most certainly imagined by nineteenth century 
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writers such as Emerson, Melville, and Whitman.  As McLuhan indicated in a 1977 
interview, “when you look in the rear view mirror, you do not see what has gone 
past…you see what is coming.”  This conceptualization of the “rear view mirror” aptly 
describes this phenomenon. 
 What Whitman and others in the nineteenth century may not have anticipated, 
however, might be some of the specific technologies through which disembodied 
embodiment could become somehow concretized.  Nor is it necessarily true that 
Whitman and others could have anticipated some of the effects of such technologies.  
Today, for example, we may experience, for example, the performance of the 
holographic image of the body of Elvis performing “If I Can Dream” from the 1968 
comeback special, performing a “virtual duet” with Celine Dion (born, incidentally, in 
1968) singing alongside him, on the popular television program American Idol.  The 
“virtual duet” allows Elvis, almost like Frankenstein’s monster, to “come back to life,” 
at least in the virtual sense.  The performance can be reproduced endlessly, through 
countless repetitions of Youtube viewings, in which Elvis can return to life again and 
again, at the will of the user clicking a mouse.  The two performers can continue to 
share their “electricity” with the globe, even long after Celine joins him in the ranks of 
posthumously honored celebrities.   
 Within the confines of virtual space, the virtual body of Elvis can continue to 
“electrify” as it is captured and witnessed in its physical prime, freed from the physical 
limitations that would cause his body to become ravaged by drug abuse and attendant 
health problems.  Yet this image of the body is simultaneously enslaved to a market 
and a public hungry for new sources of “electrification,” as it is processed and 
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manipulated, marketed and sold, without the wish or blessings of the performer 
himself.  In this process, the actual human sufferings of that body can be forgotten or 
rendered irrelevant by a generation not even born by 1968, the time of the original 
performance, or by 1977, the time of the singer’s untimely death on the bathroom 
floor of his home at Graceland.  Moreover, the original performance can be taken out 
of its historical and cultural context, namely as a response to the assassination of 
Martin Luther King, heavily nodding to the African-American gospel genre, pleading 
for racial equality and understanding in a time of significant violence and unrest 
around the civil rights movement. Instead, the performance can be transplanted into a 
different time and place, to an age that at least some Americans of a newer generation 
might refer to as somehow “post-racial,” where King’s vision and “dream” had been 
already somehow achieved.  In this way, the electronically projected image of the 
body of Elvis would effectively sanitize or elide some of the more supposedly 
ungainly aspects of Elvis’ body, as well as those of his cultural and historical moment, 
if not also those of our own.             
 The same may be said of images of Marilyn Monroe.  Communications scholar 
Lynn Spigel captures this phenomenon perfectly when, specifically referring to 
futuristic technological manipulations of images of Monroe, she writes that “in 
contemporary culture, the dream of social interconnection through antiseptic electrical 
space is still a potent fantasy” (53).  Spigel focuses on a 1989 article in Life magazine 
entitled “The Future and You,” in which it was imagined that a holographic image of 
Marilyn Monroe could emerge from the television screen into a living space occupied 
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by an enthralled male viewer, who was for his part equipped with a La-Z-Boy recliner 
and a remote control.  Musing on this futuristic fantasy, Spigel writes that  
 
  …this form of home entertainment was just the latest version of the 
  older wish to control and purify public space.  Sexual desire,  
  transported to the home from the Hollywood cinema, was made  
  possible by transfiguring the celluloid image into an electrical space 
  where aggressive and sadistic forms of cinematic pleasure were now 
  sanitized and made into “passive” home entertainment. (53) 
 
For Spigel, the electrification of images of Marilyn Monroe’s body and the entrance of 
such images into the context of the comfortable, tame suburban home through the 
means of modern or futuristic technology would “sanitize” what would otherwise be a 
sadistic and even pornographic form of objectification of the body under the influence 
of an “aggressive” male (read heterosexual) gaze.  That may be so, but such a reading 
also misses a larger point, that being that such electrified images of Monroe’s body 
would also “sanitize” the body itself, restoring to virtual health, vitality and beauty a 
long-dead body that had succumbed to very real suffering in the form of 
endometriosis, depression, and barbiturate addiction, among other maladies.  Through 
the futuristic technology of the “electric age,” the very real body of the former Norma 
Jeane Baker is rendered irrelevant—with any perceived imperfections smoothed over, 
airbrushed, or photoshopped away—while the virtual body of Marilyn Monroe could 
be subjected to the performance of virtual sexual favors at the whim and discretion of 
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the user possessing the remote control.  While the real Marilyn Monroe may have 
never consented to such activity, the virtual Marilyn Monroe can be forced to do so, 
and can continue to do so, and, moreover, the actions between the virtual Monroe and 
her user, or users worldwide, could be continually replayed and re-enacted ad 
infinitum.  While it was Marilyn Monroe’s supposed bodily “electricity” that brought 
her body to be filmed and recorded in the first place—and, moreover, which brought 
her body and no other to be the subject of this particular fantasy—the electronic 
images of her body would be manipulated, marketed, sold, and used without 
necessarily any regard for her actual body.  In short, she may become the object of 
virtual rape.  In this way, the virtual electrification of the body into an incorporeal 
form lacking definite or static subjectivity may engender consequences contrary to the 
liberation or celebration of the body foreseen by Whitman in “I Sing the Body 
Electric.” 
 Of course, many of the arguments presented thus far have relied on the notion 
that there is indeed a difference between imaginary corporeal electromagnetism and 
actual corporeal electromagnetism.  The former has been used so frequently and so 
variously over the centuries as a metaphor that the many attributes that would be 
associated with it—vitality, vigor, health, wisdom, fluidity, fertility, power, danger, 
excitement, newness, freshness, attractiveness, etc.—are too numerous and exhausting 
to list in full.  The latter, a trait we now know is common to all human beings, would 
have a completely contradictory effect, rendering the concept rather mundane and 
ordinary.  Given this apparent contradiction between imaginary corporeal 
electromagnetism and real corporeal electromagnetism, we might assume that no 
258 
 
overabundance of actual inherent corporeal electromagnetism or electromagnetic 
conductivity could actually improve anyone’s health or their ability to attract others, 
nor would it be indicative of any individual’s particular genius, despite the playful 
imaginings of Emerson and other thinkers of the nineteenth century who might lead 
their readers to think otherwise.  But could it be possibly true that some people are in 
fact more electromagnetically conductive than others, and if they are, could they be 
somehow more able than others to transfer and transmit their electromagnetic 
energies?  And if so, what would that mean?  Would they be more enlightened?  
Would they be more attractive?  More vigorous?  Is it possible, for example, that what 
Saul Bellow and others saw in Marilyn Monroe could in fact be something real, and 
not just a metaphor or a product of the imagination? 
 It is well established that while the human body is not a particularly good 
conductor as compared to other substances or materials, some human bodies are 
indeed more electromagnetically conductive than others.  Some have taken this fact to 
explain paranormal activity such as that of reported cases of human spontaneous 
combustion, or that of sufferers of Street Light Interference (SLI) syndrome, otherwise 
known as SLIders, who, because of their supposedly supercharged or superconductive 
bodies, can unconsciously wreak havoc on electrical devices in their immediate 
environment just because of the sheer electromagnetic energy generated or transmitted 
from their bodies.  It may be easy to dismiss such claims as the product of quackery, 
as twenty-first century reincarnations of nineteenth century electromagnetic 
pseudoscience, whose propagation is fueled by profiteers who would sell books, films, 
or products that would explore such theories and exploit those naïve enough to buy 
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into them.  That may very well be so.  However, some reputable scientific researchers 
today would stand by claims that would have been absurd to skeptics of nineteenth 
century pseudoscience.  For example, while electroshock therapy was largely 
abandoned as a therapeutic practice for mental health patients in the mid-twentieth 
century, it has now returned to favor among at least some mental health professionals, 
this time under the name “electroconvulsive therapy,” in treating forms of mental 
illness unresponsive to other forms of treatment.   While Dr. Johnson and other late 
nineteenth-century physicians may have scoffed at the potential benefits of electrical 
stimulation of the pelvic area in the treatment of conditions affecting the female sexual 
organs, recent scientific studies have proven the efficacy of such treatment in certain 
cases—for example, in cases of urinary incontinence in women.  And while debate 
continues among psychiatrists as to whether drugs commonly employed to treat 
depression or bipolar illness are necessarily particularly more effective than placebos, 
some recent studies have claimed that receiving magnetic resonance imaging (an 
“MRI”) could have a positive therapeutic impact on such patients, revealing some 
correlation between electromagnetic activity in the brain and possible mental 
dysfunction.  Some theorists have even contended that consciousness itself is an 
electromagnetic phenomenon.    
 Meanwhile, researchers in neurology have identified a specific neuron in the 
brain that has been dubbed the “Marilyn Monroe” neuron.  Working with patients 
suffering from severe forms of epilepsy who were candidates for neurosurgery, 
researchers from California attached electrodes to different neurons in the 
hippocampal region of their patients’ brains and projected on a screen images of 
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various celebrities from which they could choose.  The goal of this research was to see 
if these patients could use various parts of the brain to control the image that appeared 
on the screen.  Images of celebrities were paired, and depending on which neuron in 
the brain fired, patients could “choose” which image of the two appeared on screen, 
trying to force their brain to make one image dominate their thoughts.   If one neuron 
fired more than another, one picture would slowly fade to replace the other, until one 
picture completely dominated the field, and the other had completely disappeared.  
What was accidentally discovered over the course of this research was that patients 
tended to select the image of Marilyn Monroe over those of other celebrities.  Writing 
emphatically about this phenomenon, John K. Young exclaims that the researchers 
“found single nerve cells…that reacted to a picture of Marilyn Monroe!” Young goes 
on to write that “these same nerve cells reacted to Monroe’s voice or the mention of 
her name but did not react to the features of other people.”  Could it be that images of 
her body are so ubiquitous and so embedded in the public consciousness because of 
their incessant replication by modern media that the brains of these patients were 
destined to default to that choice as a result, as a dominant or over-riding thought?   Or 
is it that there is something particular to Marilyn’s face that gives it a particular power 
to affect the electricity of the brain?  In other words, is it that her electromagnetic 
energy was truly so powerful and had such an impact on the consciousness of those 
around her that the urge to photograph and record her body in the form of an image 
was simply irresistible?  Or is it that our brains have been so inundated my media 
depictions of the idea that her face and body somehow represent everything that is 
desirable and attractive—attributes metaphorically associated with electricity—that 
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gives her image such a power over our brains, and more specifically, the firing of 
neurons in our brains?  Would an image of a Marilyn lookalike have the same power 
to dominate our thoughts?  Or would our brains recognize that only an authentic image 
of Monroe should cause the firings of neurons to occur?  Such questions are difficult 
to answer without the benefit of further research and experimentation.         
 We might wonder what different results might be produced by experiments 
that would examine the brain’s neurological activities when presented with different 
voices of famous orators, or different passages composed by famous poets.  Could it 
be proven that orators, artists, or poets who are marketed and sold as somehow more 
“electric” than others, such as Walt Whitman, could in fact have more of an electric 
effect on our brains?  For example, would our neurons “choose” a passage from “I 
Sing the Body Electric” over a piece of randomly selected doggerel, composed by an 
anonymous kindergartener?  And if so, would this be because we have been so moved 
by the power of suggestion that the “Body Electric” is in fact somehow electric that it 
might produce an actual electrical neurological effect, as a kind of self-fulfilling 
prophecy?  Or would it be because the poet’s inherent “electricity”—his vitality, 
enlightenment, sexuality, or level of intellectual stimulation— somehow comes off the 
page of written words, transmitted and transferred to us, transcending chasms in time 
and space to effect changes in the electromagnetic impulses of our brains?  Could this 
“electrical” stimulation in turn stimulate us to effect changes—electrical changes— in 
others?     
 Speaking of the inspirations for her music, pop star Lana del Rey, 26 year old 
composer and performer of the 2012 song “Body Electric,” gave the answer that 
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should be obvious: Walt Whitman.  Of Whitman, and his twentieth century devotee, 
Allen Ginsberg, she said “[they] are like my first and last inspirations, the first people 
I saw that made their words really electric and come alive off the page, really visual 
writers.”  Her word choice is telling.  When she says that Whitman “mak[es] [his] 
words really electric,” is she speaking figuratively, are we to understand that she truly 
sees no difference between the literal and the figurative?  Does she truly think that 
Whitman’s words are, in fact, “electric,” i.e. infused with an electrical charge?  Or 
have the literal and figurative senses of the term become so blurred and clichéd by the 
twenty-first century that she cannot distinguish between the two?  Are they, in fact, 
distinguishable?  When the words “come alive off the page,” does this mean that they 
are otherwise dead language somehow brought to actual life, a veritable 
Frankenstein’s monster?  Or have they somehow metaphorically “come alive” in her, 
reanimated and reactivated through synthesis with her own experiences? 
 Leaning heavily on overt appropriation of Whitman’s work—and his supposed 
“electricity”—Lana del Rey stands near the end of a long line of those who would lean 
on common electrical tropes in order to package and sell a product for personal gain, 
those who, like the lightning-rod man of Melville’s short story, would “driv[e] a brave 
trade with the fears of man.”  Unfortunately for del Rey, not many consumers were 
willing to buy the product she was selling, as the song never charted in the US and 
topped the French charts at #103.  It did not help that the song came on the heels of a 
January live performance on Saturday Night Live, widely panned as one of the worst 
performances ever on the program.  Critical reception of Lana del Rey’s work in the 
song, as well as the album it came from, Paradise, was at best largely unsympathetic, 
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at worst, blistering and ruthless.  Allmusic.com’s John Bush singled out “Body 
Electric” in particular for the clichéd quality of its lyrics, writing that it exemplified 
her tendency to compose lyrics made up of “clichés and baby talk,” and observing that 
“her songwriting appears to be in stasis.”  Leonie Cooper of NME called the song a 
“heady concoction,” but added that the singer was “tottering around the edges of self-
parody on this latest offering of simmering Stepford symphonics,” which was 
“intoxicating,” but only in the sense of it being “like swigging a bottle of Chanel No. 
5.”  Noting that del Rey has developed a reputation for having “lyrics that tend to run 
on the sophomoric side of things,” Deathandtaxes.com’s Alex Moore wrote that her 
live performance of the song at the El Rey Theater in Los Angeles actually drew an 
“‘Oh Please,’ from a nearby audience member” after her lyrics made her “soun[d] like 
a literal sophomore just discovering Walt Whitman.”  It is as if del Rey chose 
“electricity” and Whitman’s “I Sing the Body Electric” as central themes of her song 
in order to engender and generate “electricity” in her crowd responses, but actual 
produced an opposite effect.  Rather than bringing audiences to marvel at her 
supposed “electricity,” she instead inspired a comparison between her own body and 
that of a “Stepford wife,” a beautiful but not quite human automaton, gears clicking 
away like an Animatronic figure, without necessarily dispelling anyone’s suspension 
of disbelief.  Whereas Marilyn Monroe would be praised for her incandescence and 
electricity for being somehow not quite fully “real,” Lana del Rey would be criticized 
for her blandness and mundanity, while also ironically characterized as somehow not 
quite fully real or human.  As she performed the song for the first time live in Los 
Angeles, colorful lights shimmered and flashed provocatively upon her body in 
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electrical bursts, as she stood almost motionless, moving almost nothing but her 
mouth, while images of an unidentified female figure flashed on the screen illuminated 
behind her.  Her performance—stiff, static, and dirge-like— was as near as could be to 
the antithesis of the animated, enthusiastic, arm-swinging, almost tearful performance 
of Elvis Presley in the finale to his 1968 comeback special. 
 But given the prevalence of the clichés of electricity over a time spanning over 
two and a half centuries, should we be surprised when a song that leans heavily on 
electrical metaphor is anything but clichéd?  Should we be surprised that Lana del Rey 
thinks that by invoking the word “electric” and the memory of Walt Whitman, she 
could somehow reanimate those clichés and collect all the accolades that would 
supposedly come with them?  Should we be surprised that when yet another new face 
emerges among the deluge of faces poured on the public each day through endless 
streams of digital media, that she becomes instantly forgettable, despite her attempts to 
“electrify” and be unforgettable?  How can she be “electrifying” as Elvis or Marilyn, 
performing for people with senses weary and exhausted from the over-stimulation of 
too much screen time?  Is it even possible?  Or is her genius in her self-awareness of 
all this, her artistic decision to perform in this static, clichéd, decidedly un-“electric” 
way anyway? 
 Del Rey’s lyrics do appear to be clichéd, that much is true: 
 
  Elvis is my daddy, Marilyn’s my mother,/Jesus is my bestest  
  friend./We don’t need nobody 'cause we got each other,/Or at least I 
  pretend. 
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Given our understanding of the vast and complex discursive arc that informed the way 
that “electricity” informed the 20th century construction of the images of Elvis and 
Marilyn (and Jesus, for that matter), we might well look in the rear view mirror.  If we 
do, we may see how Whitman’s “body electric” has become transformed, for better or 
worse, into Elvis and Marilyn in our current cultural moment, as inescapable clichés 
that might inform our very own existence, embedded in our very neurons.  Would we 
assume that becoming “electric” would be somehow better, more desirable, more 
exciting, more attractive than our own ordinary electric bodies?  Would we base our 
identities on false notions of embodiment, constructed and reconstructed through an 
endless stream of representations and images, calling to attention our own supposed 
lack of worth, our need for “electrification” through products that would be sold to us, 
the vibrators, bracelets, and modern-day lightning-rod umbrellas, that would make us 
somehow safer, better, or more fully human?  Would we pretend that in our avatars, in 
our virtual, electronic, digital bodies presented to the public, that we are somehow 
better than our bodies, by smoothing out all the lines and moles, eliding all the 
dysfunctions and arrythmias, and erasing and sanitizing all the physical and mental 
attributes that make us who we are?  In these and other ways, Elvis and Marilyn are 
the “daddies” and “mothers” of us all.                 
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APPENDIX 1  
 
Henry David Thoreau’s Journal Entry from June 27, 185213  
 
 June 27,1852.  P. M. TO Bear Hill, Lincoln.  The epilobium, spiked willow 
herb, shows its pale purple spikes (pinkish?). I will set it down to the 20th.  Epilobium 
angustifolium, one of the most conspicuous flowers at this season, on dry, open 
hillsides in the woods, sproutlands…I still perceive that ambrosial sweetness from the 
meadows in some places.  Give me the strong, rank scent of ferns in the spring for 
vigor, just blossoming late in the spring.  A healthy and refined nature would always 
derive pleasure from the landscape.  As long as the bodily vigor lasts, man 
sympathizes with Nature. 
 Looking from Bear Hill I am struck by the yellowish green of meadows, 
almost like an ingrained sunlight.  Perhaps they have that appearance, because the 
fields generally incline now to a reddish-brown green.  The freshness of the year in 
most fields is already past.  The tops of the early grass are white, killed by the worms. 
 It is somewhat hazy, yet I can just distinguish Monadnock.  It is a good way to 
describe the density of a haze to say how distant a mountain can be distinguished 
through it, or how near a hill is obscured by it. 
 Saw a very large white-ash tree, three and a half feet in diameter, . . . which 
was struck by lightning the 22d.  The lightning apparently struck the top of the tree 
and scorched the bark and leaves for ten or fifteen feet downward, then began to strip 
                                                 
13
 The text given here is taken from the edition as it was transcribed and published in Summer: From the 
Journal of Henry David Thoreau, edited by H. G. O. Blake.  
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off the bark and enter the wood, making a ragged, narrow furrow or crack, till 
reaching one of the upper limbs it apparently divided, descending on both sides and 
entering deeper and deeper into the wood.  At the first general branching it had got full 
possession of the tree in its centre, and tossed off the main limbs, butt foremost, 
making holes in the ground where they struck, and so it went down in the midst of the 
trunk to the earth, where it apparently exploded, rending the trunk into six segments, 
whose tops, ten or twenty feet long, were rayed out on every side at an angle of about 
30° from a perpendicular, leaving the ground bare directly under where the tree had 
stood, though they were still fastened to the earth by their roots.  The lightning 
appeared to have gone off through the roots, furrowing them as it had furrowed the 
branches, and through the earth, making a furrow like a plow, four or five rods in one 
direction, and in another passing through the cellar of the neighboring house, about 
thirty feet distant, scorching the tin milk-pans, and throwing dirt into the milk, and 
coming out the back side of the house in a furrow, splitting some planks there.  The 
main body of the tree was completely stripped of bark, which was cast in every 
direction, two hundred feet, and large pieces of the inside of the tree were hurled, with 
tremendous force, in various directions, — one into the side of a shed, smashing it, 
another burying itself in a woodpile.  The heart of the tree lay by itself.  Probably a 
piece as large as a man's leg could not have been sawed out of the trunk, which would 
not have had a crack in it, and much of it was very finely splintered.  The windows in 
the house were broken and the inhabitants knocked down by the concussion.  All this 
was accomplished in an instant by a kind of fire out of the heavens called lightning or 
a thunderbolt, accompanied by a crashing sound.  For what purpose?  The ancients 
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called it Jove's bolt, with which he punished the guilty, and we moderns understand it 
no better.  There was displayed a Titanic force, some of that force which made and can 
unmake the world.  The brute forces are not yet wholly tamed. Is this of the character 
of a wild beast? or is it guided by intelligence and mercy?  If we trust our natural 
impressions, it is a manifestation of brutish force, or vengeance more or less tempered 
with justice.  Yet it is our consciousness of sin probably which suggests the idea of 
vengeance, and to a righteous man it would be merely sublime without being awful. 
This is one of those cases in which a man hesitates to refer his safety to his prudence, 
as the putting up of a lightning-rod.  There is no lightning-rod by which the sinner can 
avert the avenging Nemesis.  Though I should put up a rod, if its utility were 
satisfactorily demonstrated to me, yet, so mixed are we, I should feel myself safe or in 
danger quite independently of the senseless rod.  There is a degree of faith and 
righteousness in putting up a rod as well as in trusting without one, though the latter, 
which is the rarer, I feel to be the more effectual rod of the two.  It only suggests that 
impunity in respect to all forms of death or disease, whether sickness or casualty, is 
only to be attained by moral integrity.  It is the faith with which we take medicine that 
cures us.  Otherwise we may be cured into greater disease.  In a violent tempest we 
both fear and trust.  We are ashamed of our fear, for we know that a righteous man 
would not suspect danger, nor incur any.  Wherever a man feels fear, there is an 
avenger.  The savage's and the civilized man's instincts are right.  Science affirms too 
much.  Science assumes to show why the lightning strikes a tree, but it does not show 
us the moral why any better than our instincts did.  It is full of presumption.  Why 
should trees be struck?  It is not enough to say, Because they are in the way.  Science 
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answers, “Non scio, I am ignorant.”  All the phenomena of Nature need to be seen 
from the point of view of wonder and awe, like lightning; and, on the other hand, the 
lightning itself needs to be regarded with serenity, as are the most innocent and 
familiar phenomena.  There runs through the righteous man's spinal column a rod with 
burnished points to heaven, which conducts safely away into the earth the flashing 
wrath of Nemesis so that it merely clarifies the air.  This moment the confidence of the 
righteous man erects a sure conductor within him; the next, perchance, a timid staple 
diverts the fluid to his vitals.  If a mortal be struck with a thunderbolt coelo sereno, it 
is naturally felt to be more awful and vengeful.  Men are probably nearer to the 
essential truth in their superstitions than in their science. Some places are thought to be 
particularly exposed to lightning, some oaks on hill tops, for instance. 
 I meet the partridge with her brood in the woods, a perfect little hen. She 
spreads her tail into a fan and beats the ground with her wings fearlessly, within a few 
feet of me, to attract my attention while her young disperse.  But they keep up a faint, 
wiry kind of peep which betrays them, while she mews and squeaks as if giving them 
directions. — Chestnut trees are budded. — I picked a handful or two of blueberries. 
These and huckleberries deserve to be celebrated, such simple, wholesome, universal 
fruits, food for the gods and for aboriginal men. They are so abundant that they 
concern our race much.  Tournefort called some of this genus at least, Vitis-Idoea, 
which apparently means the vine of Mount Ida.  I cannot imagine any country without 
this kind of berry.  Berry of berries, on which men live like birds, still covering our 
hills as when the red men lived here.  Are they not the principal wild fruit? 
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